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The Baldwin Articles – ALICE Pack Trilogy: Part 1 of 3

Monday, September 28th, 2015

I am going to talk mostly about the ALICE Large Combat Field Pack (rucksack) (bottom right) because that is the version that I used almost exclusively during my time in service. But I didn’t always have one. During my tour in Germany (75-78) I never saw them. We were issued strictly M1956 Load Carrying Equipment (LCE). I discovered ALICE when I rotated to Ft Lewis in the fall of 78. In stateside infantry units at that time we were issued medium rucksacks with frames and only RTOs got the large rucksacks. However, the large packs were sold at Clothing Sales. I don’t remember the price, but it was cheap. So just about every NCO and Officer bought their own for the field. And that was basically how it worked on my next tour in Hawaii. But it seems to me that when I inprocessed at the 82nd in 1983 everyone in the infantry battalions got issued the Large. In any case, in Airborne and Special Operation units the large ALICE rucksack was the standard.

The Army and USMC experimented with various rucksacks in WW II including a “Jungle Pack” that looked a lot like some of the new jungle packs that are being tested today. There had also been a popular “Mountain Rucksack” issued to some specialized units. Versions of that ruck were used quite a bit by Special Forces in the 50s and early 60s. But conventional units in WW II and Korea mostly did without. Small packs carried the soldier’s fighting load and perhaps a minimal bedroll and everything else went into the duffel bag to be moved by transport. That worked after a fashion but usually left the foot soldier shivering in the cold in both conflicts. But even that less-than-satisfactory experience didn’t convince leadership to make a rucksack general issue to the troops. So the post-Korea M1956 gear was fielded without a rucksack component.

Then came Vietnam. The long movements and extended operations in the jungle terrain kept adding more and more weight onto the soldiers’ backs. So eventually two different rucksacks were fielded during that conflict with mixed results. One is the Tropical Rucksack also called a Jungle Rucksack that I have on display (bottom left). As you can see it is nearly identical in size and pocket configuration to the medium ALICE. It has a spring steel X frame that is longer but similar to the frame on the canvas ARVN Pack. The other issued pack was the Lightweight Rucksack which came with a tubular aluminum frame. I don’t have one but if you have seen Platoon or some of the other Vietnam War movies this is the one the actors usually carry. Neither was entirely satisfactory in service but features of both were eventually incorporated into the ALICE packs.

ALICE was very much a product of the hard lessons learned from extended infantry combat in Vietnam. It is what I would classify as an excellent combat patrolling rucksack. That is it was optimized to fight and live out of for long duration dismounted operations. Despite its origins, it was also definitely not just a jungle ruck. It was intended for worldwide deployments and functions equally well in the desert, mountains, jungle or artic. It is simple and adaptable and can readily meet the load carriage needs of the Paratrooper or the Marine and anyone from conventional riflemen to Green Berets and SEALs. The ALICE rucksack is probably the closest thing to a truly universal piece of kit the US Military has ever developed.

  
A number of packs have been tested or fielded in the interim intended to replace the ALICE. The first contender I encountered was the Lowe LOCO pack (top left) which came out in the early 80s. That eventually morphed into the CFP 90 (top middle) which in turn led to the Gregory SPEAR pack (top right) and the USMC’s Arc’teryx ILBE pack (not shown). All of these were high end backpacks designed by leaders in the civilian backpacking industry. They had suspension systems that were much more comfortable than the ALICE. Yet none remained in service very long or were ever very popular with troops who live, work and fight with a rucksack on their backs. And the reason for their rejection was simple. None of them were very good combat patrolling rucksacks. The very features that made them attractive to civilian outdoorsmen made them less than ideal for soldiers as compared to ALICE. Three common characteristics in particular were problematic. Their height, the internal frames, and the extended padded waist belts.

First, they were simple too tall. Extending above the shoulders as high or higher than the top of an individual’s helmet and blocking head movement and vision. Not necessarily a significant issue if conducting an administrative roadmarch for physical conditioning but a critical problem on a tactical Movement to Contact – even if just in training. Paratroopers probably disliked those long packs the most. None of them rigged very readily for airborne operations and because of their length they inevitably drag on the aircraft floor for even the tallest jumpers. And the shorter the jumper the more of a safety hazard the long packs became. I recall my ODA jumping the CFP 90s just one time not long after Desert Storm and that experience was so unpleasant that we went back to ALICE for good the next day.

The internal frames are also not as suitable for combat operations as an external frame. Soldiers routinely carry heavy and odd shaped loads like mortar bipods and baseplates secured to the outside of their rucks. Tying items like that off to a rigid external frame rather than just to the exterior of the rucksack bag keeps the load much more stable and manageable. And as with the height issue mentioned above, internal frames are not conducive to easily rigging these packs for jumping as compared to external frame designs. Internal frame packs intentionally hug the wearer’s body when worn and do not leave space between to facilitate ventilation. Although admittedly this criticism is perhaps not as relevant today when body armor is routinely being worn. The tall internal frame packs also do not naturally sit upright like the short and squat ALICE with its external frame. Soldiers have to find something to lean the long packs against in order to load or unload items or even to put the rucksack on or off. The internal frame packs are simply less user friendly and can actually make the job harder rather than easier.

The long packs all had extended padded waist belts that were intended to distribute part of the load onto the hips. Assuming an individual’s waist and hips were actually clear of fighting load gear. This wasn’t and still isn’t usually the case. In short, while well intentioned and sound in theory, wrap around padded rucksack waist belts always interfaced poorly with LCE / LBV or body armor and tended to get snagged or tangled up with the other gear. That made donning and especially dropping the backpacks much more complicated and troublesome than it had been with ALICE. And getting tangled up with a rucksack can be more than just an annoyance; it can be dangerous. Therefore most experienced troopers kept the waist belt / pad wrapped back around the frame or pack body and as much out of the way as possible. All the time. And from what I have observed that still remains true even today.

Lots of people look at older gear as clunky and unsophisticated…and therefore deemed to be less effective than newer kit. I prefer to think of the ALICE pack as a flexible, rugged, classic design. And like all classics it continues to enjoy popularity at least in some professional circles because it always functions reliably. It gets the job done. When I retired a few years ago ALICE packs were still a fairly common fixture in many Team Rooms (I expect they still are today). Not because there were not newer “sexier” alternatives available or that people were adverse to change. But rather something that works as well as ALICE just doesn’t go out of style until something that is proven to be much better comes along. So far that hasn’t happened. It is no accident that the USMC’s current FILBE pack clearly shows its ALICE roots. And many of the complaints I have heard about the MOLLE II Large Rucksack could be fixed if it were actually a little more like ALICE (something I intend to discuss another time).

Some might take umbrage if I called ALICE the gold standard of combat rucksacks. I agree that is probably too grandiose a characterization for the old girl. But I do think it is fair to say that the ALICE pack still remains the baseline standard by which all newcomers will have to be judged for many years to come. ALICE packs were obviously not perfect. That is also a fact. But I submit that if tasked to develop a single multipurpose or “full spectrum” combat rucksack today. One that could be versatile enough to effectively fill so many diverse roles for so many people in so many different combat environments. I have no doubt the resulting rucksack would look a lot like ALICE. And rightly so.

LTC Terry Baldwin, US Army (RET) served on active duty from 1975-2011 in various Infantry and Special Forces assignments.

Next: Part 2, Common ALICE Pack modifications.

You Never Know Where They’ll Show Up

Monday, September 28th, 2015

   

Great screensaver Razz. At some point you’ll have to stop giving your patches away. Cool photo of the minisub.

 

FROG.PRO Laser Cut-Air Warrior Plate Carrier

Sunday, September 27th, 2015

This is the FROG.PRO LC-AWPC (Laser Cut-Air Warrior Plate Carrier).

  
Their take on a PALS compatible system consists of a proprietary composite fabric called LAHYCO, made of Hypalon and Cordura 500D.  It allows them s to add some special features such as utility holes for shock cord or slots for QASM buckles.

  
Its light weight (480g).  The inner ballistic plates pouches, thanks to the Open Top design are suitable for any shape of rigid ballistic plates. The low profile design allows the wearer to use it as a concealed vest. The supplied adapters allow it to attach the new LC line chest rigs.

  
Available in Coyote Tan, Ranger Green, Vegetato EI, MultiCam.

www.frogpro.it

Dueck Defense – Red Dot Backup Sight Base

Sunday, September 27th, 2015

Barry Dueck has done it again, introducing a new Sight Base for Red Dots with integrated backup sights. It’s a very straight forward design, made from bar stock and nitride coated. A major advantage is that it is tall enough to clear most suppressors and there are no modifications required to your slide.  It mounts in the factory rear sight dovetail.

 

“I designed the RBU as a simple no gunsmithing sight base to eliminate lost dots when aiming. Just align the fixed iron sights and your red dot is visible. It’s simple and it works.”
-Barry Dueck

 

dueckdefense.com/shop/firearms/red-dot-back-up-sight-base

If This Doesn’t Wake You Up, I Don’t Know What Will

Sunday, September 27th, 2015

Behold Daredevil Graham Dickinson as he flies his wingsuit down a mountain in France. The video was captured by his friend Dario.

More M4s On The Way From Colt & FN

Sunday, September 27th, 2015

Announced by DoD on Friday.

  
Colt Defense LLC, West Hartford, Connecticut (15QKN-15-D-0102); and FN America LLC, Columbia, South Carolina (W15QKN-15-D-0072), were awarded a $212,000,000 firm-fixed-price multi-year contract for M4 and M4A1 carbines for the Army and others, with an estimated completion date of Sept. 24, 2020. Bids were solicited via the Internet with six received. Funding and work location will be determined with each order. Army Contracting Command, Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, is the contracting activity.

There’s a lot of conjecture out there about this contract, but keeping the lines open through 2020 is a good move, especially considering the USMC’s interest in the M4.  I don’t see this as a response by DoD to the Colt bankruptcy but rather indicates their faith in the brand as a reliable contractor. It is my assessment that the Colt portion of this contract is in spite of the bankruptcy, rather than in reaction to it.  

There Is Too Much Social Media On This Firing Line: The Dangerous Future Of Tactical Entertainment

Saturday, September 26th, 2015

September 23, 2015
Aaron Barruga

  
The tactical training industry exploded in the mid 2000’s. This period coincided with the height of the Iraq War (Petraeus’ Surge), and the fighting that took place in Afghanistan’s mountainous border with Pakistan. During this time, American media also covered the entire spectrum of warfare. Brutal house-to-house fighting in Fallujah and coalition airstrikes in Kunar were brought into the American household via the Nightly News.

Wartime coverage provided by news outlets is not a new phenomenon. However, the 2000’s brought about some of the most prolific changes to spectatorship of modern warfare through the use of social media and user generated content. Armed with a M4 and a helmet camera, hundreds of soldiers have uploaded their experiences to websites that are devoted specifically to battle focused media. Before “YouTube fame” was a common term, thousands of spectators had viewed Blackwater snipers engage Iraqi insurgents, and Delta Force Operators perform hostage rescue.

Exposure to wartime coverage through traditional news outlets and the more recent mediums provided by the Internet has altered our methods for determining source credibility. First, when an individual watches an accredited news outlet, he subconsciously creates metrics for what “right” looks like. With regards to combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, viewers create conventions that align with the following checklist: (1) The events are taking place in the desert (2) there are soldiers running around in uniform (3) I see guns-conclusion: this is what combat looks like.

Viewers then use these models and apply them to other forms of media. When watching combat footage on the Internet, the same checklist can determine what “right” looks like. The closer a YouTube video aligns with what is shown from an accredited news outlet, the more likely a viewer is to consider the content legitimate (yes, fake combat footage does exist). The cumulative effect of building heuristics to determine credibility is that we may properly construct our interpretation of what “right” looks like; or we may empower the wrong individuals and concepts. 

The Rise Of Tactical Entertainment

Commercial tactical instruction benefited from wartime coverage delivered by both accredited news outlets and the newer forms of user (soldier) generated Internet content. For trainers posting videos to YouTube, they only need to look like what consumers consider “right.” This task is easily accomplished by: wearing camouflage or North Face-style pants and shirts, having a cool looking gun, and most importantly-growing a beard.

Absent of robust credentials, individuals that look the part are able to build massive brands around their methodology. Under these circumstances, training begins to value flair over function, and concepts that are incompatible with fundamental skills are relabeled as doctrine. Furthermore, the accelerant qualities of social media create communal consensus. From the consumer’s point of view, how can something be wrong if it is wildly popular on Instagram? Consequently, source credibility, experience, and judgment can be measured more by social media following than real world experience. 

Crossfit Case Comparison

In the early 2000’s, Crossfit exploded among the exercise industry. Individuals unfamiliar with Olympic-style weightlifting were now snatch-clean-lift-swing-battleroping themselves to exhaustion and injury. However, the prevailing mindset among Crossfitters was that pain meant growth. Unfortunately for thousands of Americans, pushing through pain meant exacerbating various forms of tendonitis.

Why did Crossfit gain robust popularity? First, Crossfit’s business model is extremely conducive to franchising. Spending $500 on a seminar to become “certified,” allows gyms to open their own Crossfit franchise. Second, the randomness of Crossfit’s programming does produce results, however, these results are not targeted towards goal specific performance. Rather than enhancing sport related abilities, Crossfit only makes people good at working out. Third, the communal effects of working out in a group formed camaraderie that made any physical activity more enjoyable due to the added social components.

Crossfit’s methodology has been challenged since its inception; however, counter-arguments were unable to gain traction due to the ubiquitous popularity of Crossfit. How can a concept (franchise) that exists globally be wrong? In the past few years, accredited news outlets and exercise professionals have vigorously criticized Crossfit’s methodology. As a result, gyms with Crossfit franchises have reverted back to being Olympic weightlifting establishments; and institutions that choose to remain Crossfit specific have restructured their programming to incorporate material that focuses on injury avoidance and meaningful programming.

Crossfit is not bad, misunderstood and poorly taught Crossfit is bad. The same holds true with tactical shooting instruction. Similar to Crossfit “instructors” that are parroting information they learned in an eight hour seminar, unaccredited tactical instructors can regurgitate information at a base level, but will always fail in expanding upon on a concept due to lack of experience.

One Sided Dialogue

Contrary to law enforcement and military organizations, commercial training is driven by what consumers are more willing to pay for. Mission success relates more to increasing profit margins than remaining honest to the fundamentals of a discipline. Distortion of knowledge by commercial firms proliferates because legitimate tactical organizations (LEO/military) do not even participate in the conversation about tactics and training. Does the marksmanship NCO for 1st SFOD-D care about what is being written in the comment section of YouTube video? No, or at least not until he retires and starts his own commercial training company.

For credible instructors, scrutinizing an unaccredited, but popular instructor is too risky.

Regardless of being right, challenging an instructor means challenging his brand and potentially alienating his client base. Moreover, challenging an individual backed by multimillion-dollar firms can expedite ostracism from the industry. Consequently, the Tier One credentials valued by government agencies to perform real world missions go undervalued in an industry driven by clever marketing and brand exposure.

A common business axiom is that you should focus less on highlighting the flaws of a competitor’s brand, and spend more effort emphasizing the strengths of your product. Although this applies to business, this concept is incompatible with academically advancing knowledge within a discipline. With regards to tactical shooting instruction, credentialed individuals should absolutely critique flawed methodology. Why-because lives are at stake.

Although social media has contributed to the proliferation of questionable instruction and tactical entertainment, it has also facilitated exposure from reputable sources. Mike Pannone of CTT Solutions recently wrote an op-ed that rigorously critiqued a pistol carry method known as the temple index. In Pat McNamara’s upcoming training DVD he frustratingly addresses search and assess methodology. Although Mike and Mac will not change the minds of the individuals that staunchly defend the temple index and search and assess, they will influence the opinions of thousands of spectators that are observing the arguments.

Compounded Effects By The Year 2020

The consequences of learning poorly recited tactical information is apparent, however, to properly understand the significance we must look at the compounded effects. Over the next few years, tactical medicine is going to be the next trend in training that gains explosive popularity. Although marksmanship-style courses will not go away, the market for this type of training is entirely saturated by both credible and questionable instructors.

Poorly regurgitated tactical medicine training poses a specific threat to patient survivability. Individuals that have been improperly trained will worsen certain wounds and injuries in such a matter that it may cause permanent damage or loss of life. In 2005, shooters highly scrutinized open enrollment tactical courses taught by individuals with questionable backgrounds. In 2015, Instagram has undermined much of the source verification process. Real world experience can now be waived if an instructor has tens of thousands of followers. At the current pace, there’s no reason to assume that tactical medicine training will not suffer the same dynamic by the year 2020.

Aaron is a Special Forces Veteran and teaches classes in Southern California. Check out his website at guerrillaapproach.com and follow him at instagram.com/guerrilla_approach

Gunfighter Moment – Jeff Gonzales

Saturday, September 26th, 2015

During our classes we ask students how do you train to run fast? At times we get some interesting responses, but the one we are looking for is “run fast”.

The ultimate balance

The balance of speed and accuracy should be everyone’s ultimate shooting goal. The mistake we see most often is when a student wants to put speed over accuracy in the early stages of their development. The basics form your foundation and that foundation will need to be rock solid because at some point you will need to hit the gas. A slow accurate shot is no better than a fast miss. I’m sure we have all heard the expression of not knowing your limits until you push yourself. I couldn’t agree more with that statement, but it is a tad bit more complicated.

Hitting the track

When we talk about pushing the limits a race track is the usual analogy. You hit the straightaways with your hair on fire, but have to negotiate the turns and this is where we find our limits. However, the mistake folks make is thinking they are a race car in the first place. A race car is built from the ground up to handle those high velocities with pinpoint steering. However, the average student is riding a mini-van with little family decals on the back (not that that’s a bad thing). While I can drive it on the race track, it is really not going to go fast and it will definitely not handle those curves well.

The failed road test

That is where the foundation comes into the equation, you have to build it from the ground up. I can get that minivan over 180mph, I just throw it out the back of a cargo plane. Obviously the sudden stop isn’t the best for return trips. Taking the time to ramp up is critical, it is also the most frustrating. There is so much that you have to think about, while it looks easy, shooting is a complex task. Once you have taken the time, put the work in to build up your vehicle you have to take it out on the track and push the limits. You will never know if the new tires or the engine are going to perform to your expectations until you push the limits.

Hit the gas big time

At a certain point in the class, usually once we have covered the fundamentals well enough and students have demonstrated satisfactory performance the next step is to get them to shoot fast. I literally tell them I want you to shoot as fast as you can guarantee the hit. That means every time you are engaging the target you are doing so as fast as your vehicle can handle the curves. Having standards are the only way of knowing if you are pushing your limits, without them you are guessing. Standards for both speed and accuracy. When I see a student fail, it is not because he wasn’t fast enough, it was because he wasn’t accurate enough to meet the standard.

Speed is important, but not at the sacrifice of accuracy, but being accurate needs to be fast enough.

– Jeff Gonzales
Trident Concepts, LLC

Jeff Gonzales of Trident Concepts, LLC is a decorated and respected U.S. Navy SEAL who has worked in a variety of environments and capacities throughout the globe. He specializes in personal protection tactics and training for armed and unarmed conflicts. His motto is “Concepts that meet reality”. Jeff’s goal is not simply to train you, but to better prepare you for the worst-case scenario.

Gunfighter Moment is a weekly feature brought to you by Alias Training & Security Services. Each week Alias brings us a different Trainer and in turn, they offer some words of wisdom.