FORT CAMPBELL, Ky. — In Fort Campbell, Soldiers from 1st Mobile Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), recently conducted a Combined Arms Live-Fire Exercise, utilizing the M7 rifle and M250 automatic rifle — marking a critical step in validating the Next Generation Squad Weapon platform.
Designed to replace the long-serving M4 and M249, NGSW brings new assurance to reshape small-unit tactics with enhanced range, improved lethality and advanced optics. The CALFEX set a high-tempo environment to assess the system’s performance under realistic conditions with combined arms elements, including dismounted infantry, aviation and indirect fire support.
“My first impression was how reliable the M7 was — we didn’t experience any malfunctions throughout the entire CALFEX,” said Staff Sgt. Caleb Harris, serving as a Platoon Sergeant from 2nd Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment.
“That level of performance gave us the confidence to push the weapon to its limits,” he added.
This reliability allowed teams to maintain tempo throughout training, adjusting fire and maneuver without the disruptions commonly associated with older platforms. Additionally, fire teams explored new bounding techniques and sectors of fire, ensuring the improved stopping power of the M7 and M250 was effectively applied in both offense and defense. These tactical evolutions highlight the importance of early and continuous integration of emerging capabilities into mission planning at the lowest echelons.
The enhanced range and improved ergonomics of the M7 allowed for greater flexibility in small-unit leadership and fire team control. “As team leader, I was able to direct my guys to engage targets at extended distances while taking a brief tactical pause myself — not off the line completely, but just enough to reposition and get more accurate shots from better cover,” said Spc. Brandon Horvath, 1st Battalion 506th Infantry Regiment.
He emphasized the rifle’s design contributed directly to improved combat flow, especially in high-pressure scenarios. “I really like the side-charging handle. Internally, with the buffer system, it’s a lot easier for me to charge the weapon from the side when repositioning — it just makes transitions smoother,” said Horvath.
The NGSW’s integration into team-level tactics reinforced the need for adaptable employment strategies, particularly in open terrain or against fortified positions by giving Soldiers the ability to shape the battlefield from a distance.
Spc. Tristan Mann, 2nd Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment, observed the practical benefits of increased range during tactical movements. “Being able to engage from farther out gave us more control over the fight. It changed how we moved, when we closed in, and how we set our fields of fire,” he said.
Cpt. Evan Myers from 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment, highlighted a new level of control and effectiveness with the M250 during the exercise. “The 250 has semi, which makes it easier to control a single shot or two rounds instead of doing 6-8 rounds,” he noted. “The suppressor reduces the muzzle flash, which is a huge advantage for maintaining concealment in low-light engagements.” His observations further emphasize how the system enhances both precision and survivability on the modern battlefield.
While the NGSW’s firepower and ergonomics were widely praised, Soldiers also noted the importance of evaluating how the system integrates with current loadouts and sustainment practices.
The M7’s slightly increased weight compared to the M4 — particularly when paired with the larger 6.8mm magazines. “It definitely feels a bit heavier on the kit, especially once you’re carrying a full combat load,” said Mann. “But the extra weight didn’t slow us down — if anything, it made every shot count more.”
Despite the strong initial impressions, leaders recognize time and sustained training are essential to fully validate the weapon system’s long-term value. “The more time we get to train with it, the more we will get to see how it really works,” said 1st Sgt. William Melko from 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment.
His comments reflect a balanced perspective shared by many senior leaders: while the NGSW shows great promise, true validation will only come with sustained exposure, data and experience across formations.
The integration of the NGSW into the CALFEX marked a significant milestone in the Army’s ongoing modernization efforts. Across planning, employment, execution, and sustainment, the M7 and M250 proved to be reliable, lethal and tactically transformative. Looking ahead, 1MBCT is preparing for its upcoming rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center, where the NGSW will be further implemented and evaluated in a simulated operational environment. This continued use will provide valuable forward feedback. Exercises like this ensure the system is not only technologically sound but also operationally effective under realistic combat conditions
By SGT Marisol Romo Franco
Imagine going into combat with less ammo on your person than your Great-Grandfather had in WW2?
Where do you come up with this crap the average basic load for infantryman in World War II was less than 100 rounds. For a Garand rifleman 8 x 10 rd clips plus one in the rifle.
m1 Garand basic load 8x 8rd clips = 88rds
m1 carbine.. no idea
M14 ?
M4 210rds (390 double)
M7 purportedly 7 x 20rd = 140rd
The bulk and weight of SR25 type mags isn’t great for carrying more if called for.
Why I usually carried five m4 mags for well supported gwot sof super swat raids.. IME a double basic load for M4 in contested urban or jungle was normative.. lots spent on denying or suppressing areas. Having less rocks to throw isn’t optimal.
This info on the new weapon system is contrary to what I have heard circulating. The information I have received is that the new system is heavy and unreliable and is therefore less than a hit with those who have to lug it all around. But, so much has been spent tooling up for this and now I’m afraid we are stuck with this tar baby.
I’m curious where you’re getting your information?
It’s a rumor circulating around the Infantry and Armor community right now. I’ve heard from leaders I trust that SMs from the 101st and 75th have both said they dislike the new rifle for being to heavy and unreliable.
In fact I’ve heard a story of 75th SMs getting broken off by carrying the new M7 during MOUT TNG.
Those rumors are also reasonable to believe, since they align with common sense.
Doubling the weight of a soldier’s weapon/ammo load, while halving his ammo count, is going to be a massive capability suck, even if they streamline enablers like optics and lasers as they have with the Fire Control.
I’ve long been skeptical on anyone who defends NGSW with statements to the effect of “past soldiers did the job with less ammo”.
Stowed kills are a thing, everyone knows it, including those who seek to minimize the effect of dropping a combat load from 210rds/7 mags to 120rds/6 mags.
We’re getting into dangerous territory for NGSW now that there will be evaluations and AARs of force on force training between legacy equipped units and NGSW units.
They will have a harder time sanitizing the results/commentary of both soldier touch points and continuing evals of the program.
You’re saying that the weapon isn’t reliable with that argument?
No, I’m not saying that the M7 isn’t reliable (I’m sure that it has an adequate stoppage rate) and I also believe it was the best option of the downselect. My comment was more in reference to the weight.
However, I do take issue with a core tenant of this program…that being the theory that the increased penetrative capability of the weapon/round and increased hit probability provided by the fire control adequately compensate for the gap created by an increased combat load (weapon/ammo) and a decreased ammo count.
While I have no doubt that the M7/GP round will turn “cover” into concealment in select cases, and that the FC will enable the average infantryman to get more effective hits on select targets, the issue is the scale. Those “select” cases likely represent the margins of combat shots, not the majority, especially with regard to modern peer level LSCO.
Further, many of the defenses or excuses of the ammo load gap referance vague generalizations about the experience of past infantrymen, with no context to the differences that exist in other factors like ISR/fires/resupply now vs the European campaign of WWII, for example.
It would be different if the Army had done significant experimentation prior to forming the program requirements that defacto shaped the design constraints of the weapons and ammunition.
In the 1960s your grandfathers made the opposite argument, that that little bullet wouldn’t do anything and that it would be deflected by foliage. Every single time there’s a weapon, there are complaints about it and every single time a new weapon is introduced, there are complaints about it.
The Army conducted an analysis and this show Att they said they needed. This is it, until a new weapon is selected.
In the 60’s people in gunfights afar wanted the AR15.. it was the ordnance board and non-operational desk bound clowns who were pushing the M14. I don’t know anyone’s grandfather who pushed the M14.
I don’t doubt that SIG made exactly what the Army asked for, this is a hit on the requirements people.
We have 20 years of combat experience, some really absurd levels of experience in SOCOM.. and specialized units with R&D charter. These tribes aren’t asking for or fielding M7’s.. for the obvious reasons.
The only argument I’ve heard against the gun on the SOF side is that it’s too heavy. That’s coming from the same community that insisted on a 7.62 variant of the SCAR and is now buying a 6.5 CM rifle.
Those things aren’t really comparable. The 7.62 SCARs and 6.5 rifles weren’t intended to replace M4’s or other intermediate carbines…the XM7 is, so critiques on its weight are entirely valid.
You can’t claim they aren’t comparable when a guy only carries one rifle into battle. Yes, they are replacing the M4, for that individual and so the critique of weight loses a lot of steam. Particularly once you start talking about who pays for what. An Army common rifle frees up money for other capabilities within MFP-11.
But this all leading to my “Inflection Point” speech.
A SOCOM shooter deploys with a full golf club bag, 5.56 & 7.62/6.5 clubs. Picking the right iron for the mission profile, and terrain. No real equivalency for a general-purpose issue.
IM-dated-E .. m4/416 with shorty (red dot) & long (1-6x) upper. SCAR-H / M110K1. There is a severe weight, bulk, and rd count penalty for going large and seldom worth it.
I have three thoughts on how weight & cubes matter to the rifleman.
-serious doubts on what contested logistics will look like, even down to the tactical level. vehicles and resupply will be multi-modal attack nodal targets by the enemy. High intensity conflict will now likely be more decentralized and what you carry may be what you have for much longer than planned.
– controlled accurate volume of fire while closing matters.. big sticks are less so
– if we think shoot move and communicate is important.. a big stick is less shootable, more problematic to move with and the weight exhaust the communication center above your shoulders.
You make an excellent point about contested logistics. We may well be heading back to the days of a one-way mission mindset where you are inserted for the duration and Resupply comes in bundles in the night.
The difference is that the argument from the 60’s was essentially an ad homenim attack on 5.56 M193…it had no basis in the terminal or exterior performance of the weapon and round. Additionally, those critiques didn’t stand the test of time… I’m not aware of masses of GI’s who were clamoring for M14’s instead of M16’s in 1973.
The argument against the XM7 in this case is the opposite, a fact/data based critique of the system weight, bulk, and effect on the individual soldier’s round count.
Well, it’s what you get. You either get this, or nothing. That’s how this works. You can either run around and complain that we should have done this or that, or…go through the stages of grief and learn to love the bomb.
I think that’s the point…if the choices are to issue the
XM7 as a general issue rifle or…not…the better option is “not”, given the issues associated with the system weight and ammo count.
Additionally, I don’t think that “burying complaints in the backyard” is the right way to handle this. The issue isn’t something vain like “why is it 13 shades of ano”…the issue is that it’s far heavier than the system it replaces, the ammo it uses is far heavier than the ammo it replaces, both are far bulkier, their competitive advantage is dubious, and this new system effectively cuts the infantryman’s ammo load in half…at a time when we’re supposedly pivoting back to peer war (which has revalidated the utility and superiority of high performance intermediate carbines over battle rifles as general issue arms).
I fervently believe that 6.8 common is a massive improvement over 7.62 NATO and that the M250 is likewise an improvement over the M249…it’s the rifle side of this equation that is most problematic. Given the fact that there are a number of superior alternatives, I also believe it’s important to raise issues that are necessary and give compliments when necessary. We can walk and chew gum at the same time.
And another thing, you aren’t getting something else. Woulda, shoulda, coulda is over. The Army made their choice and this is the direction that are going. I’ve come to accept it. It’s reality. Someone is always going to come along and claim that this caliber or that caliber would have been the perfect choice, but they are all compromises in one way or another.
The Army is going to pay for ammo. Another caliber requires a bill payer.
It a Sig product, so Joe rumors are surely going to be spread around the internet with very little actual proven facts and spread as gospel.
“Rumors” of the P320 started as rumors until more evidence and first hand experience came out. So much so that Sig had to write a letter defending their design.
prediction:
M7 will be the M-14 of the modern era, and have a short service life if troops actually go to high intensity conflict and can voice complaints not allowed in garrison. A backwards move for size & weight. Too heavy, too bulky, with limited volume of fire. A design built for a one-way square range or the unlikely long distances of some parts of the GWOT AO’s.
“M7 will be the M-14 of the modern era, and have a short service life if troops actually go to high intensity conflict and can voice complaints not allowed in garrison. A backwards move for size & weight. Too heavy, too bulky, with limited volume of fire. A design built for a one-way square range or the unlikely long distances of some parts of the GWOT AO’s.”
So the fact that the Army was supposed to be planning for a peer adversary when the requirements were generated, and the fact that body armor is becoming more prevalant on the battlefield for peer adversaries should not be just be overlooked? The Army has said one of the reasons for the caliber selected was to have better peformance than 5.56mm. And was already looking to address this with the interim combat service rifle in 2017. Thankfully, the Army was talked off the ledge from going with 7.62mm battle rifles in a squad.
https://soldiersystems.net/2023/05/01/sig-sauer-delivers-next-generation-squad-weapons-to-us-army-for-production-qualification-test/
If you think the XM7 is heavy, imagine a squad outfitted with 4, 7.62x51mm rifles using legacy ammo. All the complaints you are levelling at the XM7 would apply, plus soldier’s load would have increased even greater due to the heavier 7.62x51mm ammo.
You can claim it’s the requirements that are bad, but understand that there may have been worse outcomes than the XM7.
Rayray..
no idea why you are talking about imagining legacy rifles.. the pitfalls of weight, bulk and shoot-ability and mobility legacy or new. is the point.
I don’t consider armor piercing an issue. The 1sqft that a chest plate might cover when rarely square facing a shooter, doesn’t concern me.
How are legacy 5.45 & 5.56 doing in Ukraine against body armored opponents, just fine.
Out of all of the feedback I’ve heard from UKR, needing to defeat RUS body armor has never been one.
According to the cadaver studies, 6.8 takes limbs off.
Why is he bringing up an imaginary Interim Caliber Service Rifle? Because the G28 in currently service as the CSASS and the Army almost bought that gun for everyone in the Close Combat Force. 7.62 is dead, everyone wants to replace it. The only reason it is hanging around is that there’s a massive amount of it on the shelf and we have ranges for it.
Can someone smarter than me talk to the EM signature of the optic? I assume it has one with all of the tech built in. I’m also curious about the battery life. This program has seemed like a problem from its beginning. I’m still curious how easily and frequently its being employed because of SDZs.
Recently TWZ and Cappy Army on YouTube mentioned a report by a US Army CPT’s criticism of the XM7 confirming what many people suspected of it as well as some new details.
https://www.twz.com/land/army-captain-slams-new-xm7-rifle-as-unfit-sig-sauer-says-otherwise
I’ve read the actual paper. The young Captain is all over the place and gets a lot wrong. For instance, he doesn’t know the difference between telescoping case and caseless ammunition. His assumptions about acqusition and failure to discuss anything he was working on with the program office or the Army is screwed up like a football bat. It’s so messed up that I don’t feel like addressing everything he got wrong. I will say he did a nice job of summarizing modern rifle procurement.
He is unfortunately being used as a tool by the Marine Corps who is currently trying to get out of adopting NGSW. They dumped their SAWs in the rifle company to adopt the HK416, a foreign made rifle that when outfitted with enablers that is almost as heavy as the XM7 at a fraction of the capability. They doubled down on their decision to keep the M27 when NGSW began claiming they’d only adopt a bullpup design knowing full well that the Army wasn’t going to buy a bullpup. Unfortunately, for the author of that paper, he’ll be coming back to the Army after being egged on by his instructors and advisors at AWS.
Well, at least you didn’t go off on people like those guys over at GBRS about another Sig product.
USMC M27 is quite retarded. A back door way to get the vaunted HK416 (was issued one.. completely unimpressed).
USMC would have been better served by some form of PIP URGI, and maybe an A5 type buffer tube (use legacy rifle springs). This would have been much easier and cheaper to maintain.. most all the legacy parts would still work.
USMC in a PACOM light fight will be better served with the svelte M4/416. For the exact same reason M14’s were dumped in Vietnam for the m16.
The Army probably thinks that as the doctrinal heavy sustainment force.. and not having faced actual high intensity combat with logistics challenges for 70 years.. that the XM7 2×4 makes sense.