The Special Operations Forces Truths have been around for so long that they are taken for granted. The thing is, you can apply them to any low denisty, high demand capability. I thought we should kick off this Monday morning by revisiting them since the US Army has not only deactivated its Long Range Surveillance capability but it’s Pathfinder Companies as well. Once they’re gone, it’s difficult to bring them back.
Humans are more important than hardware
People – not equipment – make the critical difference. The right people, highly trained and working as a team, will accomplish the mission with the equipment available. On the other hand, the best equipment in the world cannot compensate for a lack of the right people.
Quality is better than quantity
A small number of people, carefully selected, well trained, and well led, are preferable to larger numbers of troops, some of whom may not be up to the task.
Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced
It takes years to train operational units to the level of proficiency needed to accomplish difficult and specialized SOF missions. Intense training – both in SOF schools and units – is required to integrate competent individuals into fully capable units. This process cannot be hastened without degrading ultimate capability.
Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur
Creation of competent, fully mission capable units takes time. Employment of fully capable special operations capability on short notice requires highly trained and constantly available SOF units in peacetime.
Most special operations require non-SOF assistance
The operational effectiveness of our deployed forces cannot be, and never has been, achieved without being enabled by our joint service partners. The support Air Force, Army, Marine and Navy engineers, technicians, intelligence analysts, and the numerous other professions that contribute to SOF, have substantially increased our capabilities and effectiveness throughout the world.
Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced. Amen.
Like the notable nike wearing, arc-rail, skull mask, excessively patched members of ISOF that danced around with their fancy american rifles and dropped them when ISIS was sweeping through western Iraq and got quite a few of the good ones killed? That’s what you get when you take important advisory elements away with the main force and let them handle it themselves for a few years.
That’s also what happens when you try to press out too many operators in a country that had its entire military disbanded. It’s fortunate that Afghan Special Forces have turned out a bit better than that. Not much better, but better.
I pray that through these hard times that hardened professionals prevail in both countries.
Seem like ISOF were the only guys that stuck around. When was the last time you were there advising them?
If you ever saw the ISIS Propaganda Film “Clanking of the Swords IV” you’d see exactly what I am talking about. Footage from their rise in Iraq, a lot of ISOF footage in there. And to be clear, I was speaking about a portion of ISOF, the most heavily publicized portion to be exact.
I will try to add some context, I don’t want to come off as completely bashing Iraq’s fighting forces. I think we all respect what the Iraqis are doing right now but recognize that it was too little too late in regards to the situation today.
Yes, back in 2014 ISOF did pick up the slack in Mosul as regular army units retreated, and they suffered some of the heaviest casualties in the city, however, given our very minimal presence in training the Iraqi Special Forces at the time due to the drawdown from 2011 leading up they were not properly prepared and as a responsive force they went in and had valuable, hardened, and trained men along with newer ISOF members who did not fight during the counter-terror operations during the US Occupation. The experience was far too limited for them to compensate, and though they were patriotic individuals, you can see a lot of unbecoming practices from their own footage, they clearly have a different set of standards than the US advisors that trained them. And with those heavy casualties, the nike/skull-mask/arc-rail examples have since been pressed in to build up the ranks. I am still horrified by the desperation of those who stuck it out, being surrounded and forced to surrender, then executed while others did turn tail. I would not dare insult their memory, but what you see out of the mostly shiite Iraqi Army propaganda machine is a highly equipped, yet undertrained force that has been “mass produced.” It’s often times hard to look at. We’re not on different sides in this argument, we both want piles of insurgents stacked up, but I think given that we’re just liberating the Eastern side of Mosul the missteps in the SOF truths listed here are apparent in their example.
Going off on a slight tangent, but the fact that the newer generation of ISOF is still of the Nike boots and skull masks variety is remarkable, given that a large portion of Iraqi security forces, if you include the PMF, look more to Iran and their Quds Force for inspiration, rather than USSOF.
It’s one thing to maintain a trainer/advisor presence and have that direct impact on trainees, but another to have a lasting impact on their military culture after advisors have left, and the concept of “better them do it their own way imperfectly, than we do it for them perfectly” (to do some paraphrasing) seems to apply here.
“deactivated its Long Range Surveillance capability but it’s Pathfinder Companies”
This is distressing to read. The Army just eats itself for no good reason.
Why do we have to relearn these lessons again and again?
Because LRS cost a arm and a leg for a capability that exists many times over and can be barrowed from elsewhere in the dod for a division/corps asset. Everybody is sucking for budget dollars right now. LRS can be quickly reconstituted by some recce and s/r team guys.
Apparently, you’ve never actually done the mission.
Sounds like an accountant to me. <3
Time and again we try to push technology over the human asset, only to learn the tech should SUPPORT manpower, not replace it. Fight your battles through a budget and you’re going to lean some hard lessons.
Having seen and been told from ex LRS members who have supported SOF mission sets both operational and in training, I don’t think this asset resides anywhere at all for the conventional piece. A brigaded R & S capability seems to come and go. We work in circles. It will be back.
LRS started out at a Det size at Div level and a Co at Corps level. The issue was never with the capability but rather with the commander’s prerogative. If he was risk adverse, the capability wouldn’t be used. SR, in the classic sense, is all but dead in SF. Besides, those forces, if they existed would be tasked with SOF missions and not Ground Force missions.
Sure, yeah, those C “troop” cav squadron guys can hip pocket execute LRS missions any time, right? Or maybe you mean the ever so prevalent S/R group guys that USASOC will so graciously loan out to conventional side as needed? I mean, I see that happen all the time. Or is it the RRD guys that you always see executing recce missions for 3rd ID? I mean that’s totally a thing, right? It’s ok though, the Bragg Pathfinder guys are sure to keep their skills razor sharp in their new duties as range detail for the 82nd’s “Enduring Range” qualification range. I mean, they might get to use a spotting scope here or there on the 25M zero range, so that’s totally gonna keep them sharp on “glassing the objective,” right?
But don’t worry, the Raven guys totally got this, ’cause that thing is sneaky AF.
You and I can be friends.
Another “truth” I’ve heard, which is identical from no matter which SOF group I’ve heard it from is:
Always look cool.
Never get lost.
If you get lost, still look cool.
🙂
Used to be a sign in the 1SFG GSC that read….
No trucks
No clothes
No food
No fuel
No Ammo
What’s so “special” about that?
Translation: Without non long tab group support transporting you, feeding you, giving you stuff, you can’t do a damn thing. Ref: 5th point.
“Where’s your helmet? You can’t eat here every soldier has a helmet.”
the REX 1 pistol look like base on Zastava CZ 999/ EZ 9
I love the SOF truths.
I always thought there should be two more:
“it’s not the best guy, but the right guy”
and
“it’s harder to keep than it is to earn”
They seem to fit in with SOF units, missions, and mentality.
“I’d rather go down the river with seven studs than with a hundred shitheads”