Right about the time USSOCOM stood up they came out with a list of SOF Truths which were there to remind everyone that SOF must remain a well trained and funded part of the force structure lest we become unable to deal with certain threats and challenges in the future. During the most recent conflict the list was amended to include a proviso that non-SOF support would be required for many operations. This is because it would be foolish to build a redundant non-specialized force structure such as strategic lift just to support their mission sets. It’s easier (and cheaper) to piggyback off of what is in already place for things like logistics, base level comms, and some intelligence information as well as the aforementioned transportation support. What’s more, those conventional force specialized capabilities are experts in what they do because its all that they do.
The funny thing is, once you read this list, you immediately realize that they apply to all defense capabilities. Look at how many times we have been caught with our pants down because our general purpose forces didn’t have a certain capability or even the most basic of training or equipment for a particular mission set. As we face the current drawdown and transition to what I refer to as “1975 Redux” I hope the leaders and planners in the Department of Defense take these truths to heart. Congress as well. They must continue to fund America’s forces so that we do not become a paper tiger.
Whilst I’ve always respected SOF for their capabilities, I’ve also always believed that there’s a need for conventional forces to support SOF missions, whether it’s security, transport, logistics or whatever else is needed. The British Army, for example, has SFSG (Special Forces Support Group) made up of Paras, Marines and RAF Regiment soldiers, but are now planning on opening up to anyone who can pass P Company or the Commando Course. Within any armed force there must be cooperation, be it inter-unit or inter-service.
British Armed Forces*
The SOF truths really apply to any low-density/high-demand part of the military structure. We’ve witnessed the dilution of the intelligence and SOF fields with relentless demand for “crap me some more force multipliers…..NOW” and while you can throw on shifts in the training pipeline, you cannot pressure marinate a baseline of experience that’s needed to be an effective asset.
So where do we get our current knowledge low-density trainers and pipleine instructors? From the force. Alas, the training infrastructure is generally a career minefield full of absurdities, drama, and micromanagement. Additionally, to volunteer for such duty is seen as “hiding out” by your peers. It’s definitely unappealing to the career professional.
At the end of this cycle, we will have to take some of the remaining capability off-line to serve as cadre for reconstitution if we wish to preserve the institutional knowledge and memory. And it’s going to have to be some of the superstars, not just the guy who wasn’t there to say no because he finally getting off the Cat IV dental list.
“Humans Are More Important Than Hardware”, “Quality Is Better Than Quantity”. So someone in the US Army finally figured out what the rest of the World’s SOF have kept as their little secret since before WWII !!
Finally? These are from 1989…