Detroit Arsenal, Mich. (Friday, Dec. 11, 2020) – Soldiers of the 82nd Airborne will soon get the chance to do something no U.S. infantry Soldier has done in 26 years – employ a dedicated mobile, direct fire vehicle platform against hardened positions, dismounted personnel and light armored vehicles.
The experience comes to them as the first of several pre-production Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF) ground combat platforms are being delivered to Fort Bragg, N.C. to be used in the Soldier Vehicle Assessment (SVA).
“We are incredibly excited to see the MPF platform entering into this phase,” said Brig. Gen. Glenn Dean, the program executive officer for Ground Combat Systems. “MPF represents an innovative and aggressive approach to system acquisition. The beginning of our SVA in January illustrates how hard the teams are working to keep the major events of this program on schedule.”
Currently the Army’s Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) do not have a combat vehicle assigned that is capable of providing mobile, protected, direct, offensive fire capability. To fill that capability gap the Army is using an innovative and competitive Acquisition approach to provide IBCTs with their own organic lethality platforms to ensure overmatch against peer and near peer threat.
The MPF solution is an integration of existing mature technologies and components that avoids development which would lengthen the program schedule. The priority has always been to field this new critical capability soonest, but the MPF will also be capable of accommodating additional weight and spare electrical power to support future growth.
The SVA is on track to commence on Jan. 4, 2021. It will be conducted at Fort Bragg and will run through June 2021. During that time, Soldiers will use the MPF prototypes to conduct a wide variety of operational scenarios. The SVA is an operational assessment rather than a formal test event, and it will directly inform the development of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) of this new capability for the IBCT.
“The MPF brings a new level of lethality to our infantry forces. The SVA gives us the first opportunity to put these vehicles in the hands of our Soldiers with the 82nd Airborne and begin to develop the methods by which our forces can best employ MPF,” said Brig. Gen. Ross Coffman, the Army’s director for the Next Generation Combat Vehicles Cross Functional Team. “Once they are able to begin interacting with these prototypes, I know that our Soldiers are going to come up with the best ways to utilize MPF in our light formations.”
The competitive phase of the program is scheduled to conclude with the selection of a single materiel solution and transition into production near the end of fiscal year 2022.
By Ashley John
This probably one of the most innovative ideas the army has cooked up in the last decade. I am a little concerned that this is going to become another example of new wine in old skins. Where do you administratively nest a tank platoon in the current ibct structure? How do you solve the issue of command literacy? How do you maintain crew competency and readiness of the tanks at bases traditionally aligned with light infantry and only have ranges and facilities to support thier mtoe. This idea works at bragg because they have ranges and facilities for literally everything.
There looking at including 14 MPFs or an entire Company in every IBCT. Two ways to accomplish this, one as an independent company al la HHC BDE or the old BRTs. More likely the company will (should!) be added to the cavalry squadrons.
Well, it’s a ten-year innovation that’s been at least 30 years in the cooking, ever since it became clear that the M-551 Sheridans were on their last legs, and the airborne armor battalion was finally dumped in about ’97. Plenty of smart people have been fighting for a long time to rebuilt some version of that capability, testing all sorts of off-the-shelf systems (Scorpion, LAV, etc), but in typical US Army fashion, it has taken an entire generation+ to turn the wheel (tank tread?) right back to this, yet another test program.
Is this new vehicle going to be “dropable” like the 551?
Arguably it’s a return to a pretty old idea. From my understanding (and I may very well be mistaken) doctrinally MPF has a lot in common with the assault gun concept widely used by the Germans and Russians (and to a lesser extent by the US as well) during WW2.
Why are Infantry Soldiers testing this new tank? Why not 19 Series Soldiers?
While I don’t know for sure, I’m going to hazzard a guess that the guys actually manning the vehicles will be 19 series. Ultimately, MPF will be an infantry support weapon, so it makes a lot of sense that they would want the infantry’s opinion on whether it suits their needs of not. You could make in argument that MPF has more in common with the mission set of the artillery than what we might think of as a tankers job.
They are 19 series Soldiers. I saw the announcement on the Thunderbolt Chapter of United States Cavalry and Armor Association ‘s FB page about a month ago.
Why can’t a separate Bn be stood up as has been done in the past at Bragg? Armor can be chopped as the mission requires affording the commander the capability to weight the effort. That’s also how the Marines did it when they had tanks.
It can be disadvantageous splitting one’s armored capability throughout a unit. Doctrinially, you don’t do that with tanks.
Since all company commanders attend the same course, literacy is less an issue now than it was when we had separate advanced courses. In any case, it’s not insurmountable. Worst case, the armored unit’s leadership can provide the expertise as we did it back in the day across branches. When I was chopped to an Armor BN as their Infantry company I advised the BN Commander on the best way to employ his attached Infantry.
Ranges might be a bigger issue until they are built but light units have TOW ranges and in the worst case we can do what we did back in the day and travel to a post that has facilities e.g. the tank unit at Campbell (if they get one) goes to Knox.
Throughout the Cold War, we maintained outstanding crew competency with only two tank gunneries a year where units had to travel to Graf. We did the same with the Bradleys. At home station which often didn’t even have a decent range for the M16 we used simulators, sub cal devices and the local training areas for our vehicle crews.
I’m not sure “tank” is the right way to think about the MPF program. To me, these seem to have more in common with the assault gun concept. It’s almost more useful to think of it as direct fire artillery. It’s not really intended to fill a roll similar to what M1s. It’s kind of like an inverse of the relationship from an Armored brigade where the tank is the primary weapon, and the infantry are there to protect remove obstacles for the tanks. MPF is designed around the exact opposite relationship.
The GDLS candidate’s turret is based on the Abrams with a M1A2 Sep V3 fire control system and CITV (Commander’s Independent Thermal Viewer) along with one 105 mm cannon. One 12.7mm heavy machine gun is mounted on the commander hatch.
The BAE Systems proposal has the same armament, though with their own FCS. I’m not sure I see the point you are trying to make. I assume you are implying the vehicle is a tank and should be thought of as one because of its armament.
I would argue that is false.
The Stryker M1128 MGS is a tank by that definition as it carries all the same weapons. During WW2 many US tanks and tank destroyers carried the same main guns. Many German assault guns carried the same main guns as their tanks.
I think you are reading into the MPF’s role and reaching back to WWII use. If that’s the case we had plenty of light tanks then.
Assault guns are considered artillery. Artillery is typically not assigned an anti-armor mission though it may be pressed into that role. The overwhelming majority of assault guns did not have a turret allowing 360 degree offensive action. That’s a key feature of a tank.
The M1128 has no where near the level of protection that the MPF does. It also does not6 have tracks, a defining feature of tanks. Armored cars have wheels.
In WWII we also had light tanks. They often supported infantry missions but were always considered tanks.
I suspect I am doing a bad job of explaining my point, but I will try again.
I am not trying to argue that the MPF doesn’t meet the physical definition of what we would think of as a modern light tank. It most certainly does. My intention in referencing the assault gun concept was to try and help explain why the Army isn’t planning to concentrate MPF vehicles into their own maneuver element.
Indeed you said in your post about spreading MPF vehicles throughout infantry formations saying “Doctrinally, you don’t do that with tanks.” I would argue that doctrinally the MPF isn’t a “tank” in the more modern meaning of the term, which we tend to associate with the “Main Battle Tank” concept, and the Army itself knows that.
I haven’t seen any official documentation from the Army calling MPF a tank (please correct me if I am mistaken), and that is most likely intentional because it isn’t intended to be used as a tank. At least not in the same way we have conceptualized the “conventional” tank’s role since the creation of the Main Battle Tank concept. So the Army is intentionally trying to distance MPF from the baggage of Main Battle Tank doctrine by not even calling it a tank in the first place. Kind of like how officially, the M551 Sheridan wasn’t a “tank” but an “Armored Reconnaissance/Airborne Assault Vehicle.”
Perhaps a better parallel to draw would be to call the MPF a rebirth of the “Infantry Tank” concept than the “Assault Gun” concept. The basic idea is the same; an armored vehicle with a large caliber (by the standards of the time) main gun whose primary design and doctrinal goal is as an infantry support weapon, but where the physical execution of the concept is closer to what we would think of as a conventional tank than a self-propelled artillery piece. Think Matilda 2 or early model Panzer 4’s. Both of which interestingly fall into the same general weight class as MPF if I am correct.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/M56_Scorpion
You’ve linked a Wikipedia page to a self propelled anti-tank gun. Something which is neither an assault gun or a light tank. Feel free to explain how you feel this is relevant to the conversation at hand.
I guess you didn’t read the entry.
The 82d previously had this capability with the Sheridan M551A1 ARAAVs assigned to the 3/73 Armor Battalion. That battalion was deactivated sometime in the mid to late 90’s – at the time they were they only airborne capable armor in the free world. I believe that since then the 1/73 was attached and are currently using LAVs, so the 82d already has some light armor. In the 80’s an 90’s there was a pretty serious program searching for a Sheridan replacement – the Armored Gun System if memory serves. That was discontinued for reasons I am not privy to, but suspect funding issues during the Clinton administration. Perhaps that has finally come to fruition.
The Russians had and have Airborne Armor. Back in the 90’s they had the ASU 85 and the BMD. They currently field the BMD4.
SImilar to the USMC the russian paras are their own branch and hence can get their special toys funded. As history has shown since the M551 the US Army chops that specialty role vehicle time and again to fund other projects. If the USMC was a corps within the US Army they would probably not have their amphibious vehicles as well, because there were other more important things to fund. And yes, if the paras were part of the russian army, they would have to take what they would be given by big army. No parachute tanks. See also how the russian naval infantry is constantly running on a budget and older equipment. There are many similar examples arond the world, wehre a specialty force gets cut short by the big army’s requirements and priorities.
So my crystal ball tells me, that this programme is again going to end in abandonment and US Army airborne will have to make do with a handfull of M1128 MGS Strykers instead. Or find a way to move an M1 around by plane.
Having a light tank in each company, available to be assigned to whichever platoon needs support is great. I don’t think the intent is to have them operate together as a maneuver element. More like another fire support asset, sim to an organic mortar section providing immediate support where the company needs it.
What about a short-range training round for the main gun? I’m not a tanker so I don’t know if something like that could work but it could facilitate getting your CALFX on.
There are sub-cakiber training devices. Basically a small barrel put into the cannon tube shooting some machine cannon round in moist cases. You can also use laser training systems to good effect. Computer simulated training has come a long way as well, but that leaves out the infantrymen obviously.
I’m not sure I understand the idea. I thought the Styker MGS was goingbto full this role in the Light Divisions and was procured with the Airborne Division in mind? Why another medium tank?
Seems like the concept of the Stryker Brigade kinda ruined that- turned into something that can’t quite roll off a 130 and fight maybe. Also could be a matter of support when you aren’t equipped for strykers. Reading about the MPF further it’s meant to have some deliberate performance compromises in favor of maintenance,-things like a less powerful engine in the GD protos that’s light enough for a mount system that lets you literally slide the whole package right out of the back of the tank. Haven’t seen as much about the BAE tank pictured yet
I’ve been scouring the internet since reading this trying to get more information. Here we are talking about using a C17 instead of C130’s so I’m sure two of them can roll off that easily ready to fight. I’m just not understanding why the vehicle we already have doesn’t fill this role now? As far as support goes, they may not be equipped for Strykers but they are certainly not equipped for a vehicle that doesn’t exist yet either. Seems like it would be easier to set up the support for a vehicle with a current program of record. I’m just having trouble wrapping my head around this concept. I’ve seen the threat profiles they were testing against it and its the usual less modern ATGM’s and main gun rounds. I wish I could find a paper explaining this better.
The Stryker MGS never worked out as intended. Spend most time sitting in a motor pool.
The M1128 had a lot of teething problems. The crew compartment used to overheat terribly and shooting on the move was a real challenge. The chassis was extremely challenged containing the recoil of the 105 gun. Wouldn’t surprise me if firing at a 90 degree angle from the centerline flipping the vehicle. They also had terrible ammo storage.
I haven’t seen any reports in the last decade of any real use.
1per130, 3perC17 . And it was the BAE with the slide out motor mounting instead of the GD. Saw the same mentions on the 1128, along with poor ammo load . Understand the confusion, might be something more nuanced that’s driving this, interesting that they’re looking for some Marine sales too. Guess we’ll just have to see how it plays out.
Infantry regiment tank company.
Infantry regiment cannon company.
What’s old is new again.