Published in 2015, ‘When Failure Thrives – Institutions And The Evolution Of Postwar Airborne Forces‘ was the first imprint from Army Press.
Author Marc R Devore examines the post-1945 evolution of airborne forces the US, UK and USSR have ever accomplished their objectives at an acceptable cost.
Go ahead and read it, the arguments are always the same either way, but it’s worth knowing what gets put in from of decision makers.
Thanks to Mud!
30 c17s pulling up to green ramp is arguably more threatening to our adversaries than a carrier strike group pulling into someone’s AO. I don’t think we knowingly throw all this money and talent at our airborne formations because the pentagon is full of static line fanboys.
I think Dr. Devore should attend jump school, and do 5 years as an Airborne Infantryman before he judges Airborne units at all!
I would like to know how he feels when he has gone 48 hours straight with only a few canteens of water and a few rations.
This is a boomer-tier comment.
Couldn’t agree more with Insane Soldier.. matty, have you ever served in an airborne unit? With a retarded comment like that it leads me to believe you’re answer if any is: no. There’s a reason why everyone that hasn’t earned their blood wings is a dirty nasty leg.
Yeah, it’s pride. It’s esprit de corps. It’s knowing you all volunteered to do something, like fail RIP or SFAS, together…
It has nothing to do with being moderately proficient at the absolute last choice for forced entry. Let’s be real, if ya can drive to, or land near the assembly area you’ll do that instead rather than watch a third of the force get waxed before link up.
But jumping is fun, even if you’ve only done static line, and it’s a great way to build confidence in young troopers, which is why we spend millions of dollars a year paying kids to do it five times before going to a leg unit.
An airborne Op against a near peer would be an actual fucking massacre. You know how many MANPADS are out there? Have fun PLFing when you and all of your pals are chunks of meat raining out of the sky,
How many anti-armor weapons are on the battlefield? Rolling around in an armored vehicle? You might as well be in a coffin.
That is a false equivalency. A tank can take cover and actually can resist anti-armour weapons at least sometimes. Whereas anything shoots a transport aeroplane out of the air and there is no cover whatsoever. There is never going to be an Operation Market Garden or Mercury again. For small units there is still a use for air drops.
Well that shows loud and clear how uneducated you are. First of all, there would be a shock-and-awe style suppression of enemy AAD and C-and-C infrastructure clearing the air for the transports. Then there’s the fact that the troops would jump, assemble and attack at night. And finally, there’s the fact that there’s no faster or better way to get a large number of well-armed troops on the ground a long way from home. Comparing a modern day airborne operation to Market-Garden is like comparing an M1 Abrams to an M3 Grant.
Matty, We all sense your concern that you might get a run in your panty hose so it’s best for you to stay safe and sound with your PS5, while you swill vodka cranberry and binge watch Bachelorette and leave the war fighting to Airborne forces.
Found the scratched airborne ego.
Hahah damn really getting under the boomers skin with this one. Say it with me. There will never ever be another mass combat jump with static line forces. LeAvE tHe WarFighTinG to AiRboRne! How much war you getting right now hooah? Getting all them combat jumps in hooah? Doggone ole Airbone. Death from above hooah?
Really good read! Generally pretty sensible analysis and comparison between states. Does highlight that the key to effective survival of US Airbourne has been a commitment to innovation and adaptation in other areas. Read it even if you are some nutcase airborne fanatic.
I wonder if the Brits have read this?
Not included I know, but plenty of success in Africa
It is in fact mentioned- though it is noted that these were relatively small operations (juxtaposed with massive forces un Russia/US), and in many cases could have been better accomplished with helicopters. Its not very long, but an informative read.
The summation is not that parachuting is worthless, the paper is more about how military institutions measure their successes and how institutions deal with innovation and obsolescence.
Absolutely, the largest drop was the battle of Casinga in ’78 with 370 paras
Sometimes innovation isnt thinking up a new weapons sysyem or unit rather its how you use/ adapt the assets/ units you have. Nobody is relevant in this day and age by Dr. Devore’s standards.. you have rangers and SFABs doing what is doctrinally an SF mission, you have BDEs and divisions covering down with their own air assets for what the Air Force gets paid by congress to do. You have the Air Force dreaming up essentially an LRS team with SR that meanwhile is not tied to any maneuver element. It 2020, the transgendering of the military is to be expected. I would also expect a “Dr”/ Officer in the Army to understand that Airborne envelopement/ forced Entry isnt the capacity airborne forces would ever be used in ( in this day and age), but rather more of a rapid deployment as every usable airfield is likely to be knocked out in any near peer scenario. Who going to fortify any of the islands in the south china sea that are outside the wezs of the surface to air system but within range of all the cruise missiles, airfields arent guaranteed, helos would need the ability to refuel and could only transport a select few. Whos going to be the speed bump in europe when every european/nato airfield is knocked out. The only logical option is the rapid deployment of airborne forces again where c17s/ 130s are able to survive. Its wont likely be the main effort or “tip of the spear” but can enable a foothold and/or follow-on capabilities.
Hello everyone.
Foremost I hope everyone is well and weathering the storm.
After many years of reading Soldier Systems Daily I wanted to make a comment.
The late summer of 1972 was a very tough time for me and my future uncertain.
Walking by an Army Recruiter; on the window a poster showing a mass jump.
I thought “cool”, I can do that. On my seventieth birthday, I signed up.
There was no obsession with Special Operations at the time; I only knew of the “Green Beret” due to the movie. SEALS, PJ’s and other Operators were unknown to me.
I thought going to Jump School, Recondo and Jungle Warfare Schools was the top of the heap; for me it certainly was.
Four years with the 82nd Airborne changed my life and defined my future. Despite the early 70’s being a lousy time to be a soldier I learned the basics of success; be, responsible, reliable and resilient. “Don’t quit” and get the job done.
Today, whether Light Calvary, Air Mobile, Armor, etc., U.S. soldiers are smart, well trained and well equipped.
However, the beret, bloused boots and swagger… the legacy of the 82nd was something really special. It undoubtedly still is.
If you ain’t Airborne, you’re just a “leg”!
It is unlikely we will ever see a mass jump onto the modern battlefield, but I believe there will continue to be a need for an Airborne Division.
I’ll read the book with great interest.
Take care,
Garv
It was great hearing from you Garv!
Here, here! Eloquently said Sir! Geronimo!
This is a worthwhile read because it has some interesting tidbits on culture and organizations but the assessment on the utility of airborne forces is very wanting.
E.G. the author’s standards: “Failures are defined as operations not accomplishing their stated objec-tives. Pyrrhic victories are defined as operations that succeed, whether through the actions of airborne forces or not, where the attacking force suffered over 25% casualties. Successes occur when operational objectives are seized and attacking forces suffered fewer than 25% casualties.”
He then uses this standard to categorize D-Day as a pyrrhic victory. Heck, what would D-Day have looked like without the airborne element? Was Omaha beach a pyrrhic victory?
He minimizes Grenada and Panama because the enemy was weak. He misses the 173rd in 2003 Iraq.
Applying his same standards to combat engineers would likely make the case they aren’t an efficient use of resources either.
I learned some stuff in his history and organization culture discussion but a lot of wrong lessons here.
Read with caution.
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_18ch1_pa.pdf?ver=2018-07-03-125841-997
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/go0610.pdf