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Archive for the ‘PEO-Soldier’ Category

US Army Seeks Lightweight Tropical Uniform

Monday, May 5th, 2014

From the outset, I have to say that technically, the Army is just looking for a new fabric, as there has been no talk (at least publicly) about developing a specialized uniform layout for tropical environments. However, in addition to a new jungle boot that we talked about last week, Natick has released a Sources Sought Notice entitled, “Light Weight Tropical Uniform“. This is excellent news.

To read the meat and potatoes of what the Army is looking for, see it here at RFITropWeight.

This is an interesting move as it is an admission that the current fabric used in the ACU, a 50/50 NYCO or nylon/cotton blend adopted for the Enhanced Hot Weather Battle Dress Uniform in the early 90s isn’t really much of a tropical weight fabric. Prior to this, Hot Weather BDUs were made from a 100% ripstop cotton fabric. This came about as the Army “rediscovered” the need for a tropical weight version of the BDU during the invasion of Grenada in 1983. The Army had begun fielding the Woodland camouflaged BDU, made from a heavy, 50/50 nylon/cotton twill in 1981. Designed for use in central Europe, they were too hot for hot weather use. However, the comfortable, quick drying, 50/50 NYCO poplin fabric of the HWBDU was to be replaced within a decade.

Grenada BDU and ERDL

By the early 90s, a serious garrison mentality had taken hold in the US Army. Soldier were starching their HWBDUs and the process was wearing them out rather quickly, with fraying at the cuffs and collars in as little as six months. Instead of telling Soldiers to stop starching a uniform fabric optimized for tropical environments, the Army introduced a new fabric that would be more durable when starched and pressed under high heat. Unfortunately, this 50/50 NYCO fabric compromise fabric isn’t so great in the hot weather environments the uniform was intended for. The nylon content lowers breathability, making the fabric feel warmer. Operational capability was abandoned in favor of looking good in garrison. When the ACU came along, the Army incorporated that same 50/50 NYCO poplin fabric. Now that the Pacific Pivot is in, and the Army is scrambling to recreate capabilities like the jungle boot that it had abandoned years ago, it has dawned on somebody that they can find a better fabric solution and I am glad.

Granted, the Universal Camouflage Pattern is an issue in the jungle and Woodland EHWBDUs are will in use by some Army SOF and students at the new US Army Jungle School in Hawaii. Hopefully, the Army will work out a solution for this dilemma. But, we can always look back to a simple solution fielded during the Viet Nam War.

VN Jungle Fatigue

I’ve called it “The Greatest Uniform Ever Fielded By The US Army” and in my opinion, the OG-107 Jungle Fatigue in 100% ripstop cotton remains just that.

DA-ST-86-02617

In fact, this uniform, as well as the ERDL camouflaged variant, continued to be worn well into the late 80s by Special operations Forces.

20140504-210823.jpg

Rightfully so, the Army is looking, at a minimum (threshold), for a no-drip, no-melt solution fabric story. Naturally, if the star’s aligned (object) they’d like a full FR solution, although this is probably overkill considering the operational environment.

If you’ve got something that you think will work, the Army needs to hear from you by 1200EST on 08 May 2014. They’ll also need 5 yards of fabric (any color) and a the usual slew of technical data. Make sure you read the details in the amendments. The Army is going to use this data to help scope an actual requirement, making this is a very important part if the process.

With so much development in the textile industry over the past 10 years, here’s to hoping that the Army identifies a fabric optimized for use in hot-wet environments.

US Army Issues RFI For Jungle Boot

Monday, April 28th, 2014

If you’re a Pre-9/11 Veteran, the old, green, issue jungle boot holds a special place in your heart. After over 12 years at war, the Army not only abandoned the design that served us for almost 40 years but seems to have forgotten it ever issued them.

Alatama Boot

Several commercially developed jungle boots have appeared over the years in including designs from the new defunct OTB, 5.11 Tactical, Oakley LSA Terrain and Water Boots and the Rocky design seen below. I’ve also seen a new design from Bates called the Recondo that is very promising.

Just earlier this year, the Defense Logistics Agency even issued an NSN for a “Fast Drying Boot” to Garmont for the T8 even though it isn’t Berry Compliant because there wasn’t anything else available in the stock system.

20140126-192046.jpg

Now, based on the “Pacific Pivot” and the resurgence of the Jungle School (in Hawaii), the Army’s PEO Soldier is finally heeding calls from operational forces over the last few years for “Hot Weather Jungle Combat Boots”. About a month ago, COL Robert Mortlock, PEO Soldier’s PM for Soldier Protection and Individual Equipment began to socialize his office’s intent to seek out a new boot. Initially, it sounded as if the boot would be evaluated under the Army’s resurrected Soldier Enhancement Program with commercial solutions cherry picked for the requirement. At the time, it sounded as if only two boots would be looked at and one of those had already failed an assessment by the US Army Special Operations Command. COL Mortlock’s public comments weren’t very encouraging, as they sounded as if the Army had just newly discovered the concept of Direct Molded Sole technology. Mortlock referred to them as “direct attach outsoles” in an Army press release but I don’t think he actually knows what that is, considering he discussed a glued sole in his description. Glue comes apart in a Hot Wet environment and you’re left with pieces of boots. So that SSD readers know, Direct Molded Soles, or “Vulcanized Rubber” soles aren’t glued but rather hot molded into place and were used is the jungle boot as well as the leather leg boot you were issued during Basic training up into the 1990s. Below is a 60-70s model. Later issued leather combat boots swapped out the tread pattern from the chevron seen here, added a padded collar and speed lacing.

Leg Boot

They haven’t discovered anything new here. The technology to produce this style of boot sole was developed by a division of Wellco named Ro-Search almost 60 years ago. Unfortunately, almost no one aside from Altama and Wellco still have the machinery to do this because Ro-Search leased, rather than sold, the machines and molds to the various boot manufacturers who supplied the military. When requirements were changed to include more comfortable mid-soles and construction techniques, the machinery was returned to its owners. Once the jungle and desert boots were dropped, the capability was as well.

However, the Army has finally done it right and actually issued an RFI. This Sources Sought Notice allows industry to put their best foot forward and tell the Army how it can fulfill this jungle boot requirement. Hopefully, this will result in an improved requirement when it is actually released.

According to the document:

“The hot weather jungle combat boots must be capable of meeting critical technical requirements, as follows:
1) Durable enough to last 12 months of wear in jungle environments where high humidity and repeated submersion in water are expected;
2) Quick drying and highly breathable, to allow for heat and moisture to exit the boot when worn;
3) Drainage which allows for evacuation of water from the boot while walking;
4) Light weight construction (under 2lbs/boot) with materials that resist water absorption ;
5) A Pronounced heel to allow for improved grip when walking down loose, muddy declines;
6) Tread/Lug pattern that easily sheds mud and debris while walking;
7) Outsoles that provide propulsion and superior traction while allowing for braking and stability moving both up and down wet, muddy slopes;
8) Able to keep mud, sediment, and debris out of boot while maneuvering through water and deep mud;
9) Designed to reduce pressure points and discomfort during descents on uneven, rugged terrain; and
10) Provide for quick break-in.”

The list is fairly broad which is good. But, a few points. We don’t seem to learn lessons very well which will become clear as you read this. Lessons learned in combat during past wars have been forgotten.

The boot cannot have any padding or linings. In the early 90s, Natick added a padded collar to the jungle boot and changed the color to black. The padding would eventually absorb water if you spent any time in a tropical environment. The black color was for uniformity more than camouflage. At least the leather remained smooth, full grain out leather. The current use of rough out leather can be problematic for use in hot-wet environments. That’s a lesson we learned in the Pacific during WWII. Another concern is that companies are going to want to add some form of cushioned midsole for comfort. Please don’t. It will absorb water. Speaking of midsoles, I see no requirement for a counter to ‘punji stakes’. This form of booby trap is a staple of jungle warfare. We learned this lesson in Viet Nam.

Panama tread

Instead of a midsole, the Army issued a Saran mesh insole insert with the jungle boot that provided cushion and helped keep the Soldier’s foot from directly sitting on the footbed in order to help keep the feet dry and increase ventilation. This is absolutely critical in the jungle. Finally, while the requirement is great concerning the capability of the sole, thus far, no one has shown superior performance to the Panama sole created during the Viet Nam specifically to improve traction and shed the mud that builds up in more traditional lug patterns. I for one, am hoping that Altama will offer up their traditional 1960s issue Green Jungle Boot with Panama tread to see how it performs against newer designs.

I’m glad to see that SEP has been reenergized and I’m also happy to see that the Army is seriously looking at jungle equipment. But, I suggest they crack the books and look at what worked in the past and see what might be readopted or adapted.

So Exactly Who Is The Guy In Charge of Army Camo?

Tuesday, March 25th, 2014

I was going to do this great post on how the Army would end up spending more money on a proprietary government-owned camouflage solution than just adopting the commercially available MultiCam when I ran across this little gem in yesterday’s print edition of the Army Times. In an article entitled, “Army Expects ‘Family Of Camo Patterns”, COL Robert Mortlock, Program Manager for Soldier Protection and Individual Equipment at PEO Soldier dropped this one on us:

“We have testimonials from soldiers in theater [who get] close enough to the enemy to hear them saying they can’t see the Americans,” he said. “That’s powerful. That’s a combat multiplier. So that’s how important camouflage is to a soldier’s mission.”

All through the article, it goes on about how they are looking for something new, to replace MultiCam. And then, at the end, this quote. My jaw literally dropped. What he failed to mention in that quote was that those Soldiers are wearing that same MultiCam he wants to get rid of. That’s right; the very pattern that this guy is going hell bent for leather to replace, is what makes our guys so awesome. He’d rather waste time and tax payer money to develop something unproven rather than give Soldiers what they (and he) know(s) works. Classic. I just can’t understand how a guy can acknowledge that a product is super effective and yet want to replace it with something he had cooked up because he has some kind of a grudge against the manufacturer. He’s interested in camouflage all right, just as long as it isn’t MultiCam.

So who exactly is this Mortlock guy anyway?

I have been struggling with whether it was right to share COL Mortlock’s background with my readers because I didn’t want it to turn into some kind of personal hit piece. It’s not meant to be. Really. These are, after all, just open source facts, and I’m just presenting them to you. COL Mortlock’s actions will tell you what kind of a man he is. I’m just showing you his background.

COL Robert Mortlock

Over the weekend, I had decided I wasn’t going to talk about PM-SPIE’s background but when I read that quote above and my attitude changed. I figure it’s more than fair that everyone is fully aware of the background of the guy who is in charge of the process of selecting a new camouflage for the US Army. Remember, whatever this guy does regarding camouflage, the US Army will be stuck with for decades to come.

Granted, COL Mortlock is an Acquisition Corps officer and they come from every branch of arms. Ironically, the acquisition profession was created in order to make sure that goat ropes like this don’t happen. Since he’s in Acquisitions, you can’t exactly throw stones at the fact that he is a Chemical Officer by trade and not a Combat Arms officer. That’s not his fault. But this is kind of a systemic problem now, isn’t it? The military’s assignments system is notorious for putting the wrong guy in the right job. Usually, you can power through, but in this case, you’ve got a fellow in charge of camouflage that hasn’t had any troop time since punching his Company Command ticket for 13 months back in the mid-90s, in Hanau, Germany. With a war raging for the past 12 years, you’d think the Army could find someone with more relevant experience. However, I’d like to point out that he is airborne, air assault and Ranger qualified. That does carry some weight. Additionally, I’ve been told that he deployed in 2005 for three months in support of 18th Abn Corps.

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I’m not even going to comment on what follows except to say that it is very impressive. The guy has one heck of a background (including a PhD), in spite of that three years at FCS. I’ll just place the CV that he uses on LinkedIn here for you to read. If it’s missing something pertinent to his current position, it’s because he left it out.

Robert Mortlock’s Overview

Current

Program Manager Soldier Protection and Individual Equipment at US Army

Past

Director, Army Budget Office at US Army
Product Manager, FCS, Infantry Combat, Medical and Recovery Vehicles at US Army
Product Manager, Integrated Air and Missile Defense at US Army

Education

International College of the Armed Forces (ICAF)
Webster University
University of California, Berkeley

Robert Mortlock’s Experience
Program Manager Soldier Protection and Individual Equipment
US Army

Government Agency; 10,001+ employees; Military industry

June 2012 – Present (1 year 10 months)
Director, Army Budget Office
US Army

Government Agency; 10,001+ employees; Military industry

July 2011 – July 2012 (1 year 1 month)
Product Manager, FCS, Infantry Combat, Medical and Recovery Vehicles
US Army

Government Agency; 10,001+ employees; Military industry

June 2007 – June 2010 (3 years 1 month)
Product Manager, Integrated Air and Missile Defense
US Army

Government Agency; 10,001+ employees; Military industry

September 2005 – July 2007 (1 year 11 months) Huntsville, Alabama Area
Project Officer, Rapid Equipping Force and Joint IED Task Force
US Army

Government Agency; 10,001+ employees; Military industry

March 2005 – September 2005 (7 months) Fort Belvior VA
Assistant Project Manager, Joint Common Missile
US Army

Government Agency; 10,001+ employees; Military industry

July 2003 – March 2005 (1 year 9 months) Redstone Arsenal, AL
Project Officer, Joint PEO Chemical and Biological Defense
US Army

Government Agency; 10,001+ employees; Military industry

August 2000 – June 2002 (1 year 11 months) Fallls Church, VA
Assistant Professor, Chemical Engineering
US Army

Government Agency; 10,001+ employees; Military industry

June 1997 – July 2000 (3 years 2 months) US Military Academy, West Point, NY
Company Commander
US Army

Government Agency; 10,001+ employees; Military industry

June 1995 – June 1996 (1 year 1 month) Hanua, Germany
Brigade Chemical Officer
US Army

Government Agency; 10,001+ employees; Military industry

June 1994 – June 1995 (1 year 1 month) Hanau Am Main Area, Germany
Platoon Leader
US Army

Government Agency; 10,001+ employees; Military industry

June 1993 – June 1994 (1 year 1 month) Buedigen, Germany
Robert Mortlock’s Skills & Expertise

Professional Engineer (PE)
Certified MBA
Acquisition Corps Member
Project Management
Systems Engineering
Test Management
Research and Development
Budgets
PMP
Leadership
Defense
Integration
Army

Robert Mortlock’s Education
International College of the Armed Forces (ICAF)
Master’s degree, Military National Resource Strategy and Policy

2010 – 2011

Webster University
Master of Business Administration (MBA)

2002 – 2003

University of California, Berkeley
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Chemical Engineering

1988 – 1992

Lehigh University
Bachelor of Science (BS), Chemical Engineering

1984 – 1988

Contact Robert for:

career opportunities
consulting offers
new ventures
job inquiries
expertise requests
business deals
reference requests
getting back in touch

Let the wild rumpus start!

Look How Far We’ve Come In 10 Years – Get Ready To Go Back To The Future

Thursday, March 20th, 2014

This photo, taken on Christmas Day 2013 depicts members of 3rd Battalion, 71st Calvary Regiment of 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division as they move to secure the helicopter landing zone on Forward Operating Base Orgun-E in Afghanistan’s Paktika province. They are fully decked out in the latest clothing and equipment, developed by PEO Soldier, in the very effective Operational Camouflage Pattern, known commercially as MultiCam.

Soldiers from 3rd Battalion, 71st Calvary Regiment of 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division move to secure the helicopter landing zone on Forward Operating Base Orgun-E in Paktika province Dec. 26 after the completion of a security meeting with Afghan security forces. Forward Operating Base Orgun-E was transferred to Afghan security forces within the last six months. (Photo by U.S. Army Capt. John Landry, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division Public Affairs)

But it wasn’t that many years ago that our Army wasn’t so well equipped. I thought we should take a hop on the way back machine, to another Christmas Day. This time, it’s 2004 at Camp Taji, Iraq, where Chief of Staff of the Army, GEN Peter Schoomaker was visiting the troops. Take a gander at the uniforms. Or should I point out, the lack of uniformity. That’s what our Army looked like, just 10 years ago. The Army we took to war in Iraq in 2003 was forced to mix ALICE Green, Woodland Body Armor and Desert Combat Uniforms. And I want to point out that this is a year-and-a-half into the operation and over three into the overall war. With all of that going on, camouflage is pretty much pointless; one pattern cancelling out the effectiveness of another. On the Army’s birthday, June 14, 2004, GEN Schoomaker unveiled the new Army Combat Uniform in the Universal Camouflage Pattern, which he alone wears. This photo depicts it all, mixed up, in one setting.

Spc. Anthony Page from Hinckley, Ohio with Company A, 615th Aviation Support Battalion, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division is handed his reenlistment certificate and documents by Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker during an award and reenlistment ceremony on Camp Taji, Dec 26. (US Army Cpl. Benjamin Cossel, 122nd MPAD)

Here we are, 10 years later. If PEO Soldier has its way, the early lessons of this war will be forgotten and the Army will once again be forced to mix multiple patterns operationally. Their new plan to adopt a pixelated version of MultiCam, called Digital Transitional Pattern, will have to be mixed with over a Billion Dollars’ worth of Operational Camouflage Pattern (MultiCam) clothing and equipment along with the previously purchased $5 Billion in UCP kit. “Why?” you ask? Well, it’s apparently about cash. The Army doesn’t feel they can afford to pay to continue to purchase OCP gear so they are creating their own pattern. But if they’re that broke, there’s no way they’ll be able to afford to purchase full ensembles of clothing and equipment in this new DTP, let alone bookend patterns of MARPAT.

Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker awards Vancouver, WA resident Cpl. Patrick Eldred, Company B, 2nd of the 162 Infantry, 39th Brigade Combat Team the Bronz Star with (V) device during a ceremony on Camp Taji, Dec 26. (US Army Photo by Cpl Benjamin Cossel, 122nd MPAD)

This is your future looks like; more a trip to the Salvation Army than the world’s greatest Army.

SSD Exclusive – MultiCam Creator Crye Precision Speaks Out Regarding US Army Efforts to Adopt New Camouflage

Tuesday, March 18th, 2014

Recently, Soldier Systems Daily published a story detailing the three latest courses of action that the Army is considering to adopt a new camouflage pattern. After reading that story, Crye Precision contacted me and said that they were considering providing SSD with some information that would clarify their position on the matter. Heretofore, Crye Precision has been very tight lipped about everything Army camouflage related and my questions have been met with a pat, “we can’t talk about that.”

While no one in the US Army has made an official statement on the current state of the effort, it has definitely gone way off schedule and seems to have lost its focus. Unfortunately, the Army has abandoned its own plan and along with it the transparency that Phase IV of the Camouflage Improvement Effort once enjoyed. Facts are difficult to come by. Crumbs of information appear here and there. Sources leak confidential info to the press. In the process, we begin to see a distorted view of what is going on. From the Army’s standpoint, it seems that Crye Precision is asking for the moon. But based on what I’ve read from Crye, a new picture begins to take focus and I am beginning to feel that the Army and Crye Precision aren’t really in negotiations at all. In fact, I’d go as far as to say that the Army’s actions suggest they don’t seem to be negotiating in good faith. Hopefully, the Army and Crye can work this out. I remain incensed that no one in the US Government can seem to pick up a pencil and paper and work out the math on this. After investing over $1 Billion in equipment in the effective Operational Camouflage Pattern (OCP)/MultiCam since 2010, the Army should be happy to pay Crye Precision a fair and reasonable fee in order to negotiate a cost savings over the next decade or more.

Early this morning I received the following information in an email from Caleb Crye. It contains some very significant pieces of info. At least now we have one side of the story and hopefully, the US Army will be more forthcoming regarding their position on this.

MC in Combat

Ultimately, the goal is to provide the American Soldier with the most effective equipment. Let’s hope that institutional momentum, bureaucracy and personal agendas haven’t made the Army lose sight of this.

I have published the contents of the memorandum below and you can download your copy of the document here.

Introduction

Over the past fourteen years, Crye Precision has produced millions of protective items for the US Army and other branches of the Department of Defense. We are proud of our work and are honored to serve those who put their lives on the line to ensure our freedoms. As a business, our focus and internal challenge has always been to develop innovative designs that help our warfighters survive and succeed on the battlefield. We have offered countless products, from body armor to protective apparel to simulation software that reduce casualties and save lives, however, it is our MultiCam® camouflage pattern which stands above all of our products as having done the most to safeguard our troops. Though it is impossible to accurately calculate the number of casualties reduced and Soldier’s lives saved as a result of being well concealed from the enemy, the overwhelming number of direct accounts from warfighters citing MultiCam’s® undeniable performance advantage in combat are the truest testaments to MultiCam’s® effectiveness.

Crye Precision rarely weighs in publicly but in light of recently released confidential information that has misrepresented Crye Precision and the situation surrounding the Army’s efforts to develop new camouflage patterns, we feel compelled to correct the record on behalf of our company, our industry partners, the taxpayers and the warfighters who deserve nothing less than our best efforts.

Key Facts

– On June 14, 2004, the Army officially adopted its familiar “pixely” blue-gray Universal Camouflage Pattern (dubbed “UCP”). Alarmingly, this pattern was adopted without scientific or operational testing.

– From 2005-2006, the Army tested MultiCam® against UCP. The Army’s official side-by-side test report confirmed that MultiCam® rated significantly higher than UCP in all environments, meaning that Soldiers wearing UCP were being put at significantly higher risk than if they were wearing MultiCam®. Despite this UCP remains the Army’s official camouflage pattern and is still being issued to this day.

– In 2006, after seeing the ineffectiveness of UCP on the battlefield in Iraq, U.S. Army Special Operations units independently tested MultiCam® against multiple patterns and adopted it. MultiCam® has been proven effective by these units during thousands of combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other theaters. To this day, it remains their issued camouflage pattern for organizational clothing and individual equipment.

– After numerous complaints in 2009 from Soldiers about the ineffectiveness of the Army issued UCP putting troops at risk in Afghanistan, Congress ordered the Army to take swift action to improve the situation. In response, the Army developed another program to test new camouflages. The Army tested sixteen patterns, including newly introduced Army developed patterns in a “Pattern-In-Picture” test against MultiCam®. Results: MultiCam® was cited as best overall performer.

– In early 2010 the Army conducted yet another camouflage test. This time testing five patterns against MultiCam® in numerous Afghanistan environments. Again, MultiCam® outperformed all others. The Army began a limited fielding of MultiCam® in 2010 to serve as an “interim solution” for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), all the while continuing to issue UCP to all troops not deployed to OEF. (The Army re-named MultiCam® as “OCP”.)

– 2011, the Army decided that it wanted to adopt a “family” of camouflage patterns (i.e., in addition to a multi or “transitional” environment pattern), and initiated yet another camouflage testing program. The Army program was launched under the name “Phase IV”, representing the fourth and final part of its most recent camouflage improvement effort. After two years of yet another expensive and exhaustive evaluation, the Crye submission, which was based entirely on MultiCam®, was again selected as the top performer. Crye was advised by PM-CIE leadership via teleconference on May 1, 2013 that its submission had won the final program phase of the camouflage improvement effort, and that a formal announcement would be forthcoming.

– Following the notification about winning phase IV from PM-CIE, Crye assumed that the Army would continue to take advantage of the already well-established manufacturing base for MultiCam® raw materials and end items, as it had been doing for years, as the Army does not currently license MultiCam® from Crye Precision, nor does it pay Crye Precision for its use.

– Instead, Army representatives approached Crye to discuss the market’s pricing of MultiCam® gear (such as uniforms) and told Crye that it would have to deliver “significant cost savings”. Since Crye does not supply the Army’s uniforms, Crye informed the Army that it, just like any other supplier deep in the supply chain, has no visibility on or ability to mandate the prices the government is charged by any of the uniform or gear makers. Crye agreed to do its part in the only way it could, which was by reducing already nominal fees it receives from its licensed fabric printers. Significantly, those fees represent only a very small part of the end-item cost and are deeply embedded in the supply chain (just as a fiber manufacturer or a dye provider is, for example.) Crye asked for nothing in return for offering this fee reduction. Crye’s proposal, which offered the Army a path to achieve immediate cost savings, was rejected outright by the Army.

– During negotiations with Crye, in October of 2013, the Army released a Justification and Approval (J&A) that it planned to issue MultiCam® as the Army’s “principle camouflage pattern”.

Continuing its efforts to reduce costs to the Army and in an attempt to eliminate the Army’s concerns that MultiCam® was more expensive than UCP, Crye submitted several formal proposals which proved that the Army could procure MultiCam® gear at prices within 1% of UCP gear. Crye’s proposals additionally showed that this could be accomplished with no upfront cost to the Army.

The Army rejected all of Crye’s proposals and did not present any counter proposals, effectively saying that a proven increase in Soldier survivability was not worth a price difference of less than 1%.

– The Army then requested that Crye provide a buyout price for MultiCam®. Crye advised the Army that a full buyout of MultiCam® was unnecessary, pointing to the fact that MultiCam® was readily available for competitive purchase and that the Army could simply continue its use of MultiCam® service-wide, with no new costs to the Army. In addition, Crye pointed out that this course of action would require Crye to cede quality and brand control to the Army, effectively undermining Crye’s commercial market permanently. As such, this option would have required the buyout price to include the entire lifetime value of the MultiCam® brand, and would have been prohibitively expensive.

– Crye declined to provide a buyout figure, which would have to be well into the tens of millions of dollars, because it was likely that any figure presented by Crye could be used out of context to misrepresent and mischaracterize Crye. It was only after continued requests from the Army, coupled with an acknowledgement from the Army that it fully understood that the cost would be in the tens of millions of dollars, and a promise that all information would be kept in strictest confidence, that Crye then agreed to provide a full valuation for the MultiCam® brand, along with a deeply discounted price to the Army for the buyout being requested.

– As Crye predicted, and despite the Army’s assurances to the contrary, Crye’s offer was rejected outright by the Army. No official counter offers to any of Crye’s proposals were ever provided to Crye by the Army.

– Confidential information provided by Crye to the Army has been released out of context, in a manner that misrepresents Crye as having been unwilling to negotiate with the Army and help it find the cost savings it indicated was its goal. In truth Crye has worked exceptionally hard to help the Army meet its stated goals and continues to so.

– Recent information suggests that the Army is now planning to yet again develop, test and field yet another new multi-environment camouflage pattern.

Summary

In Summary, MultiCam® is one of the most thoroughly-tested camouflage patterns in existence. It has been proven in combat and lab evaluations for the better part of a decade and is currently issued within multiple branches of our Armed Forces. It has been the top performer in every major Army camouflage test of the past decade and has been verified time and time again to provide a significant and undeniable Soldier survivability advantage. Its continued use by Soldiers in Afghanistan and Special Operations Forces is a testament to its effectiveness. MultiCam® materials and end-items are readily available today within the competitive market, and MultiCam® products have been proven to be available for nearly the same cost as UCP items. Despite all this, the Army remains on a persistent quest to replace MultiCam®, all the while it still issues UCP to this day, a camo pattern long-proven to put Soldiers at unnecessary risk.

A sincere thank you to all of you who risk your lives serving in defense of freedom. We remain unwavering in our commitment to you.

Examples of official feedback from Special Operations Forces:


“The MultiCam pattern is an excellent camouflage pattern that truly manages/reduces an individual’s signature on the battlefield. I firmly believe that more Rangers would have been seen
and shot during hours of daylight, if they hadn’t been outfitted with the MultiCam uniform. It’s a true force protection measure!”

“The camouflage pattern saved me and my gunner’s life by concealing us long enough to shoot first.”

“On specific missions where other members of the force were in ACU’s, they were specifically shot at or “drew fire” compared to members wearing the Crye pattern. The camouflage was amazing and
probably confused the enemy. It was very hard to see people at any distance with this uniform.”

“While taking fire in an area with moderate vegetation, the Soldiers wearing ACU’s stood out and received a higher volume of fire at their positions.”

“The MultiCam pattern is a must for combat operations in Afghanistan. We blended in perfectly with mountains of OEF.”

“We were ambushed on 3 sides by Taliban fighters. There was nowhere in my immediate vicinity that offered effective cover, so I dropped to the ground and fought from there. I was able to continuously spot and engage fighters approaching the rear of our formation before they were able to spot me despite the fact that I was laying in the open. I truly believe that your MultiCam uniforms kept me from being shot several times that day.”

And the list goes on…

UCP-D:This Is What Happened The Last Time The US Army Created A Pixelated Camo Pattern

Monday, March 10th, 2014

There’s talk of the US Army creating a “Digital MultiCam” pattern in order to avoid paying Crye Precision for a license to use their MultiCam camouflage pattern that has seen use in Afghanistan since 2010. Since some folks have such a short memory and think the Army’s scheme sounds like a good one, I’ll show you a couple of photos of the UCP-D variant. It’s from the last time the US Army created a pixelated Camo pattern. Prior to this beauty, the Army unleashed the Universal Camouflage Pattern on the world. We all know how that turned out. The Army conducted wear tests of UCP-D and MultiCam in Afghanistan. When it was all said and done, they turned to MultiCam. It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to figure this out.

Below are two photos of UCP-Delta. One with an IOTV and one without.

UCP Delta with IOTV UCP Delta
Photos courtesy of PEO-Soldier

US Army Considers 3 COAs for Camo Replacement

Friday, March 7th, 2014

A lot of info has been swirling around the internet over the past week regarding the US Army’s unending quest to find a new camouflage pattern. As crazy as some of it might sound, none of it is exactly wrong. But nothing you’ve read so far tells the complete story. I’ve written at length about the history of the Army’s Camouflage Improvement Effort that began five years ago after members of Congress asked the Army about the combat effectiveness of the Universal Camouflage Pattern adopted in 2004. Here is a Reader’s Digest version of the chain of events. Initially, the Army adopted the commercial MultiCam Pattern from Crye Precision for use in Afghanistan in 2010. This led to the Phase IV effort that investigated around 20 commercial families of camouflage patterns with different colorways for Transitional, Woodland, Arid and an optional fourth version for use with Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment. These candidates were investigated against a baseline consisting of legacy camouflage patterns such as Marine Patterns (MARPAT) and the Navy AOR patterns. After an initial picture-in-picture trial to cull the herd to the most promising options, four companies were awarded contracts to provide printed fabric for field trials; ADS inc with Guy Cramer, Brookwood, Crye Precision and Kryptek.

After several delays in announcing the results of this multi-year effort, the Army abruptly stopped talking about Phase IV and quietly began discussing expanding the use of OCP for the entire Army, even going so far as to change the military name from Operation Enduring Freedom Camouflage Pattern to a more generic Operational Camouflage Pattern. However, negotiations with Crye Precision apparently didn’t work out as the Army had expected and their soft launch plan was put on hold.

I’ve blasted the Army in the past for not taking action regarding their quest for camouflage. Now, they’ve taken action. Unfortunately, it sounds like a broken record. There are reports that the Army will announce something in April but I believe if they even bother it will be an announcement of their new strategy that includes a new round of testing that begins next week. Results of this new testing won’t be available until the end of the fiscal year, if then.

PEO Soldier has been briefing the following Courses of Action:

1. Continue to negotiate with Crye Precision for a full license to use the MultiCam pattern as the Operational Camouflage Pattern. This license would also allow the Army to adapt MultiCam to create bookend patterns for Woodland and Arid environments. So far, this isn’t going well.

2. Adopt the Scorpion camouflage pattern along with bookend patterns for Woodland and Arid environments. Scorpion is a predecessor of MultiCam, developed for the Objective Force Warrior program. Occasionally, the Army’s Natick Labs, in charge of development of Soldier Systems gear, pulls Scorpion out and does some work on it. Although it differs slightly from MultiCam, over the years it has been tested against MultiCam and bookend variants have been developed. Considering Scorpion is even older than MultiCam, this would probably pass the NDAA sniff test as a legacy pattern.

3. Test and adopt a Digital Transitional Pattern with legacy bookend patterns from the MARPAT or AOR families. This is the one you’ve been hearing about in the news. Testing will be limited to NATO or picture-in-picture testing where Soldiers are shown a digital photo of a pattern inserted electronically into a photo of a natural environment and the Soldier is measured to see how long it takes to detect the pattern. Considering that all of the Phase IV finalists outperformed both AOR and MARPAT in picture-in-picture testing, it sounds like the Army is swinging for the fence of mediocrity. Additionally, the newly created DTP, whether created from Crye’s MultiCam or the Army’s Scorpion, will be a new pattern. According to federal law, all four services must adopt it for the Army to have its way.

2014 NDAA – The Elephant In The Room
Last year, Congress enacted a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act that was intended to streamline the development of all of these service specific patterns. Had the Army stuck with its original schedule, the NDAA wouldn’t have been an issue. But they didn’t. Now, they have to deal with the consequences of their inaction.

This is what the law says about new camouflage patterns.

(b) PROHIBITION.—Except as provided in subsection

(c), after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of a military department may not adopt any new camouflage pattern design or uniform fabric for any combat or camouflage utility uniform or family of uniforms for use by an Armed Force, unless—
(1) the new design or fabric is a combat or camouflage utility uniform or family of uniforms that will be adopted by all Armed Forces; (emphasis added)

Call me skeptical, but I’m not sure the Army is going to talk all of the services into adopting this new shake and bake pixelated transitional pattern (DTP). Otherwise, they violate the NDAA.

Echos of UCP?

“It’s déjà vu all over again”.
-Yogi Berra

I can only think of the great Yogi Berra’s quote when I consider what the Army is up to. Just 10 years ago it adopted the so-called Universal Camouflage Pattern just as it had concluded an extensive camouflage study. Ignoring all of the work that had been done, UCP came seemingly out of nowhere, combining features from different patterns, it became more of a fashion decision than an operational one. Sound familiar? Now, right on the heels of the most extensive camouflage study in history, the Army throws out all of the data and creates its own pattern based on other patterns that performed well in testing.

This time it’s worse for two fundamental reason. First, they should know better as they were raked over the coals just last year over the adoption of UCP and the “$5 Billion SNAFU”. Seems like SNAFU was more appropriate than I had originally thought. Second, such an action by the Army has the effect of Big Government hurting a small business.

Sure, they’re testing it. But it’s the computer based, NATO testing, and not full field trials like Phase IV.

The Licensing Fee
The point of the US Army Camouflage Improvement Effort was to do exactly what the name of the project says. From the outset, PEO Soldier said that the Army would allow the science to guide the process. Somehow that notion went out the window sometime over the past two years and money has become the central issue.

According to Army sources, and printed by both Military.com and Army Times, Crye Precision is seeking $24.8 Million from the Army to license the MultiCam pattern. As I understand it, this is an incorrect number, but that doesn’t really matter. What matters is that the Army has the audacity to quibble over $24 Million. The amount of money spent by the Army on camouflage is staggering. What’s worse, all the while that they continue to tap dance, the Army continues to purchase clothing and equipment in both the UCP and OCP camouflage. Years ago, the Army admitted that UCP was ineffective yet they continue to spend money on it. Who wants to bet that they won’t spend in excess of $24 Million between now and September on UCP?

Considering the new round of testing is going to cost even more money after they just completed testing of commercial patterns that cost in excess of $20 Million, it’s now bordering on the criminal. One interesting point. When the Army talks about what a project like this costs they only consider travel and procurement costs. Since their employees are paid no matter what they do, they don’t include those wage costs in the total like a commercial company would. This means that they grossly under report costs.

The next thing you are going to hear from these guys is how they are trying to be good stewards of the tax payers money. They spent well in excess of $5 Billion on UCP (some estimate that across DoD, almost $10 Billion was spent on UCP since 2004). Since adopting OCP in 2010, DoD has spent well over $1 Billion on clothing and OCIE. Now, they are seriously considering adopting yet another pattern. I don’t see how the capital investment in an entirely new family of camouflage is working in my best interest as a tax payer or for that matter, in the Army’s, who has other modernization requirements. Government watch dogs are also going to start to add up all of the money the Army has spent and question why they didn’t just buy what their own testing has already shown to be effective. After all of the money the Army has spent, even $24.8 Million sounds like a bargain to me.

In the long run, it will be Big Army vs small business man. In the court of public opinion this won’t end well for the Army or for those decision makes pushing this within the Army.

From a fiscal standpoint, there is only one option. Adopt MultiCam as OCP as standard issue for the US Army.

Perception Is Reality
All along, I’ve maintained that camouflage is as much as function of branding as operational effectiveness. The British military recognized this when they contracted Crye Precision to create a variant of MulticCam called Multi Terrain Pattern as their national camouflage pattern. The Marine Corps knows this as well, creating MARPAT as a means to identify themselves and create esprit de corps. The Air Force created their digital tigerstripe pattern in 2006 after then CSAF, Gen John Jumper felt insulted after being called a Soldier while wearing woodland BDUs. Even the Army has acknowledged this with the adoption of UCP. The point was to offer a distinctive look for the Soldier. Consequently, the troops aren’t going to be exactly happy that they are getting a generic, watered down version of something they already know works. The Army is strapped for cash. This most likely means that the transition to a new camouflage identity for the Army will take some time. If a new pattern is adopted, we will see Soldiers outfitted in a combination of three different patterns for years to come. Not exactly sending a great message that they are a professional force. Nobody wants to see Soldiers wearing clashing camouflage. In not only looks bad, but operationally, testing has shown that it actually works to make the Soldier even more detectable. Way to tell Soldiers that you care.

US troops have been fighting in OCP/MultiCam for years. Give Soldiers what they know works.

The Forgotten Option
For some reason, the Army has abandoned the multi-year, Phase IV testing of the Camouflage Improvement Effort. All of the commercial candidate patterns out performed baseline (MARPAT and AOR). And as we understand it, the Crye Precision offering, while just barely, came out on top. If the Army would just award Phase IV, it could adopt the Crye Precision family of patterns and pay a measly $639,863.99 for the privilege. Is there a loophole in the NDAA? Maybe. It was used by the Army, although in a Test and Evaluation environment only, prior to adoption of the NDAA language as law.

Finish what you’ve started.

Bottom Line?
Get your act together Army. Stop wasting money. You already know what it is, so adopt a camouflage that works.

US Army Announces Improved Modular Tactical Holster Winners

Thursday, December 26th, 2013

Way back in December, 2012, the US Army released a pre-solicitation for a new Improved Modular Tactical Holster (IMTH) for the M9 pistol. The concept was to look for:

improvements to be made to the current Army Tactical Drop-Leg Configuration Holster System for the Army M9 specification Beretta 92F / 92FS pistol. The improvements sought are increased modularity including a drop-leg configuration, that can be quickly transferred to a hip configuration, as well as the capability to be worn/attached to current Modular Lightweight Load Carrying Equipment (MOLLE), load carriage equipment such as rucksacks and the Tactical Assault Panel (TAP) or on individual body armor such as the Improved Outer Tactical Vest (IOTV) or the Solder Plate Carrier System (SPCS).

Just over a year later, on December 19th, 2013, Natick announced the winners. Interestingly, the Army split the award between ADS Inc ($24,288,000.00) and Military Hardware, LLC ($49,000,000.00).

As we understand it, ADS bid a Serpa system from Blackhawk, probably similar to what they successfully won the Marine Corps contract with. To be sure, the Serpa is popular and has been adopted by militarized all around the world.

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Military Hardware on the other hand, offered a G-Code system that we have covered here on SSD in the past.

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The Military Hardware/G-Code holster consists of the XST holster along with Duty Drop Leg, H-MAR adapter for vests and MOLLE belt mount. The Kydex XST features an two forms of retention; the Over the Top, Power Assisted, Retention Canopy as well as their Adjustable Pro-Safe Tensioning. It is also outfitted with G-Code’s RTI (Rapid Transition Interface) which allows the user to securely move their holster from mount to another.

According the the pre-solicitation the overall 5-year IDIQ contract would not exceed $49 Million and consist of 225,000 holsters. Considering the ceiling on the Military Hardware award meets this, we are unsure how the Army plans to leverage this contract vehicle. Doubly so as they bid entirely different systems from different manufacturers, featuring different retention mechanisms. However, based on the two award amounts, it looks as if the Army expects to purchase twice as many G-Codes as Serpas.

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On a final note, earlier this year, US Air Force Security Forces opted out of using the Serpa and mandated the Safariland 6004/6005. Likewise, the 75th Ranger Regt as well as other SOF organizations also issue the Safariland holster.