Observations and Best Practices of The 6th Battalion, 56th Air Defense Artillery, National Training Center, Rotation 25-02

Download document here: No. 25-976, MSHORAD in BCT Operations [PDF – 565.1 KB]

Introduction: Defining the Role of Short Range Air Defense in the Brigade Combat Team (BCT)

Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD) is an inherently demanding mission set, requiring Air Defense commanders, leaders, and subject-matter experts to have a comprehensive understanding of air threats, and system capabilities, as well as an understanding of the ground fight for Air Defense units to meet their higher headquarters’ commander’s intent and end State.

The relationship between SHORAD units and the supported maneuver commander is a unique dynamic that requires detailed planning through the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) to ensure there is a shared understanding, vertically and horizontally, for incorporation of SHORAD into the scheme of maneuver.

Since 2022, three Maneuver SHORAD (M-SHORAD) Battalions have been established, with two organic to division-level organizations. It is during this initial window of establishing M-SHORAD that lessons learned, and best practices must be captured at the National Training Center, and codified as actionable doctrine for the Air Defense force at large.

This paper describes both best practices and recommendations for M-SHORAD batteries in support of the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and division, specifically regarding the role of the Air Defense Coordinator (ADCOORD), employment of Stinger and Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft System (C-sUAS) systems, and engagement authority within the division. The ADA Branch must continually examine the role of SHORAD and mission command dynamics to set conditions for success in future SHORAD implementation. This paper references the yet-to-be-published FM 3-01, dated 04 November 2024, to provide appropriate context for the National Training Center rotation 25-02. Charlie Battery, 6th Battalion, 56th Air Defense Artillery Battalion (C/6-56 ADA BN) was the supporting M-SHORAD Battery during this rotation.

The Role of the Air Defense Coordinator

Battery commanders of M-SHORAD units often find that they, as the air defense coordinator (ADCOORD), have more detailed and contextual information at their level than at the Division Air Defense (DIVAD) headquarters when supporting the BCT. Enemy air avenue of approach, force protection capabilities, other Air Defense assets in the area of operation, local dynamics, and a host of other mission considerations are often better understood in real-time by the battery commander rather than their higher headquarters. In this relationship, immediate decision-making on detailed matters and specific actions is best executed at the lowest level, where the information and contextual understanding are timelier and more precise.

Throughout rotation 25-02, the C/6-56 ADA BN battery commander validated this concept through continual integration into the brigade plans and current operations (CUOPS) at the Main Command Post (MCP). It was critical that the battery commander had a holistic understanding of the brigade’s mission, and appropriately planned considerations for the battery to manage the execution of air defense operations. The most significant impacts the ADCOORD had were specific recommendations of task organization and command relationships (COMREL), synchronized efforts for the development of the unit airspace plan (UAP) to define Airspace Management requirements, and the early integration into MDMP and Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE).

While C/6-56 ADA BN had a comprehensive task organization and COMREL going into the rotation, the nature of the fight required dynamic reorganization of the battery to optimize ADA assets in opposition to the air threats. Integrating the ADCOORD with the brigade S2, plans, and operations officer enabled the ADCOORD to inform the commander and adjust the task organization appropriately to ensure M-SHORAD coverage supported the identified unit or protected asset.

As the ADCOORD, the Battery Commander also influenced the specific type of command and support relationships within the brigade. This synchronization was achieved through the purposeful integration of the Battery Commander through the MDMP process, and the deliberate inclusion of ADA considerations in the brigade’s decision support matrix (DSM), enabling the tenets of Air Defense and Mission Command throughout the operation.

Of note, the most detrimental impact on the ADCOORD was the understaffed and undertrained Air Defense Airspace Management (ADAM) cell. Due to the naturally demanded requirements to provide real-time information to the MCP and CUOPS, there continued to be an increased expectation of situational awareness from the ADAM cell, especially considering the threat of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and deliberate integration of M-SHORAD.

To help the ADAM cell manage the fight, the C/6-56 commander provided Soldiers from the battery. However, this resulted in “mission creep,” with the battery effectively serving as the ADAM cell, specifically regarding battle drills, TOC updates, and COP management. It is critical to the functions of the MCP, and supporting M-SHORAD Battery to ensure the ADAM cell is manned, trained, and equipped to enable command post activities with marginal, if any, augmentation from the battery.

While the draft of FM 3-01 does outline a battery commander as the ADCOORD to a supported Brigade Commander, it does not clarify the relationship of multiple SHORAD Battery Commanders to a single brigade.

Non-Dedicated Stinger Teams

In 2017, the Headquarters Department of the Army published HQDA EXORD 182-17 Implementation of Increasing Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD) To Maneuver Forces Initiative. The United States Army Air Defense Artillery School immediately began training various non-air defense Soldiers and units as part of this directive. Since then, units have struggled maintaining training proficiency and standards for gunnery programs within the BCTs and divisions.

In the case of rotation 25-02, approximately 24-man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) were issued to the BCT. However, it quickly became apparent that the operators of those systems were not integrated into the scheme of air defense. This included surface-to-air missile (SAM) engagement reports, MANPADS distribution plan, or the DSM to reallocate air defense assets. It was also unclear whether the operators were trained and certified on the weapons system, as the brigade did not maintain any centralized gunnery program.

While this may not be the case with every BCT or division, all units are required to understand the training and certification of Stinger operators for the proper planning and projection of ADA combat power. If it is the intent of the United States Army to increase the air defense capabilities within the BCT to non-air defenders, it is imperative for elements at the division and below to establish and manage a gunnery program.

Training circular (TC) 3-01.18 outlines the gunnery standards for both air defenders and non-air defenders; however, the current publication tasks the organic Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) or delegated ADA Brigade Commander to oversee the program and establish a brigade standardization officer to evaluate battalion teams, training plans and training schedules.

It may be necessary to include a 14P, AMD Crewmember, Master Gunnery position, and the necessary equipment to divisions to provide oversight for evaluations and gunnery standards in line with TC 3-01.18 across the formation. The current TC only refers to Avenger Master Gunners but may be interchangeable with M-SHORAD Master Gunners based on the overlap of base knowledge of the Stinger weapon system. The Master Gunner position could be assigned to the Division AMD sections to support all division MANPADS gunnery, for both Air Defense and non-Air Defense Stinger teams.

While the draft FM 3-01 does charge the ADCOORD with providing oversight of AMD training and certification, the current TC is incongruent with the DIVAD construct within a division, including divisions that must maintain currency without a DIVAD to provide oversight. Until the training circular can better capture the current structure and requirement of non-dedicated air defense, it will likely be at the discretion of the division or BCT commander to determine the unit’s training strategies, standards, and training schedules.

In units without a DIVAD, non-dedicated MANPADS gunnery is even more problematic. In those cases, divisions maintain zero ADA commanders, with the division AMD chief serving as the senior air defender in the division and the ADAM air defense officer as the senior air defender in the brigade. In these organizations, there is even less capability to provide the necessary oversight to manage a MANPADS gunnery program in accordance with the current TC. It may be essential for the next iteration of the TC to shift to a MOS agnostic approach, enabling any organization or unit to establish MANPADS programs or source mobile training teams as necessary.

Counter Small UAS Systems and Employment

Much like the previously discussed MANPADS concerns, divisions and brigades lack the training proficiency and certification requirements associated with C-sUAS systems. While two divisions have been issued Smart Shooter, Modi, Bal Chatri, and Drone Buster, it is also clear that these systems have been either relegated to use only by assigned air defenders or lack any oversight, specifically in organizations that do not have a DIVAD battalion.

In those cases where a DIVAD is assigned to a division, air defenders show excellent proficiency when employing C-sUAS systems. However, the availability of personnel to employ handheld systems is limited, as the supporting ADA battery typically operates on their primary weapon system, the M-SHORAD Stryker. In cases where the systems are issued to non-dedicated air defenders, they generally are improperly employed due to limited training with the system.

The number of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) systems or other capabilities that are not programs of record is also increasingly challenging to manage. Systems previously seen at the National Training Center include, but are not limited to, MADS-K, BEAST+, Titan, SkyView, and Enforceair. Including these self-procured systems increases the training requirements and certification for each BCT. These systems are often challenging to manage from an emission control (EMCON) and spectrum management perspective.

As recommended with the MANPADS, it is a commander’s prerogative to ensure training and certifications are managed within a centralized standardization program. As of 17 September 2024, the Fires Center of Excellence, Directorate of Training & Doctrine released the Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Home Station Training Support Package & Administrative Guide. The UAS support package should serve as the base document for units for handheld and self-procured systems until the appropriate gunnery standards are established. However, based on the type of C-sUAS systems, it will likely not be a comprehensive training guide.

Short Range Air Defense Engagement Authorities

As M-SHORAD continues to integrate into maneuver elements, the ability to make timely and accurate engagements and manage airspace within a brigade or division becomes increasingly more complex. Key to this discussion is the level of control for SHORAD units, specifically the engagement authority.

Joint Publication (JP) 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats states that while the engagement authority originates at the joint force commander (JFC) and can be delegated to the area air defense commander (AADC), and that engagement authority can also be delegated to the individual fire unit based on the operational necessity and rules of engagement (ROE) for defensive counterair operations.[2]

This level of autonomy will be vital to ensure that SHORAD units supporting the maneuver commander can make timely engagements to protect the force. The current draft of FM 3-01 states ADA commanders in divisions and BCTs control engagements using the ROEs, with engagements typically decentralized to the fire unit. However, this will still require a certain level of synchronicity to ensure engagements occur in line with the area air defense plan (AADP). Additionally, it will be necessary to establish engagement boundaries that consider the coordinating altitude (CA) for other airspace users and clearance of fires, forcing integration between the DIVAD and echelons above the brigade and division.

During rotation 25-02, C/6-56 ADA BN, in conjunction with the NTC higher control cell (HICON), refined the engagement authority to ensure that they met training objectives and best replicated real-world application. This was primarily accomplished through the deliberate planning and coordination between the Battery ADCOORD and HICON in line with the scenario-generated air threat and constructive division guidance.

The published rules of engagement considered declared hostiles, hostile intent, hostile act, and autonomous engagements and were subsequently published in the division order. In turn, C/6-56 ADA BN codified the brigade’s engagement authority for hostile air threats: “Stout VCs have engagement authority (EA) of RW and group 1-2 UAS. All engagements must be reported to ADAM/BAE and Nighthawk 6 at BDE Main. EA for FW and group 3-5 UAS is with BDE AMD Cell, Nighthawk 6, or BDE Main. All located at BDE TOC.

What was not detailed in the C/6-56 ADA BN plan was the CA. CA is a determining factor for engagements within a joint environment. In addition to the CA, the battery, in conjunction with the ADAM cell and brigade aviation element (BAE), needs to ensure that the appropriate airspace coordinating measure (ACM) requests are submitted as part of the UAP to create shared understanding between airspace users.

Observations from rotation 25-02 suggest the use of a low-altitude missile engagement zone (LOMEZ) to better define where SHORAD units operate, specifically for those elements maneuvering with the supported unit. For those SHORAD elements in a fixed or static location (MCP, airfield, brigade support area, etc.), a short-range AD engagement zone (SHORADEZ) may be more appropriate. However, these recommendations may change based on employment and mission requirements.

Additional coordination is required for a SHORAD unit when divisional assets identify a threat aircraft operating in the division area of operations but do not have the authority to engage the threat under the rules of engagement or weapons control status. This procedure needs to provide specific guidance to include potential SHORAD engagements above the CA, as the DIVAD must coordinate with the division Joint Air Ground Integration Center (JAGIC) for engagement authority in these cases.

Annex A to ATP 3-91.1, The Joint Air Ground Integration Center, outlines this process in detail.[4] What potentially requires an update is the Call for Defensive Counterair with Established Track, with the understanding that JP 3-01 and the pending FM 3-01 delegate engagement authority to the ADA commanders in divisions and BCTs using published ROEs.

To reduce the time to engagement, the JAGIC should develop a decision authorities matrix, or appropriate Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) to ensure they are delegated appropriate authorities to execute their functions organic to the JAGIC to facilitate these engagements. It is important to remember that these authorities must be consistent with the airspace control plan and the area air defense plan defined by the JFC and Joint Force Air Component Commander.

Conclusions and Implications for Air Defense

Air Defense and Maneuver Culture. SHORAD’s current and future missions require air defenders to understand short-range air defense and integration with the supported commander. This relationship, nested within mission command, will help necessitate the development of doctrine, unit operating procedures, military decision-making, and operations.

Additionally, it is the responsibility of the Air Defense proponent and doctrine to ensure lessons learned and best practices are codified in a way that is communicated back to the force, resulting in tangible changes to Army DOTMLPF-P. This includes adjustments to the programs of instruction within professional military education for officers, warrant officers, and enlisted Soldiers as early as possible within the ADA school. Future curriculum must address joint service interoperability, large-scale combat operations, and the increasing role of air defense in the division fight. Air Defense may need to leverage maximum attendance to the Stryker Leaders Course and the Maneuver Captain’s Career Course to bridge the knowledge gap between M-SHORAD and the maneuver force.

Leader Development. The DIVAD requires mature, independently operating company-grade leaders skilled in communications, critical thinking, and the ability to conduct leader engagement while integrating at echelon. Positions, such as the ADCOORD and ADAM cell officer, are crucial touchpoints to synchronize efforts with the supported unit. It is equally important for maneuver commanders to be educated on the air defense capabilities organic to their unit. Air defense leaders are ultimately responsible for educating the supported commanders and facilitating effective mission command in complex air and missile defense environments.

Realistic Training. Conducting realistic training that appropriately replicates the complexities of a joint and dynamic environment benefits the DIVAD and the division. Demanding home station training and combat training center rotations must push the Soldiers and systems required for real-world application to ensure units can meet the stresses of combat against agile and proficient advisories. It is the charge of unit master gunners, commanders, and standardization teams to ensure units are challenged with the complexities of large-scale combat operations.

[1] ATP 6-0.5, Command Post Organization and Operations, Headquarters Department of the Army, Mar 2017.

[2] JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, 13 Mar 2024

[3] JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, 13 Mar 2024

[4] ATP 3-91.1, The Joint Air Ground Integration Center, April 2019

By MAJ Julian Rodriguez, Center for Army Lessons Learned

MAJ Julian Rodriguez currently serves as the Senior Air Defense Trainer at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA. His previous assignments include 4-3 ADA BN as a Patriot Battery Platoon Leader and Battery Executive Officer; 82nd Division, Combat Aviation Brigade as the ADAM OIC; 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade as the brigade planner; White Sands Missile Range as the AMD Test Detachment Commander; and 30th ADA BDE as a Battalion Executive Officer and Brigade Operations Officer. MAJ Rodriguez’s civilian education includes a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Texas at Arlington, and a Master’s degree in Leadership Studies from the University of Texas at El Paso.

WASHINGTON — The Army Junior Officer Counsel is a pilot program sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, that is led by junior officers. Its goal is to transform how the Army learns, develops and retains young leaders in the officer grades of O-1 to O-3 and WO-1 to CW-3.

AJOC gives junior officers a formal platform to improve Soldiers’ quality of service and life, which supports junior officer retention and career satisfaction. It’s proving to be a valuable asset by fostering innovation and positive change within the Army while cultivating the next generation of Army leaders.

The name AJOC deliberately contains the word “counsel” to highlight its advisory role to senior leaders, which allows JOs to share perspectives, insights and innovative ideas. The program capitalizes on the leading-edge knowledge and experience of junior officers because they are often the most recently formally trained, and they work close on the final planning and execution of many of the Army’s missions.

“We’re taking the knowledge we gain in our specific fields and applying it to broader Army challenges,” said Maj. Chris Slininger, AJOC’s director and founder. “AJOC provides a space to hone these skills amongst our peers, allowing for candid feedback and rapid growth.”

AJOC is designed to have numerous chapters at different installations gathering feedback, research and recommendations from JOs. It currently has three active chapters at Fort Stewart, Georgia; Smith Barracks in Baumholder, Germany; and Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

Slininger said AJOC chapters prioritize action-oriented, collaborative problem-solving approaches that focus on delivering rigorous research and tangible results. They also emphasize active listening, encouraging JOs to gather information effectively, understand diverse perspectives and build consensus.

“This isn’t about endless debates and discussions,” explained Slininger. “AJOC is about identifying challenges, developing practical solutions and driving meaningful change within the Army.”

AJOC also offers significant professional development opportunities for participating JOs by cultivating critical thinking and encouraging them to leverage data, artificial intelligence and other resources to inform and improve decision-making.

One of the program’s core strengths involves encouraging JOs to take ownership of driving change within the Army profession. It also gives senior leaders who want to support change an opportunity to hear from JOs and mentor them to help implement effective solutions to identified challenges and gaps.

Interaction with senior leaders is an invaluable experience for JOs as it gives them first-hand access to the perspectives of senior leaders, who help them understand the Army’s broader vision and its network of stakeholders, campaigns and responsibilities.

Slininger created AJOC as a junior officer after recognizing the need for a more structured and effective system to understand and address the perspectives and needs of junior officers. Even now, as a field grade officer, he is a strong advocate for the program because of its value to the Army and JOs.

“AJOC offers a unique opportunity for JOs who want to make a tangible impact on the Army,” said Slininger. “Whether driven by a desire to improve their units, enhance their leadership skills or contribute to solving complex challenges, AJOC provides a platform for JOs to drive tomorrow’s solutions today.”

As AJOC expands, its impact on the Army’s future is poised to grow even further.

U.S. Army Public Affairs there you go

THE ARMY UNIVERSITY, FORT LEAVENWORTH, Kansas – Classrooms at the Command and General Staff College, organized to replicate a real division command post, were a flurry of communications and activity March 26-28, 2025, as students participated in a Division Offensive Operation practicum.

Significant time was devoted to conducting a targeting working group, which was a student led replication of division staff directing combat actions and setting conditions for division offensive operations in a large-scale combat operation.

Additionally, students benefited from on-the-spot mentoring from experienced leaders.

Department of the Army Tactics Instructors, Matt McKinley and Brian Leakey, bring decades of technical and education experience.

Two targeting warrant officers, CW4 Calvin Cameron and CW3 Jerry Burks, enhanced student understanding through candid conversation based on their operational experience with targeting.

Students who complete the practicum are prepared for their future roles as division staff officers responsible for providing recommendations to commanders to lead their organizations in combat.

“In our first field grade roles as junior majors, our job is to integrate operations at echelon within the division,” Cpt. Michael West, CGSOC student stated. “This past year has been an opportunity to learn from the different branches in our small group and understand how to synchronize information, planning, and execution preparation. Over the last three weeks, the opportunity to see this at the division level was good preparation before going into our next job.”

Students had specific roles and were responsible to identify and nominate targets for the division, corps, and joint assets to enable a division offensive operation 24-96 hours out from execution.

Planning and preparing the operation in detail, rehearsals in time and space, and constant communication across cells ensured synchronization of the overall operation across multiple echelons and divergent staff sections.

Maj. Stewart Tice filled the role of a division chief of staff and shared that the TWG allows participants to understand the various roles and functions in warfighting and how those processes integrate across time.

“We learned to conduct current operations while leaning forward to determine what we are doing next, or how we respond if something happens,” Tice said. “It’s thinking beyond where we were in our careers, focused on here and now; and thinking what we need to do today, to enable the brigade’s success tomorrow.”

To culminate the event, students presented an after-action review to leadership.

“Everything we do training wise is meant to replicate real-world experiences we will face when we go back to the force,” Maj. James Corbitt said. “This is a good, immersive exercise to see the way rotations are run, practice processes, and take feedback with the AAR, as it’s the major last part of the military operations process.”

Reviewing and assessing outcomes of actions and decisions as division staff during a large-scale combat operation captures lessons learned and reinforces the learning objectives.

“Before attending CGSS, I completed a broadening assignment with the Mission Command Training Program. I realized our discussions before execution were very similar to what takes place at MCTP, so this is a sign of success,” West stated.

By Jessica Brushwood, The Army University Public Affairs Office

An eerie fog swirls around your boots as you lead your infantry platoon through the increasingly dark forest. A twig snaps, and the bushes rustle ominously 50 meters to the west. Suddenly, from the shadows emerges either one angry horse-sized duck or 300 angry duck-sized horses.

Given a choice, which would you rather fight? I wager you would much rather focus all of your attention on the one goliath duck than have to deal with a deluge of tiny horses. This may be just a silly thought exercise, but the concept has merit. Although the weight of one horse is equal to around 300 ducks, the effect on the battlefield is much different.1 Even with superior intellect and technology, it is much more difficult to focus energy on numerous small, less lethal targets than it is to direct your efforts on the one larger but perhaps deadlier target. Yet this is the scenario the Army has boxed itself into with the continued focused development of large, heavy, and highly technical machines of war as the solution to combat.

To use a popular science fiction franchise as another example, a long time ago in a galaxy far away, the Galactic Empire concluded that the best way to win its long-running war was to build a super weapon so technologically advanced and massively devastating that Rebel forces would be forced into a final submission.2 As franchise installments revealed, the massive time and resources required to build and operate the behemoth known as the “Death Star” was wasted not once but twice as the inferior Rebel forces exploited key vulnerabilities to destroy the weapon system with a swarm of relatively cheap fighters. The American way of war is on a similar path, but on the wrong side. We love technology. Our combat systems are built to defeat any attack, conquer any terrain, and destroy any enemy. But as history has demonstrated, even the most powerful of forces can be defeated, or at least perpetually disrupted, when attacked unconventionally.

Armies worldwide are only getting more lethal, more accurate, and able to strike from increasingly further distances. The battlefield has changed. Years of training, billions of dollars, and months of deployment activities can be lost as a barrage of hypersonic missiles crest the horizon, each zeroing in on armored vehicles individually tagged and targeted by space and drone observation.3 One entire combined arms battalion could be gone in a blink. While the Army has committed to increasing our ability to conduct counterfires and missile defense, and improve the lethality and distance of our weapon systems, that may be only half the solution. The plan of simply “out-executing” an opponent with like equipment is not actually simple at all. Army tactics must change to counter the advantages currently held by our adversaries at the same time we raise our ability to match and exceed them.

Losses are an unfortunate byproduct of war. It is not acceptable (in the U.S. military, at least) to simply throw people and equipment into the meat grinder in a battle of attrition, but it is equally dangerous to be of the mindset that losses can be fully negated with sufficiently hardened vehicles. Enemy long-range fires are at such a volume, range, and mobility that they can afford to attack targets early and often, and for better or worse, the U.S. Army fights through its vaunted main battle tanks. Most battle planning orbits around the use and maneuver of heavy armor, supported by air and artillery, to take and hold ground. We’re watching the stalemate live in Ukraine, where neither side can take and hold ground despite significant ground and air barrages. The Army should consider going lighter, cheaper, and more numerous to defeat opponent advantages before committing heavy armor. The goal would be to finish the fight with the tanks rather than start it.

If the U.S. military is planning on fighting a peer threat, we need to consider what gives a peer threat the most trouble. Namely, what gives us the most trouble. Too often, we reference Operation Desert Storm as a great victory against a similarly equipped military, but it is the Yom Kippur War in 1973 that may give us the most insight. The Israeli Army, which is similarly equipped to U.S. forces, was initially defeated in part because of the overwhelming number of individual anti-tank weapons leveled against their western forces. Coupled with surprise and other compounding factors, the better-equipped and trained Israeli forces were rocked on their heels. More recently, the U.S. military conducted the exercise Millennial Challenge 2002, where it faced an unnamed virtual Middle Eastern enemy force led by retired Marine Gen Paul Van Riper.4 The results were unnerving at best:

“Van Riper decided that as soon as a U.S. Navy carrier battle group steamed into the Gulf, he would “preempt the preemptors” and strike first. Once U.S. forces were within range, Van Riper’s forces unleashed a barrage of missiles from ground-based launchers, commercial ships, and planes flying low and without radio communications to reduce their radar signature. Simultaneously, swarms of speedboats loaded with explosives launched kamikaze attacks. The carrier battle group’s Aegis radar system — which tracks and attempts to intercept incoming missiles — was quickly overwhelmed, and 19 U.S. ships were sunk, including the carrier, several cruisers, and five amphibious ships. “The whole thing was over in five, maybe ten minutes,” Van Riper said.”5

Gen Van Riper wreaked havoc on the technologically superior U.S. forces in short order, and at a much-reduced cost, than if he had attacked with like forces (i.e., Navy vs. Navy). The lessons we learned were the wrong ones. We doubled down on protection and lethality instead of adapting the swarm tactics as a viable winning strategy.

Swarming skirmishers are not a new trend and have been a feasible tactic since formal militaries were created… and likely earlier. Throughout history, inferiorly equipped enemies have adapted by giving advanced forces both more and less to engage. They deploy small, agile, and inexpensive combat forces in greater numbers with seemingly chaotic movements, as opposed to large high value targets with structured objectives. Napoleon struggled against guerrilla tactics in Spain and also employed his own skirmishers to disrupt coalition formations before committing his own formations. Soviet tanks and helicopters struggled to defeat scattered locals equipped with anti-air and anti-tank weapons in Afghanistan and are continually harassed by small drone warfare in Ukraine.6 The U.S. has personally experienced fighting these tactics in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, not to mention the struggles with fighting Native Americans early in our own country. Yet despite the continual examples presented by history, the U.S. Army persists in the thought that our “Death Stars” will dominate future conflicts. We move further and further away from skirmishers as a viable addition to our fighting formations. With the advent of brigade combat teams, the lethality, mobility, and deep-strike capability of the Vietnam-era long-range reconnaissance detachments (LRSDs) is slowly being converted to armored reconnaissance units, designed to engage and defeat adversary reconnaissance armor with like vehicles. The ability to actively harass and disrupt without being decisively engaged has dissipated at a time when it is needed the most.

Field Manual 3-0, Operations, implores commanders to give the enemy “multiple dilemmas” in an effort to affect their observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop. Small teams — ghosting from tree to shadow in the wood line, attacking and disappearing continuously — cause trepidation and disrupt movement like almost no other force. The Imperial Tie Fighters swarmed like killer bees, never presenting a singular target and utilizing a “death by a thousand cuts” strategy. Vietcong forces mastered this fear during the Vietnam War as well as our sniper teams do today. Modern skirmishers would utilize certain traits to be the most effective:

1. Small Teams: A group of two to four Soldiers is more effective for “hit and run” attacks than the traditional cavalry and infantry formations. Operating semi-independently, and in large numbers (of teams), these groups would swarm enemy forces from multiple angles, striking and withdrawing as another team attacks from a new direction. Their goal is to create chaos and confusion, with the bonus possibility of destroying key enemy equipment and personnel.

2. High Lethality and Mobility: Smaller, lighter, faster. For the cost of one Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the Army could have around 25 Polaris MRZR all-terrain vehicles. That trade-off gives a commander 25 chaos teams, which, when equipped with individual sniper rifles, grenade launchers, and anti-air and anti-tank weapons, can attack targets of opportunity at will before quickly fading into the shadows. Given individual dirt bikes or quad bikes, especially if electric and quiet, the individual skirmishing soldier, and team overall, is even more mobile and frustrating.

3. Stigmergy: Essentially, swarming attacks are executed without continual direction and coordination during the attack.7 In an ambush, Team A engages suddenly and violently, then withdraws just as quickly. Team B engages from a different direction just as the enemy responds to the initial attack, then quickly withdraws. As enemy attention shifts, Team A, or even a third or fourth team engage again, continually interrupting the OODA loop with new problems, all without having defined planning between teams.

“Stigmergy-based rules allow units to deduce when to attack, retreat, and how much distance to maintain with other detachments based on the surrounding environment. Relatively simple sets of rules, properly vetted and trained, can allow junior leaders to rapidly self-organize with little to no electronic communication signature to complete a mission.”8

It can be argued that Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) reconnaissance squadrons, as well as Ranger battalions and even infantry companies, all retain a skirmisher mentality. This is certainly true, and the intent would be to enhance these capabilities with equipment and training rather than allow them to be slowly transformed to heavily armored, high-signature formations. The two most likely candidates for the development of chaos teams are the cavalry squadrons and infantry companies. Their missions and training sets are already closely associated with the objectives of the skirmisher, but with the added ability to bridge the gap between a reconnaissance (information) focus and the infantry (kill and hold) focus.

The arguments against such formations are largely based on risk. There is obvious concern for the survivability of the teams, which is in direct conflict with the current trend of increasing the armor of reconnaissance elements. Their key to survival, however, is the same as what makes them lethal. Chaos teams are small and fast, with a minimal vehicle signature and battlefield footprint. Much like hearing the buzz of a mosquito, it is difficult to pin down where it’s coming from, and even harder to actually swat it. This becomes exponentially more difficult as the number of mosquitoes increases. As mentioned, the teams utilize opportunistic hit-and-run attacks to avoid direct and extended engagements with enemy forces. Violent action is followed by rapid disengagement during the initial confusion, leaving the enemy dealing with the sudden chaos. There is the threat of being discovered and destroyed, which is a constant concern for all reconnaissance elements (as well as a necessary evil). Once again, the small footprint of the teams is conducive to quickly and easily going to ground as needed. Training focus on survival skills and camouflage will further enhance their ability to fade into the forest. The enemy gets a vote; however, and it is likely to find a few teams through luck or detection. The large number of teams and fluidity of their mission minimize the impacts to combat effectiveness of the skirmisher element. In contrast, the loss of armored vehicles in traditional reconnaissance formations can open gaps that are not easily closed. Whereas swatting that one mosquito is satisfying, it does little to stop the onslaught of the rest of the swarm. By nature, the chaos teams are certainly high risk, but the effects they provide could prove to be a much higher reward.

The Army currently lacks the ability to actively disrupt enemy operations on a persistent basis. We lament adversary capabilities for anti-tank and anti-air at the lowest level, forcing excessive caution before our adversary has even used it against us, but have not addressed our tactics to counter them. U.S. Army reconnaissance and infantry elements have clearly defined missions and doctrine but lack the flexibility to flow in and through the enemy with open objectives. Much like the swarms of Tie Fighters surging against approaching Rebel fighters, the benefits of the chaos teams are clear. They have minimal logistics support requirements, the ability to cause massive disruption, and can absorb the loss of teams without becoming combat ineffective.

Before the message boards fill with die-hard fans, I fully acknowledge that tanks are probably more Imperial Star Destroyer than Death Star. The point remains that the historical Army concept of relying on this heavy armor is susceptible to catastrophic failure with a few well-placed shots (and perhaps a bit of the Force). To defeat an adversary with the depth and breadth of artillery and anti-access/area denial that our adversaries have demonstrated, the Army needs to employ less Death Stars and invest in quite a few more Tie Fighters.

By LTC Travis Michelena

Notes

1 The average duck is roughly 4 pounds, while the average horse is roughly 1,200 pounds.

2 George Lucas, Star Wars, Lucasfilm, 1977, www.imdb.com/title/tt0080684.

3 Amanda Macias, “Russia’s New Hypersonic Missile, which can be Launched from Warplanes, Will Likely Be Ready for Combat by 2020,” CNBC, 13 July 2018, www.cnbc.com/2018/07/13/russia-new-hypersonic-missile-likely-ready-for-war-by-2020.

4 Micah Zenko, “Millennium Challenge: The Real Story of a Corrupted Military Exercise and its Legacy,” War on the Rocks, 5 November 2015, warontherocks.com/2015/11/millennium-challenge-the-real-story-of-a-corrupted-military-exercise-and-its-legacy.

5 Ibid.

6 “The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S. Response, 1978–1980,” U.S. Department of State, n.d., history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/soviet-invasion-afghanistan.

7 A form of self-organization without formal planning, direct control, or communication; examples: ants, bees, flocks of birds, and schools of fish.

8 Justin Lynch and Lauren Fish, “Soldier Swarm: New Ground Combat Tactics for the Era of Multi-Domain Battle,” Modern War Institute, 5 April 2018, mwi.westpoint.edu/soldier-swarm-new-ground-combat-tactics-era-multi-domain-battle.

LTC Travis Michelena currently serves in the 79th Theater Sustainment Command Forward Element in Vincenza, Italy, with a focus on sustainment operations throughout Africa. He has more than 17 years of experience as an Army logistician with deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Haiti. LTC Michelena’s previous assignments include serving as commander of the Forward Support Company, 4th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division; an observer-coach-trainer and Headquarters and Headquarters Company commander with the First Army’s 181st Infantry Brigade; and S-3 and executive officer with the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command in Europe.

This article appeared in the Spring 2025 issue of Infantry. Read more articles from the professional bulletin of the U.S. Army Infantry at www.benning.army.mil/Infantry/Magazine or www.lineofdeparture.army.mil/Journals/Infantry