Over the weekend, Japanese X account @teppoblog surprised us with a post listing National Stock Numbers associated with the Lightweight Intermediate Caliber Cartridge (LICC) Individual Weapon System (IWS), a novel weapon and ammunition manufactured by FN America. We reached out to several sources to validate the NSNs and they came back as real. We must point out that Teppoblog has a history of sharing correct info.
The LICC IWS project originated in 2019 from requirements provided to the Irregular Warfare Technology Support Directorate (IWTSD), a government office, which is responsible for conducting research and development in support of U.S. and allied organizations involved in Irregular Warfare. In fact, one of those sponsors of this system, Canada Special Operations Forces Command just nominated the program’s caliber, 6.5 x 43mm (.264) for NATO Standardization. FN America was awarded a development contract and we’ve kept up on the program with a couple of updates. Last November, FN delivered carbines, machines guns, suppressors, and ammunition to several SOF organizations.
The LICC IWS has four purpose-built components:
• Lightweight ammunition family
• Improved Performance Carbine
• 25-round purpose-built, polymer magazine
• Signature Suppressor
These new NSNs pertain to the three variants of the Improved Performance Carbine (11.5” Close Quarters Battle (CQB), 14.5” Carbine, and 18.5” Recce (Designated Marksmanship Rifle)) as well as two suppressors associated with the system.
The NSNs are:
NSN 1005-01-729-0039, FN IMPROVED PERFORMANCE CARBINE 12.5 IN CQB WITH BII*
NSN 1005-01-729-0052, FN IMPROVED PERFORMANCE CARBINE 14.5 IN CQB WITH BII
NSN 1005-01-729-0046, FN IMPROVED PERFORMANCE CARBINE 18.12 IN REECE (sic) WITH BII
NSN 1005-01-728-9868, SUPPRESSOR, FLOW 264 FOR IMPROVED PERFORMANCE CARBINE
NSN 1005-01-728-9874, SUPPRESSOR, FLOW 7.62 FOR IMPROVED PERFORMANCE CARBINE
*Basic Issue Items
The suppressors are manufactured by HUXWRX.
The NSNs are managed by the Special Operations Forces Support Activity at Lexington Bluegrass Army Depot and are available for requisition by Army, Navy, Marine, Air Force and SOCOM elements and activities.
Coincidentally, they’ve added a belt-fed machine gun to the capability in the form of the FN Evolys, but we still haven’t seen an NSN. Logic goes, that if the carbines have them, it should as well.
FN has also demonstrated versions of Evolys in 7.62 NATO and 6.5 CM in addition to the .264 model developed for this program. In fact, the first version of Evolys seen in the US was as the 6.8mm candidate for Next Generation Squad Automatic Rifle which rolled into NGSW. While it proved a desirable candidate for NGSW, it was too heavy for the specs spelled out in the requirement.
Due to the multiple caliber options, a forward leaning organization could buy the LICC machine gun and then arrange for the conversion kit from FN America for the desired caliber.
Likewise, we have not yet seen any Department of Defense Identification Codes (DODIC) for the ammunition. Not saying they don’t exist, but a reliable source of .264 ammunition is critical for adoption.
At any rate, these NSNs offer an opportunity for select DoD organizations (or perhaps Federal LE) to take advantage of the production contract associated with this program.
Cue comments stating “NGSW IS DOOMED!” in 3, 2, 1…
No. Not all of NGSW…the M250 and 6.8 Common are golden.
The M7, however, and the idea of 6.8 Common as a general issue carbine/rifle round, are done.
Soldiers don’t like the M7, there are reports about reliability issues, and the system as a whole is just too heavy.
We need another way to make the infantryman more lethal, but without an unacceptable increase in weapon/ammo load weight and bulk, and without an unacceptable reduction in the ammo count.
The IWS and LICC do that.
We’re living trough the 60’s again. 6.8 Common will replace 7.62 NATO, the M7 will live and die a short life, and we will end up with individual services procuring the IWS and 6.5×43, eventually sprawling DoD wide.
The system getting NSN’s and likely going operational with a NATO partner on our continent (Canada) is the movement needed to kickstart a real pathway away from NGSW-R.
One more time, the Army is not going to adopt 6.5 x 43. They’ve made their decision and it’s 6.8. Other services and countries? They might adopt 6.5 x 43, but the Army has selected a course of action and already invested heavily in it.
Rumors to the contrary aside, the Army is quite satisfied with what it selected. It survived the pre-DOGE night court and came out as a priority, with type classification and program acceleration. You will likely see changes to both the M7 and M250, but they aren’t going away.
The next hurdle for Army small arms is a new medium machine gun. I do not believe the Army knows how it wants to deal with this yet. There are lots of give and takes with each COA before them.
Once that is worked out, the future of the M4 will be addressed.
Ordnance Corps said a lot of the same things about the M14 and look at how that turned out.
And again. I’m not arguing that 6.8 Common or the M250 should go away…just the giant turd that is the M7.
“Ordnance Corps said a lot of the same things about the M14 and look at how that turned out.”
My rebuttal:
“The Ordnance Corps had a lot of complaints with the M16… Look how that turned out.”
See, I can do that too.
It seems the Army has spoken and has adopted the M7. If they were going to get rid of it they would have instead of type-classifying it. That kind of seems like the opposite of going away. So when do you see them getting rid of it? Keep in mind, we don’t have a ground war in southeast asia to justify rapid procurement of a replacement, and new rifles would be well below ships for the Navy/shipyards on DoD’s priority list now for procurement. Not to mention the Next Gen Air Dominance fighter/MV-75 Future Long Range Assault Aircraft for island hopping…
“Soldiers don’t like the M7.”
I’ve not heard complaints about the M7, Other components of the NGSW yes, but not the rifle itself. If you are hearing this, I’d be interested who you are talking to.
“there are reports about reliability issues”
You mean like there were reliability issues with the M16 in Vietnam when it was first fielded? That happens when you first field a weapons system large scale. Most of us don’t realize that because it has been over 60 years since a completely new weapons system was fielded large-scale.
“and the system as a whole is just too heavy”
Too heavy in comparison to what? The M4A1 with iron sights? Then yes. To a similar operating system in 5.56mm (the suppressed M27 the Marines have) then not really. There’s not as much of a weight difference there as you’d think. Not to mention what capability the Soldiers gain from the 6.8x51mm cartridge in comparison to the M855A1 out of the M27.
“We need another way to make the infantryman more lethal, but without an unacceptable increase in weapon/ammo load weight and bulk, and without an unacceptable reduction in the ammo count.”
I see these are 25-round magazines, so you still only will have 175 rounds vs. 210 rds. What makes 175 rounds ‘acceptable’ but 140 rounds are ‘too little’? That’s still only 80 percent of what the combat load is for the M4A1 if that is your ‘gold standard’ benchmark of amount of ammo carried. Your 175-round loadout is 7.3 lb. So what makes this better than giving 25-round magazines to the M7? That’s a much easier solution to get a similar ‘acceptable’ combat load.
“We’re living trough the 60’s again. 6.8 Common will replace 7.62 NATO, the M7 will live and die a short life, and we will end up with individual services procuring the IWS and 6.5×43, eventually sprawling DoD wide.”
Ummm… You realize if the DoD doesn’t go with the M7, then there will be nothing to replace it right? The stars aligned to have the right leadership in place in 2018 to champion the fact that the Close Combat Force needed a new system to give them the ability to engage threats on the modern battlefield. The Army selected 6.8x51mm: They looked at 6.5×48 caliber and did not want it. To come back to Congress 8 years later and say: “Sorry, we were wrong, we need 6.5×48 now” likely means that congress will tell the Army/DoD to come back when they have things figured out… in a decade. We’re not in a ground war now like we were in Vietnam, so there is nothing that can be used to justify changing weapons/calibers rapidly. Not to mention the Army doesn’t want to add another DODIC to the squad. They already have the M17, M320, and M250 all with individual DODIC’s for each. Keeping the M7 means several less DODIC’s that need to be managed at the SQD/PLT level.
Also, the Army has the lead on procurement for weapons for the DoD. If they go with the M7 (likely since they JUST type classified it) then the other branches will consider it first since economies of scale mean they can get more ‘bang for their (procurement) buck’ hopping in on the Army’s contract. Most of the other branches (to include SOCOM) are going to be risk-averse to having to spend significant amounts of money to procure weapons, and the ammo for them.
As such, which branch do you see championing spending their money on this? Air Force? Not enough trigger-pullers to justify it, plus fighter pilots can’t use them while flying. Navy? They’re worried about ships that they are having troubles building/maintaining. I doubt they are going to spend more on 6.5×48 for a very small portion (outside of SEALS who would get their stuff through SOCOM) of their overall force. Marines might be interested… But they’ve said the only thing that would be an acceptable replacement for their M27 would be a bullpup… Meaning this thing is automatically disqualified. Which leaves us with SOCOM who has been spending their funds on 6.5 Creedmoor.
“The system getting NSN’s and likely going operational with a NATO partner on our continent (Canada) is the movement needed to kickstart a real pathway away from NGSW-R.”
Just because a weapon has an NSN, doesn’t mean that it can be procured. I might have wanted a Mk12 when I was on active duty, and I could have gotten the NSN for it. But thinking my S4/G4 would bless off on purchasing one, let alone that TACOM/NSW Crane would give us one without a BOIP is laughable. Plus, how would I get ammo for that when there was no AA52/AA53 allocations in our STRAC?
Not to mention there’s this little nugget you all are overlooking:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/02/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-imposes-tariffs-on-imports-from-canada-mexico-and-china/
Canada has had tariffs imposed on them by the Trump administration. To think their civilian government (who would have to bless off on it) is going to be in a ‘sharing’ mood with a NATO partner is wildly optimistic at best. But if (somehow) this happened, there would have to be agreements between the US and Canada negotiated and ratified by congress… Who can’t even consistently pass a budget year to year.
Going with what you suggest here would likely mean that a 6.5x48mm weapon would not be fielded to Soldiers until the 2040’s at earliest in my opinion.
Re Complaints: You clearly need to get out an touch a little more grass.
There are dozens of YouTube videos, Reddit threads, message board threads, and assorted media of soldiers voicing their complaints with the M7. In fact, contrary to your assertion, the M7 (and the idea of issuing it as a general use carbine) is the least liked part of the system. The M250 actually is lighter than an M249, and provides ergonomic/manual of arms improvements that soldiers appreciate.
Re Reliability: Yes, the early M16’s had issues…because the government changed the spec on the ammo and issued them without cleaning kits in a jungle environment. Neither of those ills affect the M7. It’s using government spec ammo and presumably being fielded with nice Sig branded cleaning kits. If anything, I’d hazard that reported reliability problems are likely mag related, but still. That Vietnam comparison is bogus unless the issue comes back to the Army’s brain dead metal mag.
Re Weight: Yes, too heavy in comparison to the system that is being replaced. Sure, you can excuse any one aspect, but when you add it up (weapon, ammo, mags) it is a massive weight increase for the soldier. I love how everyone is concerned about lightening the soldier’s load, except for the Army with NGSW…and loads of retired shills that won’t have to carry the BS they push. The argument about capability is moot as well. M855A1 is more than lethal from a terminal perspective, and casualties in LSCO don’t come from small arms, they come from IDF and increasingly guided or semi guided munitions…not small arms.
Re Ammo Load: The M7 is being issued with 20rnd mags, not 25. Additionally, the issue that cuts the load is weight/bulk. 6.8 Common is measurably heavier and bulkier than an intermediate cartridge (because 6.8 Common isn’t an intermediate cartridge) and adding more 20 round 6.8 mags, or any amount of 25 round 6.8 mags, dramatically increases soldier load and bulk.
Re Procurement: What does 6.5 Creedmoor have to do with this? The Army started with an asinine requirement (defeating nonexistent Level IV equivalent body armor at range) and worked backwards. Per their internal testing a 6.8 ADVAP style projectile at high velocity could do this…badda bing, badda boom…NGSW becomes the ICSR on steroids.
History aside, this fictitious argument that we must choose between the M7 and nothing is garbage. None of the branches have trouble getting their pet small arms projects through, including the Army, which has tried this “M4 replacement” many times…they’ve cut their own attempts, not Congress. If the Army said they wanted to keep 3/4 of NGSW (6.8 Common/M250/FC) and move forward with an ACTUAL INTERMEDIATE CALIBER carbine, they could get that through. Especially if it was a carbine paid for by a US agency, being made by US defense contractors, with an existing TDP.
Also, nice apples to dinosaurs comparison with the Mk12. We both know that type of situation wasn’t what I was referring to.
Re Tariffs: Seriously? Now you just look silly. The IWS and LICC are a joint project between CANSOF and the IWTSD, being made by US defense contractors…in the US, and now the components have NSN’s, making them standardized and requisition-able.
There would be no need for additional international agreements, since it’s already a joint project. Moreso, are we really pretending that Canada has any ability to limit American procurement of a joint system, being made in the US, by the American MIC? Even if they wanted to start a fight over the tariffs, we all know that’s a fight the US would win 10/10 times. Pretending that Canada is the limiting factor here is just mind bogglingly stupid.
Final point, why do you keep bringing up 6.5×48 (Creedmoor)? The subject of my comment, and this SSD post, is the 6.5x43mm IWS weapons system and its LICC cartridge. Creedmoor and the LICC have 0 relation, you seem to be confused.
The funny thing is that you NGSW shills (or I should say M7 shills, since the rest of the program is fine) always give yourselves away.
You guys will debase yourselves by making the most asinine arguments in defense of the program’s legitimate failings and critiques, and you’ll outright lie or make the most wild fictitious arguments in doing so.
It’s a tell.
“There are dozens of YouTube videos, Reddit threads, message board threads, and assorted media of soldiers voicing their complaints with the M7. In fact, contrary to your assertion, the M7 (and the idea of issuing it as a general use carbine) is the least liked part of the system.”
Ah, because Soldiers never gripe about anything… And everything on social media/the internet must be true…
“Re Weight: Yes, too heavy in comparison to the system that is being replaced. Sure, you can excuse any one aspect, but when you add it up (weapon, ammo, mags) it is a massive weight increase for the soldier. I love how everyone is concerned about lightening the soldier’s load, except for the Army with NGSW…and loads of retired shills that won’t have to carry the BS they push. The argument about capability is moot as well. M855A1 is more than lethal from a terminal perspective, and casualties in LSCO don’t come from small arms, they come from IDF and increasingly guided or semi guided munitions…not small arms.”
Not sure how you have the argument that M855A1 is “more than lethal from a terminal perspective” than 6.8×51, but you do you. IDF and drones do claim a lot of casualties, but to assume they will have the same efficacy in a fight in the indo-pacific as they do in Ukraine is a dangerous assumption to make. Triple canopy jungle is a much more challenging environment to operate drones in. Weight is a valid concern but once again is it as big an increase as some have made out? I doubt it highly.
“History aside, this fictitious argument that we must choose between the M7 and nothing is garbage… If the Army said they wanted to keep 3/4 of NGSW (6.8 Common/M250/FC) and move forward with an ACTUAL INTERMEDIATE CALIBER carbine, they could get that through. Especially if it was a carbine paid for by a US agency, being made by US defense contractors, with an existing TDP.”
Ummm… That’s not how procurement works. The Army/DoD has to have requirements generated stating what capabilities they require. Those are validated by HQDA and submitted to congress for funding. If you kill something, that process starts over.
You say no trouble, but the last attempt to replace the M16/M4 was the XM8.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heckler_%26_Koch_XM8
Guess who killed it?
“The main testing was largely completed, and the army pushed for funding for a large field test. However, in 2004 Congress denied $26 million funding for 7,000 rifles to do a wide scale test fielding of the XM8 in 2005.”
So it took 20 years to finally get another system through requirements generation, get it funded by Congress, get it tested and type classified and started to field. THAT’s reality. Believing an organization who has to purchase at the scale the Army/DoD does can pivot rapidly on what is a major procurement with taxpayer dollars is highly optimistic.
“None of the branches have trouble getting their pet small arms projects through, including the Army, which has tried this “M4 replacement” many times…they’ve cut their own attempts, not Congress.”
Not sure now many other branches have been doing small arms projects, unless you mean SOCOM. SOCOM has had (what appears to be) little trouble because they are SOCOM… and they are not buying the quantities of weapons that HQDA (who has to (potentially) buy for the entire DoD) has to.
Like I’ve said in other posts, Cancelling the M7 and saying the Army/DoD needs another rifle are two different things. A fresh requirement for a rifle would be put on the back-burner now: DoD priorites for funding are the things needed for a peer fight in the Pacific: Ships, MV-75 FLRAA, and drones./missiles All the funding from the M7 would be purposed for that/other things in the DoD/congressional budget. And if you think Congress will support a rifle program right away after one has been cancelled, I like your optimism.
So like it or not, if you kill the M7, you are looking at likely 15-20 years before you see a replacement being fielded if history tells us anything. That also includes changes to the M4A1’s in the system currently.
“There would be no need for additional international agreements, since it’s already a joint project. Moreso, are we really pretending that Canada has any ability to limit American procurement of a joint system, being made in the US, by the American MIC? Even if they wanted to start a fight over the tariffs, we all know that’s a fight the US would win 10/10 times. Pretending that Canada is the limiting factor here is just mind bogglingly stupid.”
Okay, so it’s a joint project. Accepting your argument that Canda is a non-issue, I ask once again: Who in the DoD is going to be willing to champion it/spend their dollars on it? You didn’t address that point.
The Army is apparently going forward with the M7. So they’re not going to go for it. Most of the other branches will at least consider the M7, since they can save procurement dollars to use for other things if they piggyback off the Army’s contract. The Air Force brass could give two shits about a rifle, because they can’t use it in the cockpit of an airplane. The Marines have made their position abundantly clear from Modern Day Marine: They want to keep their M27’s. That leaves the Navy (who is trying to buy/repair ships), Space Force (who would likely follow the USAF’s lead)… or SOCOM.
SOCOM will not likely go for the LICC, because they’ve already invested in 6.5×48 (which thank you for pointing out I had that incorrect). Not to mention they can save their procurement dollars if they purchase M7’s to use for other things they need. So are they really going to spend their money on further procurement of this caliber? They have it as a requirement for the LAMG industry day, but I’d find it interesting if they pursue it further.
“The funny thing is that you NGSW shills (or I should say M7 shills, since the rest of the program is fine) always give yourselves away.
You guys will debase yourselves by making the most asinine arguments in defense of the program’s legitimate failings and critiques, and you’ll outright lie or make the most wild fictitious arguments in doing so.
It’s a tell.”
Okay, so what legitimate failings are we referring to? There are legitimate critiques (weight) which I’ve addressed by explaining weight difference isn’t as significant in as close to apples to apples comparison (suppressed M27 to M7) as you’d think. If you don’t agree, that’s fine. But like it or not, the M7 IS being fielded at this time. And the realities of procurement timelines/who will spend their funding to procure something always seem to be hand-waved away by critics. As you say:
“It’s a tell”
Re: “IDF and drones do claim a lot of casualties, but to assume they will have the same efficacy in a fight in the indo-pacific as they do in Ukraine is a dangerous assumption to make. Triple canopy jungle is a much more challenging environment to operate drones in.”
This is an interesting point. In a Ukraine-type fight the value of IDF and drones is quite clear. In a triple-canopy jungle the value of a round that is meant to defeat peer level body armor at distance then sits on shaky ground. That Indo-Pacific, jungle fight won’t be that, which points us right back to a previous comment/comparison to Vietnam in which we walked into that fight with the M14, realized it was too much, and rapid fielded the M16 in a less than ideal manner as history shows.
Yes, 25rd mags for the M7 are probably imminent. I think that salient data point of raw numbers of rounds carried from M4 vs. M7 will make the Army adjust planning on this. If it is driven by operational and/or testing or not, I think it’ll happen because it is one of the more visible differences.
LICC can also scale to include 30rd mags just as easily and now we’re back to apples to apples comparison to the legacy carbine.
The M7 isn’t going anywhere and I’m not debating that. NGSW is bringing more good to the table than bad. It does what the Army has asked it to do. It doesn’t mean it’s all good.
For me, as that hobbyist historian who looks at the decisions of Army small-arms procurement decisions and how they eventually played out with bemused wonder all I see of the M7 is the return of a modern M14.
First off, few troops have actually fielded let alone even fired the guns. Most of what you see online are complaints from people who aren’t involved in the process at any level and have never even touched an M7, let alone fired it. Even that goofy Captain at Amphibious Warfare School only claims to have “observed fielding”. What’s more, his observations weren’t backed up with any form of data collection. He just made assertions and never bothered to back them up. In the end, he serves as an excellent “useful idiot” for the his host’s aspirations to maintain a truly overweight rifle decked out with heavy enablers.
As far as “shills”, no, there are two types of people. Those who understand how the system works and are happy the Soldier is getting a more lethal system, and those who are uninformed and sit around and fantasize. They get angry because they believe they are smarter than the Army and are upset because the Army didn’t do exactly what they wanted it to. Go read up on the 5000 series.
Ray is absolutely right, get your way and kill this and the Army is facing the future with the M4, no improvements, because Congress, who holds the purse strings was told this issue has been fixed. And it has, just not the way you wanted.
Adding the Evolys is a step in the right direction. Thing weighs 12.5 lbs. Keep cutting the weight of belt-fed platforms and ammunition loadout will become less of an issue. There’s no reason there can’t be an 8lb belt-fed LMG, they almost got there with an experimental model of the Stoner 63 LMG.
I mean the Knights LAMG, which is a stoner design, is like 8.6 lbs so we’re pretty much there.
KAC AMG weighs less than 9 lbs.
“KAC AMG weighs less than 9 lbs.”
The 5.56mm version of the KAC LAMG according to open sources (Wikipedia) is 9.9 lb. The 6.5 Creedmoor version of this (the one likely to be used as a basis for 6.5 x 43) is approximately 12.75 lb.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knight%27s_Armament_Company_LAMG
That doesn’t account for a suppressor, which both SOCOM/HQDA want. So I don’t think that you’re quite making the argument you think you are.
I got that straight off the KAC AMG product data sheet.
“I got that straight off the KAC AMG product data sheet.”
Okay, so you got the weight for the 5.56 variant off the fact sheet at 8.6 lb. I assume? That’s pretty cool actually, but that would not translate into a machine gun in .264 International being ~ 8 lb. The closest it sounds like they are going to get in anything larger than 5.56mm is a 12.75 lb. weapon, which is what KAC’s 6.5 Creedmoor version is approximately weighing now:
https://soldiersystems.net/2024/10/23/ussocom-to-hold-industry-day-for-lightweight-machine-gun-assault/
I’d be interested once again if that 8.6 lb. includes a suppressor, which once again is a requirement for both the NGSW and the SOCOM industry day. None of the Machine guns posted on KAC’s website are shown as suppressed, so I’d say likely no:
https://www.knightarmco.com/product/military/machine-gun
“Adding the Evolys is a step in the right direction.”
Step in the right direction for who? If you are referring to DoD, what makes it a step in the right direction in comparison to the M250?
“Thing weighs 12.5 lbs.”
The M250 is 13.0 lb., and the 6.8x51mm provides way more capability for the squad than the 6.5x43mm.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M250_light_machine_gun
“Keep cutting the weight of belt-fed platforms and ammunition loadout will become less of an issue.”
There’s cutting weight, and then there’s cutting weight so much it reduces service life. 8 lb. could be theoretically possible but will definitely impact service life. The Mk46/48 were light, but had service lives significantly shorter than the M240/M249 with significantly higher costs. Cutting weight also may not make sense when you consider containing the higher chamber pressures that these cartridges have.
“There’s no reason there can’t be an 8lb belt-fed LMG, they almost got there with an experimental model of the Stoner 63 LMG.”
Well you say that but… SOCOM’s industry day for the Lightweight Machine Gun-Assault states their threshold requirement for system weight is 17 lb. with an objective of 12.75 lb. If SOCOM is not even shooting for an overall system weight of < 10 lb., it would suggest that the technology does not exist. Or if it does, it's not cost effective due to service life/cost of procurement even for them. Plus, I doubt the Stoner 63 you reference had requirements of being suppressed.
https://soldiersystems.net/2024/10/23/ussocom-to-hold-industry-day-for-lightweight-machine-gun-assault/
Also, at a certain point, cutting weight will mean increased felt recoil for the firer of a machine gun. Controllability will be important for using a machine gun in the automatic rifle role. I say that because if you look closely, you'll note that the Evolys does not have pintle mounts present: Suggesting it is focused on the AR role vs. being mounted on a tripod like you would with the LMG.
SOCOM wants the KAC LAMG but in 7.62. For some reason, SOCOM can’t figure out that if they insist on 7.62, the gun has to be reengineered and will be heavier.
WHAT!? Fantastic for, FN America!
Did they shorten the receiver of the short-action Evolys to be more “AR-12” sized?
No
5.56x45mm NATO
6x38mm ARC
6.5×43 LICC IWS
6.5 M1200, DODIC AC58 (Creedmoor)
6.8×51 NGSW
7.62x35mm (Blackout)
7.62x51mm NATO
.300 Win Mag
.300 Norma Mag
.338 Norma Mag
.50 BMG
Shoulder fired rifle cartridges currently or very recently in service with the DOD for PDW’s, Carbines, Rifles, and Machine Guns.
Did I miss any?
There was that 9mm SMG contract just a couple of years ago. Memory is foggy, but I think it was B&T that won it.
Sub Compact Weapon
Left that one out as I was specifically looking at rifle cartridges. Not pistol cartridges fired in a rifle.
What about converting the current family of 5.56 firearms to 6Max?
From everything I have seen online, it seems to outperform 5.56 in every way. My understanding is that, unlike 6Arc, it is also optimized for feeding full auto.
It also looks like the subsonic options outperform 300 blackout.
“What about converting the current family of 5.56 firearms to 6Max?”
The Army did testing prior to submitting requirements for the NGSW.
As I understand it, they looked at pretty much everything (including wildcats at the time) that would be likely to be fired in an AR10/AR15 platform. And based off their analysis, the 6.8x51mm provided what they were looking for in a cartridge.
Caliber selection was done based off the requirements they came up with it had to meet. Some (like muzzle velocity, grain weight of projectile) were inherent to the cartridge design. But some I’d imagine were based off integrating the caliber to the Soldier. Just based off muzzle velocity/energy on target, .50 caliber would win… But then you’d have Soldiers looking like Kirkwood Smith in ‘Robocop’ trying to do CQB with an M82 Barrett. So other factors like barrel length, cartridge weight/volume were likely assessed as well.
All of this was done well before the NGSW was submitted to Congress for funding NGSW and asking for 6.8x51mm.
Coming up with a caliber after the weapon is fielded is shutting the barn door after the horse has left, got in a twelve-step program for oat addicition, sought employment elsewhere, moved to a new town, got a new house, got married, and had two foals, one of whom won the triple crown. In short: It’s waaaay to late to change the caliber unless you go back to square one with a new requirement… Which Congress will tell the Army “you’ve got .264 international at home” and tell them to suck it up.
Also, cancelling the M7 right now would mean all those funds would be prioritized for other things by congress. Contrary to popular belief, it doesn’t just sit in some Scrooge McDuckian vault waiting to be repurposed for a rifle: That money would go to buying new ships/planes… Or it would go back to congress to be used for something else.
So there is simply no way to change the caliber at this point for the M4A1 or M7 unless you go back to congress with a new requirement to be funded AFTER cancelling the M7. And considering the NGSW is the fastest Army (not SOCOM) weapons program I’ve seen, that would mean at the minimum 8 years from today would be the earliest weapons would be in Soldier’s hands… If congress approved funding for it today. And since they approved funding for the 6.8x51mm ammo to be purchased/Army plants to be built to manufacture it… I don’t see that happening any time within the next decade if the Army cancelled the M7.
Ray,
From a procurement and allocation point of view, that makes a lot of sense. I appreciate the thorough reply.
Thanks for reading my very wordy rant. I know it seems like changing a caliber/ upper receiver swap should something that should be easy enough to change, as it is definitely technically possible with the weapon. But getting it paid for by congress takes a lot of steps most people don’t consider.
You don’t seem to understand that a caliber swap costs just as much as a new weapon, particularly in this case as .264 requires a new lower receiver as well as upper receiver, ie a new weapon.
Read this…. https://soldiersystems.net/2010/04/12/the-future-of-us-army-small-arms/
What’s more, ammo costs are by far the bulk of a weapon program’s costs over the life cycle.
In 2010 dollars, up front it cost $300 million in infrastructure costs every time the Army adopts a new cartridge.