Washington (June 11, 2025) – In response to current world events and in support of the strategic objectives outlined in the Army Transformation Initiative, the U.S. Army has issued a termination for convenience of the current low-rate initial production of the M10 Booker Combat Vehicle and will not enter into full-rate production as originally planned.
The Army will request to reallocate the remaining funds in fiscal 2025 to accelerate fielding of war-winning capabilities and anticipates additional significant savings to be fully realized within the next 18-24 months.
Formerly known as the Mobile Protected Firepower, the M10 Booker low-rate initial production contract was awarded in June 2022 to General Dynamics Land Systems for the production and fielding of up to 96 vehicles. The ongoing contract termination process will ultimately determine the disposition of the remaining assets.
Although M10 Booker production will conclude, the Army appreciates the efforts of the team and Soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division who worked on the program.
By U.S. Army Public Affairs
A bit of a surprise but not unexpected.
From my understanding the MPF efforts were in response to troops needing direct heavy fire support. The semi successful Stryker MGS tried to fill that gap between Bradley and the Abrams. Thus born the MPF program.
Now their axeing this for what exactly?
Looking at the War in Ukraine, heavy direct fire support by MBTs repelling Russian offensive actions and supporting Ukrainian offensive action have been invaluable.
“Now their axeing this for what exactly?”
I’d say it’s likely due to requirements creep.
Initially this thing was supposed to be airlanded on a C130. Requirements were added to add more capability, which increased system weight. I’ve seen estimates of 38 tons for the M10 in its final configuration. That is definitely not going to be carried in a C130, which means it’s going in a C17 likely.
C17’s would be able to carry ~2 M10 Bookers with their vehicle crews at most. When you consider a C17 can carry 102 paratroopers ready to jump/18 463L pallets with supplies, that’s a pretty singificant reduction in power projection.
And I’m not sure if that estimate I saw was for a combat-loaded M10. If it was a base vehicle weight, then ammo/supplies added to that vehicle means you would likely see only one per C17, with other vehicles/Soldiers cross-loaded. That means you aren’t able to get a section to the ground rapidly. And an M10 booker operating solo would be unlikely to do well in a JFE situation.
Add to this wanting to make every IBCT now “Mobile Brigade Combat Teams” with ISV’s and the juice must not have been worth the squeeze to keep them.
Training and maintenance were going to be real issues too. They were concerned that Booker crews simply weren’t going to be able to train with everyone else enough, and have limited training opportunities in general there on base. It’s really pretty similar to why the marines dropped the Abrams – lot of overhead, hard to train, maybe not super capable where we think we’re going. The 25th is playing with some ultralight stuff in their Cav units too.
The USMC won’t have that heavy fire support now that they no longer have the Abrams. I always thought the M10 would have been a better fit for the Marines.
I think there were 2 issues, both design/requirements related.
The BAE submission (a modernized M8) fit the program’s overall goal better, and would have been easier to deal with, with regard to logistics. The problem was that in order to achieve that there were some severe human engineering drawbacks.
Simply put, it wasn’t ergonomic, and had extreme issues with crew egress, especially wounded crew.
The GD submission (M10), being a derivative of the Ascod II/Griffin chassis, had better medium caliber cannon protection and much more room, in addition to using a derivative of the Abram’s turret and FCS…though all of that contributed to a much larger, heavier vehicle.
The second problem was that neither had an active protection system, making them extremely vulnerable. There were talks about adding an APS to the M10 later, but that exacerbates the weight issue.
In all honesty, the requirements for the MPF should have specified either all around 14.5 protection (roughly Stanag Level 4) at most, or frontal arc 14.5 protection and all around 12.7 protection. It should have also specified an APS…increasingly we’re hearing rumors that some of the APS systems may have some limited capability vs auto cannon fire. Regardless, an APS would make the MPF much more survivable in a modern LSCO environment.
Then there is, you could say, the third issue…which is logistics and sustainment. In its adopted form, the MPF (M10) would have been difficult to deploy (as you note) and a huge strain on support. I really can’t fathom how they didn’t foresee that or at least seriously study the impact of a 40 ton fighting vehicle in an airborne unit.
The sad reality is that this program may have been a decent idea, but was horribly flawed from a requirements and design perspective. Maybe part of that is due to an unwillingness to make compromises, but it sure looks like some of those compromises could have been avoided with more attention to design/requirements.
When I said, “for what exactly” I wasn’t meaning the reasons as to why they are dropping it but rather what are they dropping it for?
I might be wrong but I am pretty sure they dropped the fantasy idea of it being air droppable after experience from the M551 Sheridan. It was just never going to practically work.
From my understanding the main driver was that they wanted it to be lighter than the M1 Abrams. Planners and logisticians have been complaining for years about the ever increasing weight of western MBTs and how the weight exacerbates the ability to transport and deploy. To put into prospective since you bring it up, a C-17 already struggles with a stripped down M1A2.
It’s now 2025 and after multiple R&D delays, budgeting issues, and program cancellations – we still don’t have a replacement for the M551 Sheridan. A platform that had drawbacks, but was improved over time. With a few tweaks it could’ve continued to be modernized. The closest we’ve come is procuring the Wiesel 1/2, but even that effort was stupidly cancelled. This is an all around embarrassment and abject failure that’s on-going.