I had the opportunity to spend a few days this last week at Fort Benning, Georgia. It is now the U.S. Army’s Maneuver Center but has been known as “The Home of the Infantry” even longer. I went ostensibly because of my Nephew’s graduation from Infantry One Station Unit Training (OSUT). However, I traveled early specifically because I had additional objectives in mind. It was a perfect excuse for me to at least briefly observe training first hand and engage some of the training cadre. My time was short so my impressions below are admittedly not scientific or comprehensive. Still, I spent a great part of my professional career quickly assessing the capabilities and status of individuals and units. Therefore, I have reasonably strong confidence in the accuracy of these snapshot assessments. While there, I met with OSUT Drill Sergeants, Officer Candidate School (OCS) Tactical Officers (TACs) and even members of the 1st SFAB.

I will start by enthusiastically and shamelessly plugging the National Infantry Museum (NIM) that is located just outside one of the Post’s gates just off Victory Drive. I actually visited the NIM twice. The first time by myself and the second time with my Nephew and his family. It is an impressive and ultra-modern historical facility and is open and free to the public. There is everything one would expect from a museum focused on the Infantry. Like small arms and support weapons displays – including never fielded experimental items – broken down by era. Likewise, uniforms and field gear. Touch screens accompany many displays and provide background and context on the history of the individual exhibits. For those that appreciate the art of scale modeling, as I do, there are a number of examples displayed throughout the museum including several impressive professionally built dioramas of battle scenes. If I had more time, I would have gone through a couple more times. The NIM alone is worth the side trip if you happen to be in the area.

On my second visit to the NIM, I had one of my better Forrest Gump moments. That is I was in the right place at the right time. By sheer coincidence, it happened that the 1st SFAB had their official activation ceremony on the parade field behind the museum mid-day on Thursday. I cannot tell you who was in the reviewing stand on the far side of the field or who spoke at the ceremony. I observed the event from the second level observation windows of the NIM. I had a great view – but no sound! Two things stuck out immediately about the unit formation. First, as to be expected, it is much smaller than a standard modern maneuver Brigade. Second, it is a combined arms and multifunctional organization. There were infantry, artillery, engineer, combat support and combat service support company guidons on display.

SSD has already reported on their revised beret color. In person, it is dark brown as the pic he posted most recently showed. No mistaking it for the SF green or Ranger tan berets. Likewise, the revised patch is more distinct than the earlier version. I talked in passing to a handful of the younger SFAB NCOs after the ceremony. They were all combat vets – as were most of the NCOs and Officers I saw from the unit. Not to say there were not some without combat patches, but they were few in number compared to those with combat experience. To a man, they were eager to get on with their upcoming deployment. In short, they seemed sharp, disciplined, motivated and ready to take on their mission. As I have said on this site before, I have concerns about meeting their long-term personnel sustainment needs or if the Army can find enough talent to stand up six SFABs total. However, I do believe the mission is valid and, based on everything I have seen and read, I am convinced this first unit is well prepared to tackle this critical assignment.

I had hoped to spend some quality time with the Black Hats at Airborne School but had only limited success. I observed training for the students in ground week for a couple of hours. Specifically the aircraft exit drills on the 34’ Towers. Not much has changed in this phase of the school since WWII or when I went through decades ago. No surprise, the mechanics of jumping out of a fixed wing aircraft in flight or the physics of how a parachute canopy functions have not really needed to evolve much over the years. Consequently, although the students were wearing ACHs rather than steel pots or camouflaged ACUs rather than OD green fatigues, the drills looked exactly the same. The tempo of the drills and the student to instructor ratio was such that I did not get to talk with the Black Hats there. They were simply too busy for me to feel comfortable interrupting their rhythm. I had intended to go out to Fryar Drop Zone on Wednesday. The Cadre Drop Zone Safeties usually have down time between aircraft sorties and I knew that was my best opportunity. However, it drizzled rain all that day and I unfortunately did not have the option of rescheduling.

I did get to spend two early mornings with the TACs at OCS during their 0545 PT sessions. It was my first formal exposure to some of the newer PT techniques that the Army is transitioning towards. For old timers, the most obvious difference is that PT is a lot quieter than it used to be. Not any “in cadence…exercise” involved in the new system. There were still traditional pushups as well as a number of variations, pullups, dips, fireman’s carries and tire rolls. In short, it was not as exotic or unfamiliar as I might have expected. In fact, it just looked a lot more like the small team / individualized PT I had seen and practiced for years in SF units. Of course that means it was quite different from the centralized and regimented system I had experienced in line infantry units way back when. I do not know if this system will ultimately result in better overall physical conditioning. I do suspect that it will generate fewer long-term joint issues than the old system routinely produced. In any case, by the end of those hour plus drills I observed, it seemed obvious that the OCS Candidates were getting a good workout.

I, of course, spoke to my Nephew quite a bit about his experiences in OSUT. I also talked to a number of his compadres. They were all sharp, disciplined, respectful, and showed appropriate pride in their uniforms – as one would expect of newly minted infantrymen. It would be fair to say that they seemed a hell of a lot more professional than my peers and I were at the same point in 1975. However, since the new guys did not have any real frame of reference, it was the Drill Sergeants that I was most interested in surveying. During the week, I spoke one on one with four different Drills, one from E Co, and three from C Co, 54th Infantry (OSUT). As one would expect, they were an impressive bunch of leaders and trainers. All had CIBs, some with multiple tours, all were airborne and one had his Ranger Tab. They certainly compared favorably with the Vietnam veteran Drill Sergeants that trained me.

I will summarize what we discussed beyond exchanging war stories. They were generally comfortable with the product that they were putting out to the force. They emphasized to me that they had already incorporated portions of the 2016, TC 3-22.9: Rifle and Carbine, during the Basic Rifle Marksmanship (BRM) portion of OSUT. In fact, Drill Sergeants were required to rotate through a formal marksmanship program on post specifically to learn how to train what was in the TC. They saw that as a significant positive and thought as a result that BRM was much improved from just a couple of years ago. Still, we all agreed that the new guys did not really know their ass from a hole in the ground yet – but they had proven to be trainable. However, we also agreed that they were no more clueless than we had all been at their age and level of training.

A generation in the Army is about six years. You can tell because every six years or so some young promotable Sergeant, Staff Sergeant or First Lieutenant will write a letter to the Army Times bemoaning the supposed FACT that today’s entry level soldiers are no longer as well trained, disciplined, patriotic or professional as they were when he or she came in. Of course, the “grizzled veteran” is oblivious to the fact that someone said exactly the same thing about him when he was a cherry soldier. After observing this cycle a few times, it becomes predictable and humorous. Often the alarm is raised because someone saw a ragbag or two at some airport. And, of course, that in turns means all new soldiers are ragbags. If you think an occasional disheveled soldier is a new phenomenon you must not have passed through an airport in the 70s, 80s, 90s or 2000s.

But, the alarmist will say, the standards have obviously been lowered! Standards change all the time. True, not all changes produce the intended results. In that case, standards will be readjusted yet again. Rigidly adhering to the old techniques because that “is how it has always been done” is even more counterproductive and ultimately dysfunctional than experimenting with change. The new PT routine I mentioned above is one example that may or may not be perfectly successful but will likely at least reduce rates of injury over time. But, but…the minimum standards are too low. This argument is entirely subjective so it is a little harder to refute. Most professional soldiers believe in demanding and achieving the highest practical standards – individually and collectively. I do. But do not fall into this trap. You will notice that the guy who can run fast always thinks the minimum run times should be shortened. If he is less confident about his upper body strength, he will argue just as energetically against raising the pushup standards.

Likewise, the guy who readily shoots expert thinks “marksman” is too low a standard. Alternatively, the guy who is already bilingual or learns languages easily always thinks 2/2 should be the minimum entry-level score for SF soldiers. I for one would not have gotten into SF if that had been the minimum standard. Each and every one of us have probably been in a situation where we were eternally grateful that the minimum passing standard was no higher than it was. My observations at Fort Benning led me to conclude that the minimum standards are being strictly enforced and that those new infantrymen, soldiers seeking those silver wings and candidates reaching for a commission are, in fact, doing far better than the minimums.

Let us talk about symbols. Are hats or beret colors important to you?  Probably not. Ask any Green Beret and he will tell you that it is not the hat that makes the man and therefore the beret is not that important. He will be sincere when he says that, but just try to take that piece of felt away from him and suddenly it is important. Symbols in the military are significant and powerful. They are magic. But they only have as much magic power as we infuse them with – sometimes even including baptism with the blood of heroes. I thought of that magic as I pinned my Nephew’s infantry blue cord on his ASUs on Thursday morning. Symbols like that cord, or jump wings and jump boots, or tabs, or combat patches can simultaneously mean nothing…and everything.

I personally appreciate the passion that symbols evoke – often manifested in the comments on this site. I was in when GEN(R) Rogers took away the Airborne maroon beret and GEN(R) “Sly” Meyers gave it back a few years later. Paratroopers had complained about the beret until it was no longer authorized – then they wanted it back. Now it would be all but impossible to take it away from them again. GEN(R) Shinseki wanted to harness that symbolic power when he made the decision about issuing the black beret. I respect him and think he was well intentioned. Unfortunately, it has not worked. The Army has never managed to infuse the black beret with any magic. If it went away tomorrow, it is not likely that there would be much of a fight to keep it. However, those kids at OSUT did not know all of that history or drama and seemed genuinely proud to be wearing their berets. As a side note, I admit that I had not noticed before that the generic blue Army flash is a good match in color to that infantry blue cord.

Everyone I observed and talked to at Fort Benning gave me confidence in the future. These young people and their instructors are ably carrying on the traditions of selfless service the American people expect. The Army is sound and the Republic is not in any jeopardy with them – ever vigilant – on the parapets. They are at least as capable and motivated as those that served in my formative years and on par with every generation of soldiers I have served with since. Bottom line, they ARE as well trained, disciplined, patriotic and professional as we “old timers” like to think we were. My Nephew starts Jump School on Monday.

LTC Terry Baldwin, US Army (Ret) served on active duty from 1975-2011 in various Infantry and Special Forces assignments. SSD is blessed to have him as both reader and contributor.

Lately there has been quite a bit of talk about the connection between history, professional military education and quality training on this site. Perhaps we can all initially agree on a couple of facts to frame some additional discussion. First, war is a bloody art form much more than it is a science and requires continuous study and practice to truly master even at the tactical level. Second, planning, managing and conducting good training is also an art – and in many ways is just as hard to master. For the sake of brevity, I am going to address training separately in part two of this article so that we can concentrate on history as a component of professional education up front.

So how can studying history help make you a better soldier and build stronger units? To be sure there is an important caveat; any “lessons” gleaned from history cannot and will not give definitive answers to today’s military questions. The past is not some accurate predictive tool that can somehow be used to prophesize future outcomes. Nevertheless, the study of history certainly often provides valuable context that can and does serve to inform decision makers in the present. Therefore, it is safe to say that seeking to understand events and characters in history does indeed teach and enlighten.

Obviously countless others have had a similar opinion about the enormous utility of historical study. I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that a great many notable historical figures have been self-acknowledged students of history. That has certainly been true of military leaders. Roman generals like Caesar studied the writings of the ancient Greek warriors intently. Not just to learn how they fought, but also how they successfully trained, motivated and sustained those earlier formidable armies. Later others studied Caesar’s campaigns to capture his insight into war. Each generation in turn contributing and perpetuating an unbroken military historiographic circle of life.

We now live in a golden age of information. I have more educationally sound books about all aspects of warfare throughout history sitting on the shelves in my home than were ever available to any general in WWII. Moreover, my collection is extremely modest compared to the exponentially greater volume of material accessible through any modern digitally empowered library. It would be a shame – really a crime – if those of us with that kind of fingertip access to vast reservoirs of information did not take full advantage of all of that educational abundance.

Based on my own personal experiences, I have always been able to learn a great deal about my profession from men and women who died long ago. Military philosophers and theorists like Clausewitz still speak to me. Over time I internalized his concepts, Sun Tzu’s teachings and Machiavelli’s advice and was no doubt the better soldier, trainer and leader for having done so. For me, reading “Lee’s Lieutenant’s” and “This Kind of War” or “The Uncertain Trumpet” was never some academic exercise that was not destined to serve any practical purpose. I learned to appreciate history from the example set by the leaders I met early in my career. In turn, I have tried to pass on that historical sensibility to those I have had the privilege to serve with, lead, and mentor over the years.

In fact, studying books like those above was vital to my vocational education and eventually critical to whatever success or failure I might achieve while practicing my profession. Most importantly, I was able to make better and timelier decisions in ambiguous and challenging circumstances than I would have if I had not had that reasonably broad and sufficiently deep historical exposure beforehand. I simply would not have full confidence in any senior military leader who had no informed sense of history.

To be clear, I am not talking about a formal educational or degree producing program. No one needs to run off and get a PhD in Military History in order to be a good soldier or capable leader. Indeed, we can start at the small unit level with resources we already have readily available. How many leaders out there have made the effort to teach their subordinates their unit’s unique history – let alone the Army’s service history? I can tell you that the answer is not enough. What campaign streamers do you display on your colors? What battles do the elements of your unit crest represent? Why is your unit called the Manchus or Cotton Balers or Devils in Baggy Pants. Of course you might ask, is that “minutiae” really truly important to know? How will that information help “kill the enemy” or keep my people alive?

The answer is simple and ancient in origin. Expending the energy to inculcate a unit’s history helps build stronger teams. The Roman Legions understood this dynamic. Even today, the USMC – better than any of the other services – still understands and leverages this important bonding practice. So why doesn’t the Army do the same? Some units certainly do, but far too many do not even try. Some units consider it a waste of time and a distractor from other priorities. I would argue that the leaders of those units have the wrong priorities. They are shortchanging the professional development of their soldiers and failing in arguable their most important duty. That is to build motivated, cohesive, and ultimately winning teams.

And no, this does not mean a unit has to “stand down” or curtail other training to get it done. Some still serving NCOs or former NCOs out there probably think I am trying to put another rock in your already-too-full professional rucksack. The fact is that particular rock has always been your responsibility. You are the keepers of a unit’s history, and by extension the Army’s history, and have always had the responsibility to pass on that knowledge to your soldiers. The majority of NCOs do not need a reminder. They know they have the mission and do a superb job. But far too many do not – probably because they were never taught what right looks like when they were growing up. You cannot set the example or effectively teach what you don’t know or don’t value.

Obviously, we need to work diligently on correctly that problem at the unit level. However, we should not stop there. What are some of the positive aspects of studying history for broader professional development? Below I have selected three relevant quotes from my favorite fiction book, “Starship Troopers” by Robert Heinlein. For those not familiar with the work, be advised that the book has absolutely nothing to do with the movie series of the same name except the title. I have literally read the book a hundred times or more and always carried a paperback copy with me on deployments. I also loaned it out many times. But it was not the plot or the characters that keeps drawing me back. Rather it was the core ideas; the embedded concept of civil responsibility and duty as well as selfless service and even insight into conflict and war itself.

As many of you know, Heinlein was a brilliant, unique and even odd historical figure. He wrote science fiction primarily and never saw combat himself. Yet in Starship Troopers, Heinlein was able to capture the quintessential rationale of voluntary military service and martial virtue. He clearly intended to present more of a philosophy of duty than a practical military theory or strategic concept of war. Still, his book is a recognized military classic and has been on the recommended reading list for the Army and the USMC for many years. That is not to say that all of Heinlein’s ideas were original. He was well read and had an inquisitive mind so I suspect he had read at least potions of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu and quite possibly Machiavelli as well.

I appreciate this first quote because it perhaps explains why Sun Tzu still resonates after more than two thousand years. Why Clausewitz and Jomini are still read intently to be both interpreted and misinterpreted by countless professional soldiers. And perhaps it also explains why no more contemporary authors have ever been able to convincingly threaten their intellectual authority or supplant them.

“Basic truths cannot change and once a man of insight expresses one of them it is never necessary, no matter how much the world changes, to reformulate them. This is immutable; true everywhere, throughout all time, for all men and all nations.”

The second quote might appear to be no more than a restatement of Clausewitz’s basic theory. And I am reasonably sure that was Heinlein’s original source. But it does expand on the idea that in war it is the application of coercive violence and not killing itself that is actually the military “means” to the political “end” or “objective” that Clausewitz referred to repeatedly.

“War is not violence and killing, pure and simple; war is controlled violence, for a purpose. The purpose of war is to support your government’s decisions by force. The purpose is never to kill the enemy just to be killing him . . . but to make him do what you want him to do. Not killing . . . but controlled and purposeful violence.”

Lastly, I have used what I call “the cooking analogy” below many times to try to explain the notion of military education and realistic training providing immense value added on and off the battlefield.

“…unskillful work can easily subtract value; an untalented cook can turn wholesome dough and fresh green apples, valuable already, into an inedible mess, value zero. Conversely, a great chef can fashion of those same materials a confection of greater value than a commonplace apple tart, with no more effort than an ordinary cook uses to prepare an ordinary sweet.”

Unfortunately, higher-level professional training and education is largely undervalued in the institutional military. That is a counterproductive but systemic organizational attitude. To use Heinlein’s analogy, the services consequently only manage to consistently produce good “fry cooks” that can perhaps reliably fashion an edible meal but have a limited repertoire. In other words they are generally “tactically sound” in the most limited sense but not necessarily adaptive, multifunctional or innovative in any way.

We simply do not produce many world-class chefs; i.e. master craftsmen or artists with more advanced skills that can take the raw material and other means provided to them and produce results approaching a tactical, operational or even strategic work of art. We need military artisans who can be hard fighters AND consummate trainers AND equally deep thinkers. Leaders that have the intellectual tools necessary to profoundly reflect on the art and artifices of war and the disciplined aptitude to translate the resulting thoughts into practical applications. The enduring challenge for us remains how to identify, cultivate and encourage the intellectual development of more martial master chefs at every level.

That brings us to the final point for now. It would certainly be possible to put a committee together and “distill” the more advanced works of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, et al into 3×5 cards of command approved military axioms that every soldier could carry in his or her breast pocket. Laminated of course and dutifully memorized and regurgitated on command. But that will not make us any smarter. To seek legitimate understanding of Sun Tzu and the others it is important to consider the social, cultural and historical context in which they lived and wrote. In other words, it takes intellectual effort. There is no shortcut.

If simply taken literally, out of context, or only partially and imperfectly understood, Sun Tzu’s or Clausewitz’s or Machiavelli’s ideas can be truly dangerous rather than helpful to a soldier or politician trying to make a decision with life and death implications. Therefore, the services – especially the Army – would clearly be best served by providing more opportunities for high quality, practical and continuous professional education at all levels. This could start by making the effort to instill a deeper appreciation of history in Army leaders of all grades. That is probably the single most useful thing we can do to improve the U.S. Military’s tactical, operational and strategic rate of success in the future.

LTC Terry Baldwin, US Army (Ret) served on active duty from 1975-2011 in various Infantry and Special Forces assignments. SSD is blessed to have him as both reader and contributor.