This post originated on Beach Bang Clear.
Risk, Maneuver and Positional Warfare
by Peter Nealan
“Shoot, Move, Communicate.” That’s been the mantra for the infantryman for years. So how come we do so little of the second one?
I’ve been in several firefights downrange. In every one, we held our position and shot back at an enemy that maneuvered freely around us. On the first day on the ground in Helmand, we were actually taking fire from three directions, and were effectively pinned for several hours. During a firefight in open country in Zaidon, Iraq, we were actually told by our commander to stay put, rather than try to close with the enemy.
Marines of 2ND Recon at night near Zaidon, Iraq – infantrymen today are as much beast of burden as they are grunt.
To read the rest, visit www.breachbangclear.com/site/10-blog/306-we-shoot-and-communicate-but-dont-move-so-much.
Tags: Breach Bang Clear
To fire and maneuver you have to be willing to incur casualties. Casualty aversity has gone from becoming a strategic weakness to becoming a tactical one.
The same aversion is driving the size and cost of our vehicles and personal equipment.
That’s exactly the problem. Chain of command, chicken-shit officers , and political correctness .
The problem is very much rank blind.
From my experiences in Iraq I can’t say that the refusing to move is the norm among Marine ground-warfare units. I say Ground-Warfare Units because I’m a cannoneer who did a provisional infantry role. We never just returned fire from a roadway and instead launched attacks into the roadside ambushes, rapidly pushed out perimeters during IED discoveries or detonations. From experience, I’ve only seen the Army units taking such a less aggressive stance. Could this be individual leadership failures? Or could it be the result of a different culture among the Marine Corps, the Warrior Culture?
LOL, yeah dude, it’s just the Army. Who wrote the article again?
Nice try, hardo.
The article itself is spot on, and seems to be the norm with all units I’ve worked with, including several coalition nations. I see the problems as
1- weight. We are just to heavy to maneuver well. Period, there is little that can be done to curb this except set a max body weight percentage for load carriage and stick to it. VERY difficult to do with modern “must have” kit.
2- training. We either train for cold war invasion- which is not what was faced in the last ten years, or we train for end of the world black hawk down stuff or “unwinnable” massive IED scenarios during pre-deployment. These were good to a point, but I had young soldiers that were more terrified AFTER mission specific training then before it- as all of our scenarios (including those at international centres) ended up being simply about minimizing casualties, and rarely did we continue an exercise after medevac was complete. It was as though medevac was the whole purpose of going to war.
3-mission. There has been so much confusion about the actual mission and intent ( both large scale and at sub unit level ) for so long that many are not willing to risk casualties for an unconfirmed purpose.
I should add one more-
4- disconnect. I have both heard a company commander yell “close with and destroy” as an actual command (even though the enemy TTP in that AO was to lure us into IED ambushes, luckily someone changed the plan before we rushed into an IED field)- and I have heard “now just hold on, just wait out” when the battle was in our favor. The problem is that too many fights are micro-managed from too far away over the radio. Often by men who don’t have a real understanding of the situation on the ground.
Weight (and wait)
Medevac orientation
Unclear mission
Micro-management
I think you just nailed the problems – what’s the solution?
Weight is a twofold problem. a) We need lighter gear, straight up.
b) We need to find a way to ALWAYS train the way we fight. There are very few courses or exercises where we actually carry ALL of the equipment we carry on operations. This leads to an unrealistic expectation of how we can perform at war.
MEDEVAC orientation- it IS ABSOLUTELY key to train for difficult MEDEVAC, however the scenario should not end after the casualties are gone- it must continue. One of the best scenarios I went through was before my second tour to Afghanistan. Someone that was on my first tour set it up- a very realistic village with plenty of actors etc. The mission was to conduct a presence patrol through the village and follow the ROEs. So we went through, and then at the end of the trace it ended. Many of my young soldiers were expecting to get a blast- they thought they had missed something, but no- the point was that sometimes NOTHING happens except developing a rapport with the locals. That was a good lesson for them.
Unclear mission- well, that’s a western culture issue I think. Any western army that I’ve worked with has always had the mindset “get the task complete no matter what”. This is important, however we are often roll with an unclear picture of the OVERALL plan for an AO or theatre. This is both a military mindset and obviously it’s political- if the politicians don’t set benchmarks for success, they no one can identify any failures- not a good way to win a war.
Micro-management, this is obviously difficult. Really the platoon needs more freedom to decide and act within it’s AO. Following the lack of cohesive strategy- often a platoon is at the mercy of someone far in the rear. I’ve actually heard a NATO general use the words “I don’t know what to do, just keep doing what you’re doing, it’s a hard fight” when I questioned him about the mission in our AO- this was a TWO STAR! Either lead, follow, or get out of the way!
IN THE END, THE KEY FOR OURSELVES AND FUTURE WARS AND WARRIORS, IS TO MAKE SURE WE ADAPT OUR DOCTRINE, AND TEACH NEW SOLDIERS THE REAL LESSONS THAT WE DIDN’T GET.
“b) We need to find a way to ALWAYS train the way we fight. There are very few courses or exercises where we actually carry ALL of the equipment we carry on operations. This leads to an unrealistic expectation of how we can perform at war.”
I think we could stand for some commonsense approach to the mission analysis. Do we really need front/back/side ESAPI? I fought up Hwy 1 in Iraq wearing nothing more than a front plate, against a more heavily-armed conventional force, and would do it all over. Why are we wearing so much PPE again? That was rhetorical, but until we change that mindset we are going to continue to be out-maneuvered by guys in pajamas and sandals. The next enemy will likely be more capable.
Well said.
I agree completely, well said.
Right on Canadian!
I mentioned this on the original post, but I’d add another:
5- Over-communication. Instead of a simple and brief “You, this is me. Contact, 400m. Small arms fire. Out…” contact report, there’s often this odd shift to over-reporting and communicating all sorts of irrelevant information back to the COC (granted, a lot of this is caused by a misunderstanding of ISAF SOPs that cause HHQs to micromanage in the first place). This tends to result in leaders spending too much time with their face in a map or GPS when they should be focusing on maneuvering, fighting the subordinate elements, and getting in THE ENEMY’S OODA loop. It’s been shown time again that small unit leaders who can do that typically prevail.
Unless we need support, reinforcement, have to deconflict battlespace geometry, or have a dire casualty situation (and even then often the safest thing to do is fight harder), there shouldn’t be a need to talk to the COC except to report that the bad guys are dead.
While there is a difference (slight) in our warrior culture that are mostly dictated by the stated MISSION of each branch—There were a couple of things that caught my attention in the article—“in the open” “pinned down” “fire from three sides” and “several hours”—I can almost promise you someone had “eyes on” from above and they were following and learning– or trying to– the logistics of the enemy for that area…
I think it comes down to simply listening to the guys on the ground. CoC/Leadership needs to trust their guys. If the PL thinks it would be adventitious to set up an LP/OP on xx hill, but in order to do so we need to drop the body armor, then LISTEN TO HIM. He’s the one running around everyday! Not saying body armor is the crutch here, there are a lot of things that hold us back i.e. retarded packing lists. Also, we rely tooooo much on ground and air transportation. Every goddamn S3 wants to do a fucking air assault. The boys have legs, sir. They can walk! Back to my first statement, listen to the guys on the ground.
ADVANTAGEOUS not ADVENTITIOUS.
Good discussion.
One point in the original article that I’d like to emphase: “Just practice the tactics. If you get a chance, try some team-on-team exercises, preferably with simunitions. You’ll work out tactical weaknesses pretty quick that way.”
The simulator(*) stuff – despite its limitations – really brings the point home. Both for the leaders as well as the individual grunts. You will experience what works, what fails, and what gets you destroyed. It’s highly motivating.
((*) By this I mean the lasers attached to blanc firing weapons and sensors on soldiers and vehicles, and the central computer system keeping track of all the stuff in the exercise. . My limited experience is with some simulator system by Saab a few years ago. I really wish we would have had this stuff when I did my basic training!)
Doesnt help why you only have enough men to manage 8 man patrols and when you get in a TIC its with a squad + EF
A unit that’s given a defensible piece of ground to take and hold will accept its casualties. Just visiting? Why bother.
Casualties that come in service to the fiction that you can wade into a civilian population with full freedom of movement and surgically eliminate the adversary using the larger population for cover as it goes about its business aren’t worth it. To leaders or to rank and file.
And how can you blame them when host nation populations in the places we’ve most recently fought in expect it, the leadership of those countries we deprecate ourselves as “guests” in expect it, and worst of all, the home front expects it.
Modern western armies can maneuver more efficiently and effectively than ever before. And we can do so with a greater economy of force than ever. But it’s still about breaking stuff, killing people, and scaring the living shit out of anyone (then building rapport, then gaining trust, then compelling action) who lives to tell.
As long as we fight in places where the host nation population even deliberates on the choice of aligning with a 50th-generation bad guy or a “visiting” Army that’s planning to be gone by 2014 or 2016 or 2018 or 2020 (as distinct from the COIN program we ran in Europe from ’45 onward), we will (rightly) weigh our risks.
“A unit that’s given a defensible piece of ground to take and hold will accept its casualties. Just visiting? Why bother.
Casualties that come in service to the fiction that you can wade into a civilian population with full freedom of movement and surgically eliminate the adversary using the larger population for cover as it goes about its business aren’t worth it. To leaders or to rank and file.”
I think we need to bother because if we don’t eliminate that bad guy who got off a free shot and caused friendly casualties today, we’ll be looking at facing them tomorrow, the day after that, and on, and on.