At the end of Part 2, I had taken command of F Company of the Training Group’s 1st Battalion at Camp Mackall, NC. For those that do not know, Mackall is a small installation, occupied by elements of the Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) about 30 miles west of Fort Bragg. It is home to several components of the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC). At the time, F Company ran 2 Phases of the SFQC. One (Phase II), focused on land navigation and small unit tactics and the other (Phase IV), conducted Unconventional Warfare training and the culminating Robin Sage Exercise. I was living the dream and enjoyed every day of that assignment. Of course, the Army’s personnel management system has the mission to make sure that nothing good ever lasts long.
It started indirectly. Although I had not known him before, I got along very well with the Battalion Commander (BC) who had hired me. As luck would have it, he came out on a Special Mission Unit (SMU) Command List shortly after I took command – and he was gone. It was a great opportunity for him – but turned out not so good for me. Another Lieutenant Colonel was activated off the Alternate Command List to take the Battalion. As it happens, he and I had been Majors together in 3rd Group (96-98), although I did not know him well. The mission at Mackall was clear for my cadre and me; however, as I wrote in an earlier article, there were many ill-conceived initiatives for the SFQC being considered at SWCS during this period. I quickly found out that my new BC and I were philosophically on opposite sides of these plans. That naturally led to friction between us. Moreover, as often happens in these situations, that friction eventually evolved into one of those annoying ethical dilemmas I have written about ad nauseam.
Long story short, in May of 2001, I was Relieved of Command by that BC, a.k.a. fired, sacked, dismissed. However, since that episode is convoluted and not germane to the subject at hand, I will save that part of the story for another time. Suffice to say, getting fired is considered a sub-optimum outcome to any assignment. That is also how I became personas non grata at the Training Group and, indeed, all of SWCS for the second time. I spent the next few months fighting the accusations made against me to justify my firing. I will mention just one here because it is the only accusation that was based on a kernel of truth. Allegedly, I had been “insubordinate” to the BC. For what it is worth, I have found that it is all but impossible to tell your boss something he really, really does not want to hear without him perceiving it as insubordination.
As a practical matter, there is an administrative process to appeal those sorts of negative personnel actions and I took immediate advantage of that mechanism. Bottom line, I made my case to the Army and achieved a partial vindication in a matter of 9 months or so. I received my promotion orders to Lieutenant Colonel in March 2002, backdated with an effective date of 1 January of that year. I purposely held my promotion ceremony in front of the Bull Simon statue across from the SWCS HQ. Then Brigadier General Stanley McChrystal did the honors. He was one of those SF qualified infantrymen I mentioned in Part 1. As he put the rank on my collar, he asked me, “Terry, is it true that you commanded three SF Companies?” I replied, “Yes Sir, twice successfully!” We all got a chuckle out of that.
That was not the end of the story; I also had to spend a considerable amount of money to hire lawyers who spent years getting the associated “bad paper” removed from my records. Oddly enough, that was not my biggest career management problem going forward. With my promotion orders came a letter from Department of the Army (DA). The letter stated that since I had more than 24 years of combined service I was ineligible to be considered for War College attendance. In effect, I was non-select for the school before I even pinned on that silver oak leaf. In turn, that meant that I was instantly non-competitive for Battalion Command or promotion to Colonel. Unfortunately, there was no waiver or appeal process for that verdict – and, yes, I looked.
However, in the interim, 9/11 happened and I had little time to dwell on it myself. I wanted to get into the fight ASAP. For that first few months, I was in assignment limbo at Fort Bragg. SF Branch wanted nothing to do with me and DA was indifferent. I came to realize that essentially I had been ejected from the system. I had not jumped ship, I had been pushed off. That was fine with me. I still knew a lot of people and started doing my own independent talent management. The pattern for the next 9 years went like this. I would call commanders I knew directly, or have a mutual friend introduce us and ask for work. I was not often rejected. I did a number of jobs: J3 (Operations), J5 (Plans), Chief of Staff, and Deputy Commander for example. Additionally, I did Liaison work between HQs on occasion and even commanded a couple of ad hoc organizations in theater.
I do not want to exaggerate my contributions to the mission. I am not pretending to be a hero. I took my share of risks, but I have no medals for valor or purple hearts. Nevertheless, I carried my share of the burden and then some. I am proud of that. The reasons I was able to do that for an extended period are directly related to the idiosyncrasies built into the current personnel management system. First, because I was a “free agent,” I could go where I pleased and no one at DA or SF Branch cared – or interfered. Second, the system was consistently failing commanders in the field. Almost everyone else was “locked” into his or her current assignment and even the system itself had no pre-existing mechanism to meet fluctuating personnel demands from the field commanders. Never mind “talent management,” there is something fundamentally wrong with a system that has to ignore its own rules to even try to support the warfighter. The result was that commanders – by necessity – had to make off the books “handshake deals” with their peers who were not deploying for critical manpower fills.
It was a heck of a way to run a railroad. Still, it worked for me for a long time. Of course, the system could not abide that sort of autonomous freedom of action indefinitely. Toward the end, I was involved in planning for the drawdown of all SOF in Iraq. In February 2011, I had briefed the plan for approval to all the senior leadership in the theater and beyond. Afterwards, I decided to take some down time back at Bragg with my wife. That is when SF Branch sprung their ambush. About 10 days after I got home they hit me with a “Request for Orders” (RFO) sending me to a Branch Immaterial (BI) assignment with the 8th Army HQ in Korea. BI simply means that the job required only a warm body to move papers. As usual with the system, my training, expertise, experience, and / or “talent” was entirely irrelevant to the job parameters.
To be certain, I could have dodged this RFO. Technically, I was “on leave” and could have got on the first thing smoking back to Iraq. The 1-Star Commander of the HQ I had been working for had asked me to come back as soon as felt like it anyway. I doubt that Branch would have even tried to “extradite” me out of theater. That is why they did not drop the RFO earlier. I also could have gone to a number of 3 or 4-Stars I had worked for and asked for a favor. I did not do either. My last boss in Iraq in 2011 was a Colonel (O-6) who had worked for me as a Major in 2004. One of my peers had already pinned on his first star and another was about to. I did not envy their success, but all were glaring reminders that professionally I was just treading water. Objectively, I had done all that I could do and then some from outside the system. And, just as obviously, the system saw no further value in me. I did not leave because I was tired, disillusioned, or discouraged but I also had no interest in just killing time. Therefore, I came to the conclusion that while I was still having fun and did not want it to end, just as clearly, it was the right time to go.
So I told SF Branch to find someone else and I dropped my retirement packet. Frankly, I do not think they cared. I believe that they offered that crap job as my one and only assignment option because they wanted to force me out. I may not be anyone special, but I am not Joe Shit the Ragman either. I thought that it was insulting and told them so. They certainly made no effort to dissuade me from leaving. They were convinced that I was “excess to the Regiment’s requirements” and needed to go. The sooner the better as far as the system was concerned. The funny thing is that when someone takes retirement “in lieu of PCS,” DA does not let you quit honorably; rather, they make it abundantly clear that that you are being fired as punishment for your transgression. In other words, after 36 years of mostly exemplary service, DA itself declared me persona non grata! Somehow, that seems entirely appropriate.
In terms of military careers, in typical American style, today we have made promotions (and the resulting pay raises) the single measure of professional success. You either get promoted on a strict timetable or you are forced out. No matter how good you are in your current job, you must always keep moving with the herd. Therefore, the system persists in pounding ill-fitting human pegs into holes they are not suited for to temporarily fill spaces. And, I do mean temporarily. In a year or so we pull out all of the pegs and start pounding every one of them into new holes! In the process we disillusion far too many and they vote with their feet and leave. How exactly does a personnel system that facilitates and perpetuates high turnover help sustain unit combat readiness? It does not. That does not make much sense today. I would argue that it never did, and it is past time to overhaul our system.
I submit that the current system is actually optimized not to retain talent, but rather to deprive the Army of soldiers and officers – just as they are seasoned enough to be of real value to a unit. In effect, the system is fratricidal and designed to encourage the majority of our junior officer and NCO leaders to self-select out at the end of their initial contracts. In turn, we spend enormous time, money, and effort, bringing newer people into the front end of the pipeline to replace our loses. There is no real logic or military necessity that drives this dysfunctional methodology. We allow that nonsense to continue simple because that is the way we have always done it – at least since WWII. If an enemy had such a devastating casualty producing capability, we would be working tirelessly on an effective countermeasure. We certainly must stop doing it to ourselves – and soon.
Managing talent effectively takes more effort than what we are doing now. To make the best blades, you have to hammer the steel. The harder the metal, the more you have to hammer. It takes extra work, but those harder heads – if hammered properly by a good leader – often make great soldiers. I was lucky that some good leaders took the time and effort to hammer me. Here are some of the old-fashioned mallets used successfully on me over the course of my career. Rehabilitative transfers, “acting” rank (call it a test run), and Article 15s – used old school style to punish, educate and shape, not to terminate. Leaders must be provided these kinds of tools if talent management is ever going to be a reality. True talent cannot and will not be centrally managed and mass-produced by DA. Rather, it must be handcrafted by the individual soldiers themselves and their leaders at the lowest levels. The Army must push down the right tools and authorities to them and would be better served by removing the bulk of those “personnel management” responsibilities and decisions from PERSCOM.
Epilog: one of the foreseeable consequences of having been rogue for almost a decade is that I did not really belong to anyone at Fort Bragg. SF Command and later USASOC had carried me as “excess” on the books for that entire time. The HQ G1s had kept accountability of me, but none of the Staff Directorates owned or owed me. Therefore, there was no one obliged to even consider putting me in for an end of service award or to sponsor a retirement ceremony of some kind. Therefore, it is no surprise that I got neither. When I signed out on my last duty day in the Army, one of the Specialists at HHC USASOC gave me a folded American flag in a triangular display case and thanked me for my service. I thanked her back and left. I must say, it was an anticlimactic conclusion to a professional career I consider very well spent. Moreover, I will not deny, I thought the occasion was fully deserving of a wee bit more pomp and circumstance.
I did have one last “official” duty to perform. Two days after my retirement date, I returned to Camp Mackall one last time to take a student team’s Robin Sage Briefback. After interacting with the students, I sat down with a couple of the Cadre Team Sergeants and reminisced about the Q-Course for an hour or so. Although I did not remember him, one of the NCOs had gone through the course when I had been out there. It was a pleasant afternoon. Of course, I had to eventually let them get back to work; so, I said my goodbyes and headed home. Although I was driving east and it was mid-afternoon, I had no doubt that I was riding into the sunset. That is, after all, exactly the way a story like this is supposed to end. De Oppresso Liber!
LTC Terry Baldwin, US Army (Ret) served on active duty from 1975-2011 in various Infantry and Special Forces assignments. SSD is blessed to have him as both reader and contributor.
Great article Terry; I remember well your, what 4 or 5 years straight in Iraq. Luckily I was never off the books in a limbo status, I would have been Col Kurtz part two leading my own band of Gs.
Travis
Travis,
4 in Iraq and 3 1/2 in Afghanistan. After a little R&R I actually was planning to go back to Afghanistan for one more turn just to even things out. Although I had that opening waiting for me in Iraq I was not intending to go back (I had told the 1-Star as much).
You and I were in Iraq for the invasion. That was fun. So were the Surges. I was just not all that interested in experiencing the withdrawal. The clean up after the party is always pretty dull. In any case, I was thinking that one more 6-7 month rotation would be all for me. So, while Branch accelerated my plans, I was well aware that retirement was fast approaching.
TLB
Awesome!
Just so much to agree with as the Officer Personnel System was developed for a pre-WWII Army saddled with officers who were no longer physically or mentally fit to conduct a World War. (We were in the same condition pre-Civil War.)
On a personal note the ends of our career bear tremendous similarity though I made a conscious decision not to pursue O5 after Battalion Command came off the table.
Your lack of an award/retirement ceremony is unconscionable. I routinely conducted retirement events for retiring NCO’s that the system/organization was forgetting.
While I loved your series maybe you can do one focused on the NCO system? Many problems span both groups as do the solutions.
Will,
Good point about those pre-WWII Regimental commanders. I remember reading somewhere that almost 80% had to be pushed out between 1940-42 because they were not up to modern maneuver warfare standards. They had become ornamental rather than value added to their units. I don’t want a system that keeps old guys around for nostalgia’s sake. But if someone is still meeting the standards why run that hard earned talent and experience off?
It would also be true that Eisenhower and Patton – just to name a couple – would have been forced out of service well before WWII started if the current 20 year system had been in effect in the 1920s-30s. I am certain that we are running similar high end talent out today after 20 years because…that is the schedule. That is talent we can ill afford to lose and should be fighting to retain.
I agree with your last point about Officer and NCO management systems having many of the same problems. However, it has been such a long time since I had direct personal visibility on the NCO system. 2000-2001, when I was in Command at Mackall was the last time. During GWOT I did OERs and NCOERs for guys and gals working for me in theater but had zero visibility after they rotated back to home station. Someone with more current experience would be better suited to take on that task.
TLB
P.S.
Some people may be thinking “if it ain’t broke don’t fix it” right about now. That is especially true for people that have benefited from the current system – as I mostly did. However, the system is broken and here are just three relevant pieces of evidence to prove it.
One, as I mentioned in the article, is that for a decade the system was unable to provide timely support to the warfighter in Iraq or Afghanistan. The problem was minimized after 2011 only because we had drastically reduced the number of troops deployed. That took pressure off the system but fixed nothing. Surely, any effective personnel management system for the Armed Services should be able to shift gears from peacetime to wartime mode without missing a beat. War is our raison d’être, the personnel system should be optimized for that purpose – not paralyzed by it.
Two, today the Army is once again struggling with a severe pilot shortage. We are several hundred pilots short of requirements. This is not the first time. This is a perennial problem. I can recall it happening at least three times while I was on active duty. In each case the Army payed big bonuses and staunched the bleeding temporarily. In some cases, pilots were leaving because of lucrative opportunities elsewhere. However, from surveys, we know that most left because they were dissatisfied with how they were being managed by the system. A problem the Army shares with all the other Services. Constant PCS turbulence and non-flying related administrative and assignment demands were cited as examples. These are guys and gals who want to fly! We need them – and, yet, we keep driving them off.
Third, graduates of West Point are currently leaving service after their initial obligation at a rate far greater per capita than their OCS or ROTC counterparts. That is especially troubling since West Point costs approximately three times more per student then any ROTC program and exponentially more than OCS. Therefore, the Army is considering extending the service obligation for West Pointers by a year. That will provide some short-term return on our investment, but does not attack the real problem. These competitively selected and motivated young people are presumable inclined to make the Army a career. Why are they leaving in droves at their earliest opportunity? I don’t think it is a problem with them, but rather with the institution.
We spend an enormous amount of time and treasure to find suitable pilot candidates, quality NCOs, and Officers in general. Why don’t we put more effort into keeping them? The short answer is that the current system is designed – indeed optimized – to cycle people through the pipeline in perpetuity, not to retain them and maximize their talents. It is past time to make significant changes.
TLB
“War is our raison d’être, the personnel system should be optimized for that purpose – not paralyzed by it.”
So true and so sad. You spoke below of DA likely to continue current “managing talent” practices. Organizations and their subsets often act like living organisms which seek to survive at all costs. It took Marshall himself to change officer management practices in WWII. It will likely take that kind of intervention to change the current status quo. I hope it comes without the same significant traumatic event that WWII was but doubt the decision to act will appear without the unavoidable need.
As to West Point I again agree. As a grad, former cadre member and current admissions coordinator for my region, the talent drain hasn’t escaped me. Part of this is the Army’s fault and you’ve explained some of the issues though you didn’t go into the detail I’m sure you are aware of that drives junior officers out of the service.
The other part of the problem is West Point itself. It has IMO overemphasized the Athens over Sparta duality that makes West Point unique and the self-stated keeper of the Army officer corps’ ethos. There was a time before ’76 that the mission statement stated a career of service as a combat arms officer. That statement has morphed much over time and I believe with the requisite result.
Will,
We have been surveying outbound people since Christ was a Corporal. We know why our younger Officers, NCOs and Aviators keep leaving. The system dutifully collects the data…and does nothing. Rinse and repeat. The Army cannot be all things to all soldiers or fully meet everyone’s personal career expectations all the time. But we can do much better than we are doing now.
I specifically think that powering down personnel management would have a significant positive impact. Let those assignment and career progression decisions get made at the lowest possible level rather than DA. That way, at least the individual soldier can directly engage and have the opportunity to influence the local leader (talent manager) making the decisions.
An actual functioning mentoring program would be helpful as well, to sound out the young soldiers, educate them about professional options and guide them in figuring out what their individual definition of career success looks like. I have tried to do that for a good many of the people that have worked for me. I have found that it helps.
I have also found that a significant number of soldiers have no one providing that kind of professional advice on any regular basis. Why not? If we had a performance counseling system that wasn’t just a finger drill maybe – just maybe – we could get some real individualized teaching, coaching, and mentoring, done.
Imagine how much more job satisfaction a soldier might have if he or she knew that someone actually cared about their career and appreciated what they contribute to the unit and the mission? I can dream anyway.
TLB
Great article that actually lays bare the complete lack of talent management in the Army. As a former Army officer and now a practitioner of TM in the civilian world, LTC Baldwin nails it. I cringe when I hear the Army and DoD talk about their talent management. True management of talent doesn’t promote everyone on a fixed time table, it identifies the best and puts them in the next role when they have achieved the needed skills, not before. It also doesn’t arbitrarily eject strong leaders just because they don’t fit a set of bureaucratic hurdles. Sometimes you need to bring higher level talent back down to a lower level to “fix” (turnaround) an organization. Wouldn’t it be great if we could give experienced Majors a company command in a line battalion that needed to conduct independent company operations? Or, give very promising young Captains an early command, pre-career course? Ah, well, rant complete and I enjoyed (as always) Baldwin’s writing.
Michael,
I agree. Despite the optimistic talk, it appears that DA fully intends to keep “managing talent” at their level – just like we are doing now. Albeit with some cosmetic changes that won’t really ameliorate – or even acknowledge – any of the fundament shortcomings of the current system. After a time, the Army will declare success and quietly go back to doing things the comfortable old way.
TLB
Terry,
Great story with a pile of lessons therein.
I had a similar experience in the Reserve, and it required a lot of of sideways movement to clear the obstacles. In the end, it is the people you bond with along the way that are most important. Best wishes.
Sir-
Loved the series of articles, as well as your SSD contributions in general. It seems some of the Officer management system may be changing, for the better- talking with peers that are SF branch, that world is changing to a model where you can stay a Captain as long as you like without repercussions- you board for Major once you want to, as long as you have filled your time in grade requirements. They are also opening up SFAS to post KD O3’s, with the stipulation that they will not board for Major until they have completed their team time. Seems like a good deal to me, and it helps address the problem that from what I can tell the Army and from what they are saying SF branch in particular seems to be hemorrhaging Captains.
Moshjath,
Yes, there is a pilot program that is – or is about to – go hot that sounds promising. As I understand, it is only for officers now, but may be expanded to the rest of the force later. The tell (for SF officers) will be if those in the program can remain competitive for commands beyond Major. In SF every Captain commands an ODA, and virtually every Major a Company.
On the other hand, Battalion Command slots for SF are very limited and the competition is fierce. Will the guy who stayed on an ODA for 4 years be competitive for O-5 Command with the guy who did two and then a couple of other “developmental” jobs afterwards?
We had guys in 5th Group “stabilized” for a third year of ODA command during and immediately after Desert Shield / Storm. That actually put them at a disadvantage down the road and none of the guys I knew personally were selected for Battalion Command. It sounds good on paper and briefs well, but we shall have to see if this new initiative is an improvement or not.
TLB
Thanks for all you did to make this country a safer place. Sorry that the system sucks to such a high degree. The leadership in this country should be ashamed that this stuff happens. Enjoy your posts!!
Mark,
I appreciate your comments. I tended not the think that the system sucked but rather that the system is what it is. It is important to note that in my case the system basically functioned as it was designed to for my entire career. Sure, some thumbs had to be put on the scale from time to time. Sometimes in my favor and sometimes against me. But the system WORKs exactly the way the Army wants it to work. I have argued here that the mechanism is obsolete and needs to be replaced or at least overhauled. But, the only “failure” of the system that I experienced is that it did not manage to get rid of me sooner!
TLB
Oh man, I’d love to set you down with a couple guys I know and a few beers. Might have to wait a few more months before they hit retirement and/or the Statute of Limitations expires!
AbnMedOps,
Sounds good. All I know about the law is that indictments don’t equal convictions!
TLB
Thank you Sir. Very nice read.
Its even worse in the reserve side. Where you basically have self-selecting promotion. All the high performing career professionals select themselves out so the only real qualification for promotion is continuing to show up. With the addition of requirements to almost active duty levels in regards to “readiness” has also made command a death sentence for anyone with a real job so good officers avoid it like the plague. No reward, only a chance to get relieved and/or fired.
I have been in Guard and Reserve Aviation units / squadrons for over 28 years. For my entire time, I have been a “Free Agent” and doing what I wanted to do.
Several times I was asked by commanders and staff to do this or that job. However, many times I was able to, crawfish my way out. A couple of times, I hit a career dead ends and just maneuvered to another opportunity.
My desire was to stay in the cockpit and flying as long as possible. I was never hell bent on making rank. I stayed a 2LT, 1LT, CPT, MAJ as long as possible. One time I had a PERSCOM civilian call me and ask “CPT you haven’t put in your OERs and docs for your 1st look promotion board.” I told him “Thanks. Yes that is correct, I want to stay a company commander another year and to keep flying. If I get promoted to MAJ, they will transfer me up to BN / BDE (FAC 3) nonflying staff.” There was a long pause on the line and he replied “I’ve never heard of such a thing.” Yeah, it happens sometimes in aviation.
One year later, I boarded and picked up for MAJ. While I was deployed to Iraq, I was told by my new CONUS BC that I was going to staff at the Training Division. I then applied, interviewed, hired and transferred to a USAF Reserve Squadron. Later I was promoted on up the ranks and still actively flying…..
The whole DoD promotion system must be relooked.
The USAF has implemented Flyer and Command tracks for cargo pilots. If you just want to fly, you stay in the flyer track. However, I’m not sure it USAF wide though yet.