This is the twenty fifth installment of ‘Max Talk Monday’ which shares select episodes from a series of instructional videos. Max Velocity Tactical (MVT) has established a reputation on the leading edge of tactical live fire and force on force training. MVT is dedicated to developing and training tactical excellence at the individual and team level.
Continuing with the theme on squad maneuver, this video is an introduction to the concept of ‘Satellite Patrolling’ as described in the MVT Tactical Handbook: Small Unit Tactics. Utilizing a sand table model with figurines, as a method of introduction to explain this advanced patrolling technique.
Detailed explanations can be found in the MVT Tactical Manual: Small Unit Tactics.
Max is a tactical trainer and author, a lifelong professional soldier with extensive military experience. He served with British Special Operations Forces, both enlisted and as a commissioned officer; a graduate of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. Max served on numerous operational deployments, and also served as a recruit instructor. Max spent five years serving as a paramilitary contractor in both Iraq and Afghanistan; the latter two years working for the British Government in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.
Website: Max Velocity Tactical
YouTube: Max Velocity Tactical
Excellence in Tactical Training.
Is three enemy in a fire team clustered in one small location usually the size of the element responsible for conducting a near ambush?
How well does the friendly fireteam do on its assault when the flank of enemy ambush made up of over a squad, plus machine gun team, that has security posted on its flanks?
Duncan: you may be taking the instruction out of context. There was no mention of a near ambush in this presentation. The point is to describe the technique of satellite patrolling, which has proved very effective in low intensity conflict and can (as described) be escalated in numbers to match high intensity situations i.e. 6 man rather than 4 man teams, squads rather than team elements, platoons rather than squads etc (i.e. Helmand Province , Afghanistan). The use of an assault example is to show a situation similar to the standard taught squad attack (previous videos) where a point enemy force is assaulted. I believe I also discussed the propensity of enemy to ‘shoot and scoot’ and thus if the assault is not “hard and fast” they will get way, thus needing to be fixed in position if they are going to still be there when the assault team arrives – always a challenge.
It’s always easy throw throw out increasing enemy strengths to such a point where the assault is infeasible. Same applies with a standard squad attack, unsupported. The assessment of whether to assault or break contact lies with the patrol leader and must be taken into account before a decision is made to do either, based on an assessment of the situation encountered. This video does not in any way deal with an ambush. There are two follow-up videos, both of which can be viewed on the Max Velocity Tactical YouTube channel right now, the next one dealing with multiple enemy firing points, and the final one being an example more related to a multiple-firing point ambush, where in that case the satellite patrol breaks contact with a casualty.
At no point was the situation in this video described as a ‘near-ambush’ and combat will throw a lot more situations at you than what may simplistically be read in various manuals. Satellite Patrolling (known as multiple patrolling) is a staple of the British Army and has been effectively utilized for decades. I know from first experience that it has also been adopted by the USMC, in at least one instance, where it was also used with a three element patrol in Helmand Province. Coalition transfer of knowledge UK to US etc.
In this video you were demonstrating an ambush situation where a three man element is taking on a squad+ element inside hand grenade range, which is near ambush.
In previous videos on similar subject, I’ve noticed the same thing. Whenever you set up a squad attack drill, there is never any means of explaining how the forces on the ground know the enemy are only grouped in <fireteam sized elements in a little tiny objective that a fireteam sized element can assault through alone.
Nor is there any explanation why there is a tiny enemy element alone in the first place, with no support, which happens to be taking on much larger elements at close range and only with ineffective small arms fire.
Do they not possess machine guns? Grenades? Claymores? Mortars? Arty? Rockets? Armored vehicles? Where is the rest of their squads? Platoons? Companies? Why are they alone?
I just wonder why are you using this as the template for react to contact/squad attack scenario. Did you encounter that situation often in Iraq or Afghanistan? Where a fireteam(-) element was taking on squads from close range, necessitating an assault to finish them?
Duncan: I am sure I explained the scale of the terrain model with ranges of at least 100m (at they very least on one of the videos), and also explained that the formation was slightly scrunched up due to the constraints of the terrain model. There is no way any of this is happening within grenade throwing range. On a related note I also don’t subscribe to the near/far ambush you quote, because you are quoting specific tactics which is not echoed in BritMil teaching – to me, ’35 yards’ is still a long way and should be flanked, not assaulted directly on, but that is another topic that I have written about at length and I’m not going to be drawn into it in comments.
This is simply an explanation of a tactical technique (satellite patrolling) with a simple example of how an assault may happen in the same way that a squad attack drill may happen i.e. 3 element rather than 2 element. It is necessarily constrained by the time of the presentation. I already gave you the info that I have two further videos that take a satellite patrol through a multiple firing point assault scenario, and multiple firing point (ambush) break contact with casualty scenario. Again, decisions on what to do are made by the patrol leader on the ground and I am just giving examples. The patrol leader will make decisions based on what he observes tied in with the Intel picture on historical enemy actions.
There is no Intel picture with these presentations, there is no info on Enemy or Friendly forces. You are making a lot of assumptions about who you think the enemy is, which are not born out by the actions as given in the examples on the terrain model.
This specific example is not a template for react to contact, but simply an explanation of how satellite patrolling works, with a simple example of how a hasty attack may happen. To say again, there are two further videos, and more planned, showing other examples.
In fact, ‘shoot and scoot’ type attacks from usually multiple firing points (the next video) are fairly common and most often the norm. Certainly in places like Afghan and other places I have served. You are making too many assumptions on the type of enemy you want it to be, and not learning from the simple examples. In fact ‘multiple patrolling’ as a technique grew out of the Northern Ireland conflict over many years specifically against shoot and scoot snipe / multi-weapon shoot scenarios. The assault tactic was a little different but involved the flanking satellite teams going ‘hard and fast’ into depth to attempt to kill or capture the enemy, who would usually attempot to escape. As I think I mentioned the concept was then taken and utilized, often with larger than team groups (think 6 man or squad elements x 3) for conflict in the middle east as part of the GWOT. It simply may not be something you are familiar with and does not necessarily jive with what you have read in the Ranger Handbook.
I am curious why you object to this instruction so much, for a proven method pf patrolling? There are only so many times I can repeat myself in these comments, and clearly you have not looked to the other videos or perhaps the Tactical Manual? I urge you to research a little more before hitting me with you assumptions. I am coming back at you in comments in an attempt to steer you and answer your initial queries, not to set off the typical internet troll-fest. So let’s keep it constructive. I am also curious as to what your specific military experience is, and whether that leads you to be dubious of these patrolling techniques? I’ll try and be available to answer so long as the discussion remains sensible. Thanks.
I appreciate the two of you having a conversation that expands on the topic being discussed in a mature manner. This is what puts SSD above other forums.
Sadly, it went downhill and he turned out to be running a baited ambush. I usually stay out of comments but in this case genuinely responded to answer what appeared to be a genuine question. Lesson learned again, don’t expect me in comments in future!
If you are looking for a forum where we keep discussion rational in the realm of tactics and even politics, you might want to check out the MVT Forum. We simply don’t do trolls over there. It is a relatively small forum with plenty of SMEs in various fields.
https://forum.maxvelocitytactical.com/
I was an infantryman in USMC and US Army, having served as a rifle team and squad leader, reconnaissance scout team leader, and sniper section leader. So I’ve done a few patrols myself.
Now that is out of the way, lets talk about why you are consistently framing the enemy situations as one so poorly positioned that a poorly armed fireteam can assault through with ease. It seems every video you make that shows the basic Army React to Contact/Squad Attack battle drill, which always has the same tactical flaw the Army version possesses. Enemy forces are always within easy distance to maneuver on them, there is always a nearby avenue of approach. The enemy is to part of a larger element that can support it. It doesn’t have any flank security. There are no obstacles. There are no support weapons. No explosives, etc.
If you’re going to design a battle drill, it needs to replicate an actual scenario. Thats what the British did when they invented the battle drill. That’s what the first US Army regimental commander did it in WW2, when he also created them. You take a very specific template, that is based on something that everyone is almost certainly going to encounter, and then create a way to defeat it that works so well nobody really needs to think about it when it actually happens.
Is that the case with your battle drills? In my opinion, no, they are just not realistic.
For that matter, who are your tactics even designed for? It seems from your videos I’ve watched that its geared towards civilians. makes sense, since you don’t include anything regarding supporting arms, nothing with demo, nothing with automatic weapons (which, since WW1 have all been prerequisites for bringing on assaults).
Why are your trainees even assaulting through objectives? That is a task that comes with it great risk. Militaries do it because they are willing to take casualties to either destroy the enemy or take important ground. Why are you doing it? Are civilians in a SHTF scenario going to be willing to accrue friendly casualties?
As I mentioned earlier, the tactics you’re teaching, since 1917, have been historically proven to necessitate the at least occasional use of hand grenades as well as fully automatic fire. That you’re teaching the assault without those is a problem…
Why aren’t you just trying to flank with fires? That was German doctrine since the 1920-30s and they did it extensively in WW2. It was why they didn’t fix bayonets much, because they weren’t often assaulting across many objectives. They bound groups/sections/squads forward, always looking to outflank an enemy with fires to put them into a position the enemy either died, was forced to surrender, or forced to retreat. That is a much safer tactic for poorly armed civilians who cannot take casualties for obvious reasons just to roll up an enemy fire team (-).
FYI, my intent isn’t in calling you out, or trying to hurt your business. But since anything I write challenging your videos, which are tied to your business, I feel like your credibility and business are at risk, so I understand if you don’t want to really get into it here, and will naturally be defensive.
Also, I forgot to mention, a major problem with flank assaults is communicating the shifting/lifting of fires. Friendly fire is a very real problem in actual combat, even with units with comms and decent situational awareness, there is always going to be someone who didn’t get the memo. Its why hardcore established and highly practiced SOPs for marking and signalling are needed before any attempt to cross into a friendly force’s sector of fire isn’t just a luxury, its an outright necessity or else the assault force is risking taking heavy enfilading fire, while in the open, from friendly forces who suddenly think they caught a large group of enemy smack in the open, and light them up. Suddenly you’re sitting on a mass casualty situation, with a combat ineffective unit close by to the enemy who need to be extracted.
So what is the commo PACE plan for civilians doing flank assaults?
Duncan: I seriously doubt that your comments here are putting my business at risk. LOL though.
The problem is that “by challenging my videos” you are discussing things which are way out of scope for the specific videos. For example, this video is an introduction to satellite patrolling, followed by a simple example of an assault, which echoes the squad battle drill in the previous videos. There are currently two further videos (I know I said this before) which show different circumstances and situations for the same satellite patrol.
For example, I set the sand table up in certain ways to show ideas such as using a covered/concealed approach – so what if there isn’t one, you will ask? The question answers itself, because it comes back to the patrol leaders’ combat estimate and what he decides to do once in contact. You posit on a much larger enemy force with flanks covered by MG fire – so OK, then we are breaking contact, we are not a strong enough patrol, it is clearly not the small ‘shoot and scoot’ force shown in the video as the example. The latest video I have up there shows something very similar with a multiple firing points x 3 “L-shape’ style contact. It’s just the same as with a basic squad attack drill, shown in one of the previous videos, where someone will always ask ( and I covered it in the video) what will happen if the flank assault team starts moving up and encounters more enemy – situation changed, change the plan. This is all basic stuff that you should know with any formal training in MDMP and the need for an infantry squad leader to make a quick combat estimate before implementing a plan. It’s what he is doing once the patrol comes under contact.
You are making the assumption that I only know as much as I put in each video. You mention fratricide. I know that in this series of videos I have specifically discussed shifting fire and safety angles. But I also don’t expect anyone watching these videos dry to be able to pop up and perform these techniques. That’s the same as people thinking they can learn by YouTube alone. At MVT we run a progression of live fire and force on force SUT classes and of course these topics are taught. I also have a tactical manual that you clearly have not read that covers all these angles. You want to talk about attack by fire and double envelopment – not in this video, but covered elsewhere. These are interest videos that will expand the knowledge of those with enough training to get it.
It’s simply that you are watching one video on one thing and then trying to cram a whole bunch of questions about things that are not in the scope into comments. There are in fact many things that you mention in your comment that would need a whole post on themselves to cover. You should perhaps think about joining the MVT forum if you want constructive questions and feedback on this stuff: https://forum.maxvelocitytactical.com/
You mention a little bit of military experience, and I am not sure if you ever deployed, but I suspect you are highly influenced by your specific experiences either in GWOT deployments, or in training influenced by same. Your mention of what I consider the defunct idea of ‘near ambush’ reeks of Ranger Handbook. Given that the US Army is stuck in second generation warfare explains why you are focused on putting explosives on targets and are so tied to the idea of having MGs before you can do anything.
There are plenty of examples that can be used of well trained light infantry forces, unsupported by fire, effectively using the art of SUT in lower intensity warfare to overcome less well trained enemy. How about Rhodesia, or BritMil in many examples, or certain SOF parts of the US Mil in VN, to mention a couple. We specifically had an SOF team train with us because they wanted to focus on essential SUT prior to a deployment where they would not have supporting fires readily available. You only have to think places such as AFRICOM or Jungle deployments to get an idea about that.
I will not deny the effect that an MG can have, having been operationally in command of maneuver support groups in my time. You mention civilians, and what is the point of this training for them absent MG’s? See my point above about well conducted SUT. I have been advocating a civilian ORBAT utilizing available weapon systems for some time before, for example, the USMC decided to replace the SAW with the M27, which is effectively acknowledging the primacy of accuracy over weight of fire. Thus, absent grenades and MGs is is perfectly feasible for a civilian patrol to reach a level of proficiently where they can be effective over less well trained enemy forces, of whatever description. This is exactly what Americans should be doing – training SUT to a level of effectiveness that makes then the modern equivalent of the official militias of the revolutionary era – and no, I’m not talking about ‘modern militia, but a functionally effective equivalent that is the duty of every patriotic American.
I have two years in Iraq, and total of 12 years of infantry service, 9 of them being active duty.
What about you? Wasn’t there a lot of controversy with you trying to embellish your British military service, claiming Paras was special forces? I remember when you and your fans started a war on AR15.com with some established JSOC dudes and others and that didn’t go down well.
When were you in “command of maneuver support groups in [your] time?” Weren’t you a medic in the Army Reserves after moving to the US? Or was this in your stint in the Paras? What rank were you in the Paras? How many years and did you rise to the rank of Lance Corporal, Corporal or Sergeant?
If I am stuck in my second generation understanding of warfare (that’s kind of messed up, you don’t know anything about my knowledge to state that), what generation do you consider yourself in?
Lastly, if you’re an actual trained infantryman, who has actually bothered conducting a historical analysis of assaulting an defended objective, how can you deride my claims of casualties, grenades, and automatic weapons as outdated? Are you insane? One, if you cross over an enemy held objective and get into close range combat, it MASSIVELY increases the chance of being hit. Second, grenades are absolutely needed, because there is no telling if you’re going to encounter someone holed up well enough that the only way to get them out is with explosives, which was something written in blood way back in 1917-18. And yes, automatic weapons aren’t a luxury, that level of close range firepower is critical in the assault. SOF in Vietnam were rocking full auto, belt feds, grenade launchers, time fused claymores for breaking contact, and were calling in massive arty and air strikes on the enemy. Rhodesian Fireforce were doing similar, they had air support, heavy weapons, and a FN MAG and grenade launcher in every team. When I suggest full auto is necessary, I’m not suggesting it needs to be from a belt fed LMG, but it needs to be an option. Same with demo. Same with the understanding that if you even remotely plan to assault an enemy objective, you better be ready to pay the boatman his due,because you likely going to end up with friendly casualties.
Since you’re not teaching this stuff to actual military personnel or units, instead to civilians, maybe tune down the Stormtrooper stuff and actually teach individual and collective skills that are appropriate for someone who isn’t rolling on a patrol with a $500,000 SGLI life insurance policy and F16 on standbye.
So where to begin?
Well Duncan you started out pretty good with somewhat reasonable discussion points.
This is good!
You’ve kind of jumped around a bit though…
First the state of SUT throughout the GWOT has steadily gotten worse. It’s a “you only know, what you know” thing.
It is certainly true that LMG’s, indirect supporting arms, and support are desired and used historically. However due to a variety circumstances those well versed in SUT train to fight both with and without these assets.
What circumstances prevent there use?
Politics for one, beyond the well known Secret; at the time, operations in Southeast Asia. “Advisors” in Central America in the 80’s certainly didn’t have such support often.
I could write a book going into all such details, but suffice to say “excrement happens.”
While you were doing discussing things somewhat satisfactory, then you had to jump into resumes and experience. My DD214 is bigger than your DD214 stuff!
Really?
After stating your “12 years of infantry service, 9 of them being active duty?”
Nothing to be ashamed about there, but that’s still a nugget for many of us career military types that know far more than just the GWOT.
Then you bring up “war on AR15.com with some established JSOC dudes?”
The Academi (formerly Blackwater) guy with decades of SOF experience?
Who in reality had 4 years Army and I think 2 1/2 as a Ranger!
How do I know?
I am the guy that outed him!
I don’t like Stolen Valor types pretending to be something they are not.
You need to get your facts straight and learn the context of a introduction video.
Now if you truly want to discuss SUT then come on over to the MVT Forum we would be glad to talk it over.
On the other hand if your here to be a Troll I can deal with that.
I am good at bringing truth out regarding Trolls!
https://forum.maxvelocitytactical.com/members-2/g-w-n-s/
You’re a moderator on Max’s site. You’re now claiming to be HSLD secret squirrel SOCOM or CIA SAD.
SOCNET verified?
Perhaps more time reading and less time writing will help get something correct today.
All ya’ll need to chill and let Max Velocity run his business. It’s like that rock and roll fantasy camp my uncle went to, where he learned from the bassist of Styx. Its Army fantasy camp, where guys who never served can learn basic infantry tactics, er, “warrior skills.” But make sure you buy the book, man cannot learn just from videos of toy soldiers!
British Paras are some of the best in the biz, but lets be honest, us airborne guys are pretty common. But if you give a purposely obtuse definition of Special Operations Forces, now you’re conjuring images of bearded killers with cool Spartan patches who “run” their “weapons systems” as opposed to “using rifles” like mere mortals. Extra points if you let your students call you by your old call sign (Black Widow Hatchet Ninja-6).
Professional veterans have to make their shekels somehow, and we sure don’t need another vet owned t-shirt company.
I got no problem with someone making money, but if they advertise their wares and they are stupid, then I have the right to state my opinion. If civilians are being run through a tacticool class to play dress up as Big Army infantry squad member for the week, without doing the stupid stuff, then advertise it for what it is.
Well, I gotta admit you made me chuckle.
I promise I won’t start selling Paras t-shirts if Duncan M promises to not destroy my online reputation 😉
This is the thing about Special Operations Forces, which I absolutely stand by:
There was a question on SSD comments about my use of a US Military term (SOF) in application to British Paras and Royal Marines Commando, where SOF is not used in the British Military – simply a translation issue across the pond. To be correct in British military terminology, Paras are either an elite force (2 & 3 Para assigned to 16 Air Assault Brigade) or Special Forces (1 Para assigned to the SFSG). Paras in 1,2 and 3 Para Battalions are no better than each other and will rotate in and out of SFSG, so it is an artificial organizational distinction. Given that I am writing for a US audience here, I simply use the US term (SOF) to cover the Paras, which can be equated to an organization like the Ranger Battalions.
The issue is that SOF is not a Brit term, But ‘elite’ and Special Forces is, and Paras are not Special Forces (SAS, SRR are, etc) despite being under an SF organization in SFSG. Given that Paras are mostly equivalent to Rangers, it is easiest to translate that to SOF, because it essentially is the same thing and gives people a better understanding of what the Paras are, given that many in the States have no idea. Many who don’t know any better will equate Brit Paras with something like 82nd, which simply isn’t the case, Same as the Royal Marine Commandos are not the same as USMC – these are elite units with a specific selection course.
At this point I will run into people who will say that all Brit mil is crap cuz ‘Merica and then I have to simply stop talking….;-)
AHA! So now the true colors come out. I thought it was only a matter of time before you made it personal and tried to attack my credibility. So let’s just clear up a few things that you seem to have wrong:
1) There was no controversy over embellishment of my military service. There was (another) troll on here who questioned my use of a US Military term (SOF) in application to British Paras and Royal Marines Commando, where SOF is not used in the British Military – simply a translation issue across the pond. To be correct in British military terminology, Paras are either an elite force (2 & 3 Para assigned to 16 Air Assault Brigade) or Special Forces (1 Para assigned to the SFSG). Paras in 1,2 and 3 Para Battalions are no better than each other and will rotate in and out of SFSG, so it is an artificial organizational distinction. Given that I am writing for a US audience here, I simply use the US term (SOF) to cover the Paras, which can be equated to an organization like the Ranger Battalions. I hope that clears it up for you. I had written a comment addressing this on the video that was trolled.
2) I was enlisted and commissioned in the Parachute Regiment, and finished my service as a Captain. In terms of “command of maneuver support units” I am referring a period of my time as the Anti-Armor Platoon commander in 2 Para, where we teamed with elements from the MG platoon, to form mobile maneuver support groups both in training and on operations.
3) I think it is simply hard for you to understand where I am coming from in terms of professional training, development and operational experience. For example, as a Parachute Regiment Officer, I was fortunate to be selected while at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst for this elite unit, before going on pre-parachute selection (P Company), followed by the platoon commanders battle course at the infantry training center, before then arriving at my first rifle platoon. This is followed by a career in various positions and ongoing professional / infantry development.
4) We are actually teaching this to US SOF units. I am a professional and have taught British military and foreign units in my time of service. I spent two years at Para Training company training and selecting Parachute Regiment soldiers. It’s ridiculous of you to question professional military instruction, which I learned in the most professional of units / armies, both in training and on operations. There is no merit to do so, and you are simply trolling now with no basis, simply using a video on satellite patrolling to leverage what has turned out to be a personal grudge. I engaged with you in a helpful manner, but now we have some motive revealed, that’s the last of it. It simply beggars belief that you would try to establish yourself as a greater authority on SUT, and attack what is in fact professional teaching with proven operational merit. I did not make this stuff up! I may have my options and ways of doing things based on my pwn experiences, but the basis of this training is not my own. This shows nothing but a huge hole in your military education tied to an unassailable ego. An unearned ego is a terrible thing.
“It simply beggars belief that you would try to establish yourself as a greater authority on SUT, and attack what is in fact professional teaching with proven operational merit.”
Just so I’m tracking, what operational merit are you referring to? Where did YOU USE THIS STUFF IN COMBAT? In what unit? I read your various resumes online, I would like some more info please.
Weren’t you in the US Army Reserves too? What did you do there? Where did you deploy and in what capacity?
What company as a PMC did you work for? I had a bunch of buddies that were in various, I’d like to ask around about Max Alexander. Surely you served in ample combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. How much small unit tactics were you doing as a PMC in those places? How much dismounted patrolling?
Also, when has your company MVT been brought in to train the British Army? I would sure appreciate info about which units and what time frames, so I can verify this on forums frequented by British veterans.
Thanks!
FFS, this has become a bit much.
I don’t go out back of 7-11 and slap dicks out of your mouth, so don’t come around here with your crazy bullshit because you were banned on another site.
You don’t like the guy? Great. Ignore him.
Long ago when I was in, 2005ish, some of the higher ups in the USMC decided that Satellite patrolling was the cool new thing. They kept ordering us to do it, and demonstrate it, but never gave us adequate communications gear for the teams to be able to communicate with each other their situation and location. Needless to say the teams doing satelite patrolling always got their asses handed to them in force on force drills.
I’m not knocking the technique, but I never got to see it be successful.
Ah, the USMC, uniquely capable of promoting the loftiest of expeditionary strategems and heroic appearance standards while consistently mandating that every Marine is a rifleman and that no rifleman is too well equipped.
How is this different from traveling overwatch?
Further distances apart from one another, where teams or squads aren’t always within line of sight of sight of one another. It makes it harder to establish patterns by the enemy, and provides more maneuver options on chance of contact. But control is much harder, part of which is communication. Not always the smartest thing to do.
Have you conducted satellite patrolling operationally? Worked very well at Company level with BritMil in Helmand.
So platoons operating separately from one another, but in support, works well? WOW!
You are really showing your ignorance now!
https://forum.maxvelocitytactical.com/members-2/g-w-n-s/
This is the exact same thing that happens on every internet discussion. The cheerleaders come out in force and jump in for a dog pile. But I don’t want to talk to the student. I want to talk to the sensei.
I am not a student!
A colleague and career military, retired after many decades of service.
Cheerleader?
How juvenile a response are you sure your old enough to have 12 years in?
I suspect I was serving before your birth based on your observed written demeanor.
Of course you could be poorly educated.
So you really want to stick with your above comment on satellite patrolling?
Good enough then.
Your’e a student of Max Velocity, you’re a moderator on his forum, and his bodyguard apparently too. I googled your name, it pops up numerous times in this very blog, where you did the same thing you are doing now, butting into a conversation you weren’t involved with in order to dogpile the person who insulted your sensei.
Moderator at a Forum equals student?
From my above…
“A colleague and career military, retired after many decades of service. ”
From you…
“where you did the same thing you are doing now, butting into a conversation you weren’t involved…”
And this is news?
From above…
“I am the guy that outed him!
I don’t like Stolen Valor types pretending to be something they are not.
You need to get your facts straight and learn the context of a introduction video.
Now if you truly want to discuss SUT then come on over to the MVT Forum we would be glad to talk it over.
On the other hand if your here to be a Troll I can deal with that.
I am good at bringing truth out regarding Trolls!”
So from above quote…
Yes I like dealing with Trolls like you!
Nothing new about that, Trolls waste time for the readers that truly seek information!
So again, the moderator of Max Velocity’s website that supports his business, needs to come to SSD to defend him?
Why can’t the Sandhurt graduate and British SOF veteran do it himself?
No shit. Try this to educate yourself, by Russ, a colleague of mine:
https://www.amazon.com/Company-Commander-Russell-Lewis/
In response to:
“So platoons operating separately from one another, but in support, works well? WOW!”
That link didn’t work. Found this one with a word search; figure its the same: Company Commander, by MAJ Russell Lewis, MC. Bought the book; I’m not too proud to learn newer/better tactics.
I hope this one is better:
https://www.amazon.com/Company-Commander-Russell-Lewis/dp/0753540312/
Cool that you bought the book. Win for Russ!
Although you won’t see what he is talking about described as satellite patrolling, there are a lot of patrols from their FOB at company strength, moving as a satellite element with the various groupings. It’s a good book and Russ (Major Lewis) did a really good job in command. He is a very humble and nice guy.
Well if nothing else we at least confirmed Duncan M as a Troll.
Sad stuff.
Oh look, Max Velocity’s forum moderator popped into a thread to defend his master. Everyone who doesn’t agree with SUT Sensei is obviously a troll…
“Everyone who doesn’t agree with SUT Sensei is obviously a troll…”
LOL…
Are you reading what you write before you click submit!!!
This is as funny as it gets.
So now your saying you are not a Troll?
Really?
You’re a moderator, who works on Max’s professional forum, which he uses to earn a living. Who then came into a thread and started defending Max. Your boss. Who you are either an enthusiastic student of, or an employee of. When nobody asked you.
Or did he ask you to? Can he not have a discussion himself?
Not many friends I am guessing?
Again Trolls and Stolen Valor suck!
Got you on one, will see about the other?
Thanks for the laughs!
I sure as heck am not a troll. Just because I don’t agree with your sensei/employer, doesn’t make me a troll.
But you are a shill. You’re literally a moderator on Max’s forum, coming here to defend the boss.
Dude, you’re a troll. Stop being a troll.
Keep your forum stuff on your forum.
So to sum up-
Satellite patrolling to counter shoot and scoop insurgency threat dilemma but
Duncan wants to bring in GPMGs, LMGs, CAS, C4, with all his platoon in eyesight, not using the advantage of advanced comms because there’s always a possibility it might break, and even more of a set piece battle!
(my favourite was the the explanation of lifting fires, merci. Like telling mumsnet.com about what to expect at child birth)
You’re going to be a great commander in the next war,
George Duncan McClellan.