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Archive for the ‘Profession of Arms’ Category

USMC Releases 219 & 220 Uniform Board Results

Friday, March 25th, 2022

The US Marine Corps released the finding of Uniform Boards 219 and 220 with this MARADMIN message. It also updates Maternity uniform initiatives.

R 231339Z MAR 22
MARADMIN 134/22
MSGID/GENADMIN/CG TECOM QUANTICO VA//
SUBJ/UNIFORM BOARD 219 AND 220 RESULTS AND MATERNITY UNIFORM DEVELOPMENT UPDATE//
REF/A/DOC/MCUB/1 MAY 2018//
REF/B/CMC DECISION MEMORANDUM 7 JAN 2020/NOTAL//
NARR/REF A IS MCO 1020.34H MARINE CORPS UNIFORM REGULATIONS/REF B IS THE CMC DECISION MEMO REGARDING MATERITY UNIFORM UPGRADES//
GENTEXT/REMARKS/1.  Several decisions were rendered for uniform boards 219 and 220 by the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), on 3 February 2022.  As a result of the below decisions, new text to reference (a) will be available immediately on the Marine Corps uniform board website, https:(slash)(slash)hqmc.usmc.afpims.mil/agencies/marine-corps-uniform-board/, and will be published as change 1.
1A.  Manicures for female Marines.  Clear fingernail polish and nude fingernail polish that resembles the wearer’s skin tone and covers the whole nail, as well as manicures that mimic the natural nail (e.g., French and ombre manicures) are authorized for wear in all uniforms.  All other fingernail polish regulations detailed in reference a, paragraph 1004.7.B.2.a remain in effect.
1B.  Special characters on Marine Corps Combat Utility Uniform (MCCUU) nametapes. Special characters (i.e., apostrophes, accent marks, tildes and hyphens) are authorized for wear on MCCUU nametapes, as the space on the tape allows (the width of the tape and the minimum font size detailed in reference a, paragraph 3033 remain the same).
1C.  Supplemental clothing allowance for enlisted personnel assigned to Tactical Training Exercise Control Group, Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Command is approved and includes 2 BLOUSE, MCCUU, WOODLAND WITH NAME / SERVICE TAPES, 2 TROUSERS, MCCUU, WOODLAND, and 1 MARINE CORPS COMBAT BOOTS, HOT WEATHER, PR.  Per MCO 4400.201, v13 officers are not eligible for supplemental allowances.
1D.  “Edging up” male hairline.  “Edging up” undesirable hair that extends beyond/below the natural hairline is authorized (e.g., remove a “widow’s peak,” or remove excessive hair on forehead so it provides a neat line), as long as it provides a neat, professional, and natural appearance.
1E.  Bulk of hair limitations.  The bulk of hair limitations for all Marines is extended from 2 to 3 inches.
1F.  Optional helmet caps.  Optional (commercial) black, olive drab, MARPAT and coyote helmet caps (also known as helmet caps or helmet liners) may be worn underneath the helmet and may be worn as an outer garment for short periods when the helmet is removed, per the Commander’s discretion.  The helmet cap will not be worn in lieu of the MCCUU caps.
1G.  Boot socks.  Optional olive drab or black cushion socks may be worn with the MCCUU.
2.  Maternity uniforms.  Per reference b, CMC rendered several decisions on updating current maternity uniforms and developing additional items for optional purchase or inclusion in the maternity uniform supplemental allowance.  The below items are now available for purchase and / or issue (unless otherwise noted).
2.A.  Adjustable side tabs on the maternity tunic:  tabbed items are already in circulation and are available at MCX / MCCS.  Non-tab items are still authorized for issue and wear.  Selection will vary by location until all non-tabbed items are sold out.
2.B.  Adjustable side tabs on maternity short and long sleeve shirts:  tabbed items already in circulation and available at MCX / MCCS.  Non-tab items are still authorized for issue and wear.  Selection will vary by location until all non-tabbed items are sold out.
2.C.  The Maternity undershirt is certified and available for purchase.  Beginning in Fiscal Year 2022 (FY22), when the maternity uniform allowance is issued, the Marine will receive a supplemental cash allowance for the purchase of two shirts.  The maternity undershirt is authorized for wear in the same manner as the standard olive drab undershirt.  Additional details were published in the FY22 MCBul 10120.
2.D.  The Nursing undershirt is certified and available for optional purchase.  Only certified nursing shirts will be worn with the uniform effective immediately.  The shirt is an undergarment and will not be worn as an outer garment.
2.E.  Dress blue skirt.  In development, tentatively available FY23.  Fielding information to be published via SEPCOR.
2.F.  Dress blue slacks.  In development, tentatively available FY23.  Fielding information to be published via SEPCOR.
2.G.  Maternity physical training (PT) shorts.  In development, tentatively available FY23.  Fielding information to be published via SEPCOR.
3.  The point of contact is XXXXX.
4.  Release authorized by LtGen K. M. Iiams, Commanding General, Training and Education Command.//

SecAF Kendall Details ‘Seven Operational Imperatives’ & How They Forge the Future Force

Thursday, March 24th, 2022

ORLANDO, Fla. (AFNS) —  

Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall outlined his increasingly urgent roadmap March 3 for successfully bringing about the new technologies, thinking, and cultures the Air and Space Forces must have to deter and, if necessary, defeat modern day adversaries.

The particulars of Kendall’s 30-minute keynote to Air Force Association’s Warfare Symposium weren’t necessarily new since they echoed main themes he’s voiced since becoming the Department’s highest ranking civilian leader. But the circumstances surrounding his appearance before an influential crowd of Airmen, Guardians, and industry officials were dramatically different, coming days after Russia invaded Ukraine.

Kendall used the invasion to buttress his larger assertion that the Air and Space Forces must modernize to meet new and emerging threats and challenges. The path to achieving those goals are embodied in what Kendall has dubbed the Department of the Air Force’s “seven operational imperatives.”

“My highest personal goal as Secretary has been to instill a sense of urgency about our efforts to modernize and to ensure that we improve our operational posture relative to our pacing challenge; China, China, China,” he said. “The most important thing we owe our Airmen and Guardians are the resources they need, and the systems and equipment they need, to perform their missions.”

“To achieve this goal, I’ve commissioned work on seven operational imperatives. These imperatives are just that; if we don’t get them right, we will have unacceptable operational risk,” he said.

Kendall spent the balance of his address discussing each of the seven imperatives. But he also noted that, given recent events, the threats are not abstract.

“In my view President Putin made a very, very, serious miscalculation. He severely underestimated the global reaction the invasion of Ukraine would provoke, he severely underestimated the will and courage of the Ukrainian people, and he overestimated the capability of his own military,” Kendall said.

“Perhaps most of all, he severely underestimated the reaction from both the U.S. and from our friends and allies,” he said.

The world’s mostly united response to Ukraine should not divert attention from the distance the Air and Space Forces must cover to adequately upgrade and change to face current threats.

“We’re stretched thin as we meet Combatant Commanders’ needs around the globe,” Kendall said, repeating a frequent refrain. “We have an aging and costly-to-maintain capital structure with average aircraft ages of approximately 30 years and operational availability rates that are lower than we desire.”

Kendall added, “While I applaud the assistance the Congress has provided this year, we are still limited in our ability to shift resources away from legacy platforms we need to retire to free up funds for modernization. … We have a Space Force that inherited a set of systems designed for an era when we could operate in space with impunity.”

Those realities, he said, triggered establishing the Department’s seven operational imperatives. They are:

1. Defining Resilient and Effective Space Order of Battle and Architectures;
2. Achieving Operationally Optimized Advanced Battle Management Systems (ABMS) / Air Force Joint All-Domain Command & Control (AF JADC2);
3. Defining the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) System-of-Systems;
4. Achieving Moving Target Engagement at Scale in a Challenging Operational Environment;
5. Defining optimized resilient basing, sustainment, and communications in a contested environment;
6. Defining the B-21 Long Range Strike Family-of-Systems;
7. Readiness of the Department of the Air Force to transition to a wartime posture against a peer competitor.

The first imperative, he said, is aimed at ensuring capabilities in space. “Of all the imperatives, this is perhaps the broadest and the one with the most potential impact,” he said.

“The simple fact is that the U.S. cannot project power successfully unless our space-based services are resilient enough to endure while under attack,” he said. “Equally true, our terrestrial forces, Joint and Combined, cannot survive and perform their missions if our adversary’s space-based operational support systems, especially targeting systems, are allowed to operate with impunity.”

The second of Kendall’s seven imperatives is to modernize command and control, speed decision-making and linking seamlessly multi-domain forces. In short he wants continued development of defense-wide effort known as Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) and the Air Force component of that effort known as ABMS or Advanced Battle Management System.

“This imperative is the Department of the Air Force component of Joint All Domain Command and Control. It is intended to better define and focus DAF efforts to improve how we collect, analyze, and share information and make operational decisions more effectively than our potential adversaries,” Kendall said.

At the same time, that effort demands discipline. In this regard, Kendall was blunt, saying “we can’t invest in everything and we shouldn’t invest in improvements that don’t have clear operational benefit. We must be more focused on specific improvements with measurable value and operational impact.”

Another imperative is Defining the Next Generation Air Dominance (or NGAD) System of Systems. 

“NGAD must be more than just the next crewed fighter jet. It’s a program that will include a crewed platform teamed with much less expensive autonomous un-crewed combat aircraft, employing a distributed, tailorable mix of sensors, weapons, and other mission equipment operating as a team or formation,” he said.

Kendall’s next imperative is “Achieving Moving Target Engagement at Scale in a Challenging Operational Environment.”

The effort, he said, has direct connection to the JADC2/ABMS initiatives but tightens the focus.

“What enables our aforementioned ABMS investments to be successful starts with the ability to acquire targets using sensors and systems in a way that allows targeting data to be passed to an operator for engagement,” he said, adding, “for the scenarios of interest it all starts with these sensors. They must be both effective against the targets of interest and survivable.”

The next imperative is a pragmatic throwback to a concept that has long been important – defining optimized resilient basing, sustainment, and communications in a contested environment.

But as in other efforts, Kendall says the concept needs new thinking. In addition to relying on large, fixed bases as the Air Force has done for generations, Kendall said there needs to be a new “hub-and-spoke” arrangement that includes smaller, more mobile bases. That concept is known as Agile Combat Employment (ACE).

“It’s the idea that you don’t just operate from that one fixed base. You have satellite bases dispersed in a hub-and-spoke concept, where you can operate from numerous locations and make your forces less easily targetable because of their disbursement,” he said.

The sixth imperative has a heavy focus on hardware. The effort will define the B-21 Long Range Strike “family of systems,” he said.

As in other imperatives, this one has echoes to others in the list. “This initiative, similar to NGAD, identifies all of the components of the B-21 family of systems, including the potential use of more affordable un-crewed autonomous combat aircraft,” he said.

“The technologies are there now to introduce un-crewed platforms in this system-of-systems context, but the most cost effective approach and the operational concepts for this complement to crewed global strike capabilities have to be analyzed and defined.”

As a former senior weapons buyer for the Department of Defense, Kendall has a keen understanding of the tension between equipment and cost. That understanding explains, in part, this imperative.

“We’re looking for systems that cost nominally on the order of at least half as much as the manned systems that we’re talking about for both NGAD and for B-21” while adding capability, he said. “ … They could deliver a range of sensors, other mission payloads, and weapons, or other mission equipment and they can also be attritable or even sacrificed if doing so conferred a major operational advantage – something we would never do with a crewed platform.”

The seventh and final imperative is both ageless and essential – readiness.

“To go from a standstill to mobilizing forces, moving them into theater, and then supporting them takes the collective success of a large number of information systems and supporting logistical and industrial infrastructure. We have never had to mobilize forces against the cyber, or even the kinetic, threats we might face in a conflict with a modern peer competitor,” he said.

While achieving the imperatives is challenging, Kendall said he’s optimistic.

Kendall said industry, with its “intellectual capital” will have a critical role in finding solutions and compressing the often decades-long development time. So will allies and, of course, Airmen and Guardians.

“I’ve gotten to meet a lot of Airmen and Guardians. Nothing is more inspiring to me than to have informal conversations with the men and women who wear the Air or Space Force uniform. The dedication, commitment, professionalism, and passion these people bring to their service and to the nation is simply awesome,” he said.

“As I’ve traveled to places like Alaska, Montana, North Dakota, and Thule, Greenland, the positive attitudes, drive, and commitment our men and women serving far from home, and in sometimes challenging circumstances, is just exceptional.”

By Charles Pope, Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs

Secretary Approves Implementation of Revised Army Combat Fitness Test

Wednesday, March 23rd, 2022

WASHINGTON – Secretary of the Army Christine E. Wormuth issued an Army Directive today outlining a time-phased implementation of a revised ACFT as the Army’s general physical fitness test.

Changes made to the ACFT incorporate feedback from Soldiers and independent analysis of test performance.

Among the key changes announced by the Army are new age-and-gender-performance normed scoring scales; the replacement of the leg tuck with the plank for the core-strength assessment; and the addition of the 2.5-mile walk as an alternate aerobic event.

“The ACFT is an essential part of maintaining the readiness of the Army as we transform into the Army of 2030,” Wormuth said.

“The revisions to the ACFT are based on data and analysis, including an independent assessment required by Congress. We will continue to assess our implementation of the test to ensure it is fair and achieves our goal of strengthening the Army’s fitness culture.”

A common concern identified by the Army’s independent analysis and the RAND study was that a gender-neutral test might not accurately measure all Soldiers’ general physical fitness levels. One example was using the leg tuck as the assessment of core strength.

RAND concluded that Soldiers might have the core strength that is not accurately measured if they lack the upper body strength required to perform a leg tuck. Now, the plank will be the sole exercise to assess core strength, using recognized standards from sister services as a baseline, and modifying the scales based on Army requirements.

The revised ACFT will utilize scoring scales that are age and gender normed, similar to the APFT. The Army designed the new scoring scales from nearly 630,000 ACFT performance scores, historical performance rates from the APFT, and scoring scales used by other military services.

The Army will continue to assess performance data and has established an ACFT governance body to provide oversight of the full implementation of the new test. This structure will assess ACFT scores, pass rates, injuries and environmental considerations, and report those findings along with any recommended changes to Army Senior Leaders. The first comprehensive assessment will be in April 2023.

Unlike the APFT, which went largely unchanged for 40 years, Army leaders believe the ACFT must be adaptable.

“Since 2018 we’ve said this test would evolve, and it has,” said Sgt. Maj. of the Army Michael Grinston.

Grinston noted the governance structure will continue to advance the ACFT to maximize the physical fitness of the force.

The six-event ACFT now provides commanders and Soldiers an accurate assessment of a Soldier’s physical fitness level and sustains the Army’s efforts to maintain a physically fit force capable of a wide range of missions.

Implementing the ACFT

Beginning April 1, units will start diagnostic testing under the new structure. Record testing begins for Regular Army and Active Guard Reserve Soldiers on October 1, 2022, to allow Soldiers six-months to train. Also on October 1, a passing ACFT score will be used for retention, graduation of initial military training, professional military education, and evaluation reports for Regular Army and Active Guard Reserve Soldiers. Implementation of separation actions may begin in April 2023 for Regular Army and Active Guard Reserve Soldiers.

The Army also approved similar, but longer, timelines for Army Reserve and Army National Guard Soldiers, with April 2023 marking the start point for most personnel policies, and the implementation of separation actions beginning in April 2024.

“During this transition, we want to make sure all Soldiers have the proper time to succeed,” Grinston explained. “Put the test on the calendar and make sure your Soldiers have a solid training plan.”

Grinston said while Regular Army Soldiers can be flagged beginning October 1, 2022 for failing the ACFT, no Regular Army Soldier will be separated solely for ACFT failure until April 2023.

The policy also directed a change to extend retesting periods from 90 days under the APFT to 180 days for Regular Army and Active Guard Reserve Soldiers, and 240 days for Reserve Soldiers for the ACFT. Grinston noted that the extended reconditioning timelines will guarantee that Soldiers who are willing to put in the time and training are provided an opportunity to pass the test.

Chain Teach throughout the Force

To help inform the force of all the policies and procedures of the test, the Sergeant Major of the Army is initiating a chain teach throughout the force – and personally gave Army Command, Army Service Component Command, and direct reporting unit command sergeants major a class on changes to the ACFT.

“They will turn around and give that class to the NCOs who report to them as well as the [command sergeants major] for their subordinate units,” Grinston said.

The chain teach will continue throughout the Army to ensure all noncommissioned officers and Soldiers are directly informed of the policy.

“This is an opportunity for leaders to get engaged and understand their Soldiers’ questions and concerns about the test,” Grinston said. “Know where they are struggling and develop a plan to help them succeed. Leaders need to address more than just physical training and focus on the Soldier’s overall fitness.”

To ensure Soldiers throughout the Total Army have comparable training opportunities, the Army procured and distributed more than 40,000 sets of equipment, 60% of which were designated for Soldiers in the Army Reserve and National Guard.

Grinston encouraged Leaders to use their equipment for physical readiness training, including on drill weekends for the Reserve Component, to help Soldiers familiarize themselves with the events before testing.

There are also a number of resources available on the ACFT website to help Soldiers train, including workout program examples and videos of exercises – many of which require no equipment.

Holistic Approach

Army leaders expect units to incorporate principles of all the Holistic Health and Fitness (H2F) System domains into their training. In addition to the physical domain, Leaders should include proper nutrition, sleep, and spiritual and mental fitness to improve overall Soldier readiness. Unit master fitness trainers are the subject-matter experts and are trained to advise in all domains of fitness.

“H2F is an incredible system that looks at training in ways the Army has never done before,” said Brig. Gen. John Kline, commanding general of the Center for Initial Military Training – the Army’s lead proponent for the H2F system.

“Incorporating things like mindfulness training, proper nutrition counseling, and better sleep techniques are proven methods to improve mental and physical readiness,” Kline said.

“If you really want to improve your ACFT score,” Grinston agreed, “start with those other four domains of fitness.”

For the full details on the implementation of the ACFT, visit www.army.mil/acft.

By SFC Will Reinier

Air Commandos Earn ACA Honors

Tuesday, March 22nd, 2022

HURLBURT FIELD, Fla. —  

Past and present Air Force Special Operations Command Airmen were recognized for their dedication and hard work by the Air Commando Association.

Due to COVID-19, the Air Commando Association’s Heritage Seminar Breakfast and the Awards Banquet were not held.

The following Airmen were recognized for receiving Commander’s Leadership Awards:

Technical Sgt. Andrew T. Flynn, 23rd Special Operations Weather Squadron, Det 1

First Lt. Brittany K. Brown, 4th Special Operations Squadron

Technical Sgt. Adam C. Long, 720th Operational Support Squadron

First Lt. Erik A. Lolland, 720th Operational Support Squadron

Technical Sgt. Arthur W. Mapp, 27th Special Operations Group

Captain Jonathan C. Edwards, 27th Special Operations Aircraft Maintenance Squadron

Staff Sgt. James R. Evans, 58th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron

Major Jacob L. Wiseman, 58th Special Operations Wing

Master Sgt. Robert T. LeMay, 352nd Special Operations Squadron

First Lt. Ryan M. Laube, 352nd Special Operations Support Squadron

Technical Sgt. Jeremy D. Morlock, 353rd Special Operations Support Squadron

Captain Zachary R. Maginnis, 1st Special Operations Squadron

Staff Sgt. Trevor L. Rohrer, 524th Special Operations Squadron

Captain Riley A. Feeney, 492nd Special Operations Training Support Squadron

Technical Sgt. Keith A. Proze Jr., 2nd Special Operations Squadron

Captain Jason M. Morris, HQ AFSOC/A3

Technical Sgt. Brett E. Rush, Data Masked

Major Michael J. Lintz, Data Masked

The following awards were presented:

Chief Hap Lutz AFSOC Commando Medic of the Year – Tech. Sgt. Stephen M. Sauer, Data Masked

Senior Airman Julian Sholten Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operator of the Year – Tech. Sgt. Nicholas A. Lord, 25th Intelligence Squadron, RAF Mildenhall, U.K.

Operational Squadron of the Year – 7th Special Operations Squadron, RAF Mildenhall, U.K.

Deployed Aircraft Ground Response Element Member of the Year – Staff Sgt. Ethan C. Pierce, 352nd Special Operation Support Squadron, RAF Mildenhall, U.K.

Special Tactics Operator of the Year (Enlisted Category 2020) – Tech. Sgt. Adam Anderson, 17th Special Tactics Squadron, 24th Special Operations Wing, Ft. Benning, Georgia

Special Tactics Operator of the Year (Operator Category 2020) – Capt. Brandon Farrell, 320th Special Tactics Squadron, 353rd Special Operations Wing, Kadena Air Base, Japan

Special Tactics Heart of the Team Member of the Year – Master Sgt. James A. Olk, 720th Operational Support Squadron

The following recipients were inducted into the ACA Hall of Fame:

Colonel (ret.) Timothy Hale – Hale excelled as an MC-130E/H crew commander and instructor/evaluator and an AC/MC-130J instructor. From his first combat mission as an MC-130E pilot in the lead aircraft over Point Salinas, Grenada, Hale led from the front with professionalism, courage, a keen sense of humor, and respect. He commanded an Expeditionary Group and Wing, flying missions and riding resupply convoys during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Upon retirement, he continued to serve Air Commandos as an aircrew accession instructor with the 58th Special Operations Wing.

Lieutenant Col. Bill Schroeder (posthumously) – As an officer-in-charge and then commander of the Special Operations Weather detachment at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, his steadfast leadership of low-density, high-demand Special Operations Weather Team (SOWT) operators was critical in ensuring premier weather support to the 3rd and 7th Special Forces Groups as they deployed during Operations ENDURING and IRAQI FREEDOM. He later led the effort to modernize the Battlefield Airman training program and played a role in establishing the Special Warfare Training Wing. Schroeder laid down his life after confronting an armed assailant determined to inflict harm to the men and women under his charge. He was posthumously awarded the Airman’s Medal and honored by the Air Force Portraits in Courage for his valor and selfless sacrifice.

Major (ret.) Dan Turney – Turney was an MH-60 initial cadre pilot in the 55th Special Operations Squadron, the first H-60 unit in the U.S. Air Force. He was the first MH-60G special mission planner for the 1st SOW and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). He deployed as an MH-60G Combat Search and Rescue mission manager during Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM, coordinating over 40 combat missions. After retirement, Turney served as an AFSOC operations analyst and developed the first formal Aviation Foreign Internal Defense Concept of Operations and Roadmap for the 2006 and 2009 Quadrennial Defense Reviews.

Chief Master Sgt. (ret.) William C. Markham – Markham served as the senior enlisted leader of the Joint Special Operations Air Detachment and Combined Joint Special Operations Air Component in combat. He was the first U.S. Airman on the ground in Afghanistan a mere five weeks after September 11, 2001. Then-Sergeant Markham controlled close air support that decimated the ranks of the Taliban, and ultimately liberated Bagram Air Base and Kabul International Airport, and returned the U.S. Embassy to American control. For gallantry in action, he received the Silver Star. As an AFSOC Command Chief, he led the growth and re-missioning of the 352nd Special Operations Group integrating the MC-130J Commando II and CV-22B Osprey weapons systems. Markham personally enabled hundreds of thousands of dollars in scholarship funding and pro-bono legal support to American service members and their families.

Senior Master Sgt. James Lackey (posthumously) – Lackey’s outstanding professionalism and personal leadership were vital to building the readiness of the 8th Special Operations Squadron, AFSOC’s first operational CV-22B squadron, and prosecuting the squadron’s mission during the global war on terrorism. From 1992-2006, Lackey served with distinction as an Instructor and Flight Examiner for the MH-53 Pave Low Models J/M. His leadership, courage, and superior airmanship were evident during Operations PROVIDE PROMISE, UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, BEVEL EDGE, ALLIED FORCE, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM. He was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for heroism as well as the Meritorious Service Medal and Air Medal. He excelled as a CV-22 flight engineer during combat deployments supporting OIF and OEF. Lackey gave his last full measure on April 9, 2010 during a combat mission in Afghanistan.

The ACA recognizes retired and active duty Special Operations Forces Airmen by honoring their achievements as well as providing support to Air Commandos and their families.

By SSgt Brandon Esau, Air Force Special Operations Command Public Affairs

US Navy Updates Policy for Sailors with Pseudofolliculitis Barbae (PFB)

Wednesday, March 16th, 2022

As a result of feedback from Sailors and waterfront leadership, the Navy has updated grooming policy and requirements for Sailors diagnosed with the shaving-related condition pseudofolliculitis barbae (PFB) in NAVADMIN 064/22, Mar. 9.

Navy dermatologists and the Navy Uniform Matters Office conducted the latest periodic review of the instruction regarding management of Sailors diagnosed with PFB, and took into account recommendations from Sailors directly affected by PFB.  This latest update provides guidance for those Sailors, military medical care providers and commanding officers.

PFB, also referred to as razor bumps, is caused when tightly curled beard hairs, sharpened by shaving, curve back and re-enter the skin, resulting in facial inflammation, bumps and infections.  

The first on the list of updates announced that Sailors diagnosed with PFB will be authorized to outline or edge their beards.

“We listened to recommendations by Sailors personally affected by PFB and we worked with our medical professionals to refine the Navy’s PFB management policy and procedures,” said Robert B. Carroll, head of the Navy Uniform Matters Office.  “These changes directly reflect the Navy’s commitment to Sailor health, safety and mission readiness in the force.”

With this update, the Navy will also eliminate the mandate of carrying a facial hair waiver or “no-shave chit” while in uniform. Sailors have the option to maintain a copy of their waiver treatment form on a personal portable electronic device or a paper copy for convenience in situations such as embarking a ship or temporary duty assignments where medical records may not be immediately available.

Another major update to the instruction will ensure that PFB treatment failures are not considered as grounds for a Sailor’s administrative separation. In the vein of prescribed treatments, Sailors diagnosed with PFB no longer have to consider laser hair reduction as a required treatment.

For Sailors whose conditions do not improve with PFB medical treatments, the duration between required evaluations will now occur every two years, unless prescribed more frequently by their military medical care provider.

Prior to this latest review, the last update to BUPERS Instruction 1000.22C was released Oct. 8, 2019.  The NAVADMIN announcing current PFB program changes was released in advance of BUPERS Instruction update.  The Navy continues to update grooming standards and uniform policy based on Fleet feedback and direction from Navy leadership.

The Navy Uniform Matters Office welcomes feedback and recommendations from Sailors regarding uniform and grooming policies via the MyNavy UNIFORMS App or MyNavy Portal. Once signed into MNP, select Professional Resources, then select U.S. Navy Uniforms and “Ask the Chiefs.”

By MC1 Jeanette Mullinax, Chief of Naval Personnel Public Affairs

Air Force Translators Enable Water Sustainment Project for African Partner Nations

Saturday, March 5th, 2022

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, Ala. (AFNS) —  

Eleven German Language Enabled Airman Program Scholars aided the 435th Air Expeditionary Wing, Ramstein Air Base, Germany, and the 409th Air Expeditionary Group, Nigerien Air Base 201, Agadez, to share best practices with African nation partners through language support that further enhanced water sustainment at Nigerien Air Base 101, Niamey, Niger.  

Through the Air Force Culture and Language Center’s Training Partnership Request, the 435th AEW requested translation support for a technical writing project to translate two major documents. The documents, totaling 62 pages, needed translation from German to English. 

“This technical writing project demonstrated the can-do impact of LEAP Scholars on building partnerships in Niger and meeting short-notice operational needs through language and cultural skills,” said Christopher Chesser, AFCLC’s Language Division chief. “In response to Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr.’s call to ‘Accelerate Change or Lose,’ our scholars are smashing old paradigms and bringing the capability to bear when and where it’s needed.” 

The translation of these documents was critical for continuing a project in progress with the 435th AEW and its German partners to drill a well at a deployed location for enduring water sustainment. Without support from the LEAP team, the unit’s mission could have been postponed or derailed. 

The LEAP team coordinated with members around the globe and divided into teams. Each team then divided the pages equally amongst team members to work translation. After completing the translation of their assigned section, members sent their documents to a designated partner for review. The lead from each team consolidated the documents and looked for discrepancies. The consolidated documents were then sent out one final time for review before a final copy was sent to the requester.  

German LEAP scholar Maj. Franklin Nesselhuf participated in the project as his first official translation opportunity for the Air Force. 

“The documents prevented the USAF from having to go through the testing and verification process a second time,” he said. “The documents we were using were a German translation from French, from the government of Niger, and revealed the water was too hard for use with filtration. That information will be very useful in informing the civil engineers where to drill and the requisite facilities needed to make the water potable. As we look to compete against Russia and China in Africa, developing bases and promoting stability in societies will be key to geopolitical success and human flourishing.”  

Lt. Col. Gordon Kinney, director of staff at the 435th AEW, thanked the LEAP Scholars for their efforts in fulfilling the translation needs of this project. 

“Africa is an unforgiving environment,” he said. “Between the heat, dust, wind and lack of water, our Airmen are taxed daily. This well affords our Airmen the peace of mind they need to focus on delivering secure, reliable, and flexible power projection platforms to combatant commanders and that’s thanks to the efforts of a few brilliant, dedicated LEAP scholars.” 

Before the requested translation support, the German partners involved in the project had already accomplished well drilling on their side of the base. The team at 435th AEW needed a translation of these documents concerning the established well to expedite and enable drilling of the U.S. forces’ well. Without the translation of these documents, U.S. forces could not proceed with digging the well for airbase sustainment. Funding and engineering were in place, so the document translation was the final piece needed to commence the time-sensitive project.  

Lt. Col. David Troxell, commander of the 768th Expeditionary Air Base Squadron, also expressed appreciation for the LEAP team and their work to support a project that will significantly enhance essential systems on base. 

“This translation helps streamline a $500,000 project, ultimately supporting a $1.6 million total water production, treatment and distribution system,” he said. “This will go a long way to calm our nerves about sourcing water so we can focus on sustaining base operations, building our African partner’s defense capabilities, and enabling counter-violent extremism operations in the Sahel. This isn’t just a win for the U.S., it’s a win for all our allied and partnered nations.” 

By Mikala McCurry, Air Force Culture and Language Center Outreach Team

AF Competency Modeling Handbook Provides Airmen with Roadmap to Become Future-Ready, Critically Thinking Warfighters

Wednesday, March 2nd, 2022

JOINT BASE SAN ANTONIO-RANDOLPH, Texas (AFNS) —  

In line with Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. CQ Brown, Jr.’s Action Order A (Airmen) effort to find and enhance universal skillsets that are important to all Airmen regardless of their specific Air Force Specialty Code.

The Air Force Competency Modeling Handbook is now available to Airmen after officially being published Feb. 8.

Developed by Headquarters, Air Education and Training Command A3J team, Air Force Handbook 36-2647 includes a validated competency-modeling framework that is scalable, reliable, and repeatable to assist career fields in developing their occupational competency models. It also outlines the service’s 24 foundational competencies, which are a combination of knowledge, skills, abilities, and other characteristics that manifest in an observable, measurable pattern of behaviors that improve an Airman’s performance.

“Our competencies are the bedrock to developing the Airmen we need, and they provide Airmen with a roadmap to become future-ready, critically-thinking warfighters,” said Brig. Gen. Brenda Cartier, AETC director of operations and communications. “The occupational competency model integrates technical capabilities with the foundational competencies, along with the leadership, combat, joint, social mastery, and all-domain skills needed to be successful in a career.”

In the attachments of AFH 36-2647, Airmen can find detailed definitions for the 24 foundational competencies, which are grouped under four sections: developing self, others, ideas and organizations.

“The foundational competencies are those competencies that are valued by the Air Force and are universally applicable to all Airmen,” said Vincent Villanueva, AETC’s Occupational Competencies branch chief. “These competencies are the core of Airmen development and enable them with tools, pathways, and capabilities to improve their performance in any job, specialty, or situation.”

Competency models support organizational vision, mission, and priorities by identifying the behaviors needed to maintain a competitive advantage and meet strategic objectives.

“The competency model framework enables Airman-centric, mission-focused, competency-based Air Force learning, and as we add career fields, we scale the enterprise-level benefits,” Villanueva said. “It also identifies the competencies needed for key positions and informs decisions for the right person and right job.”

Other features in the handbook include application of competency assessments based on real-world environments and expectations to help Airmen have the right tools and resources in terms of training, education, and experience, Villanueva said.

To access a copy of AFH 36-2647, click here.

By Dan Hawkins, Air Education and Training Command Public Affairs

The Baldwin Files – Lessons We Can Learn

Monday, February 28th, 2022

“War is merely the continuation of politics by other means”

“No one starts a war–or rather, no one in his sense ought to do so–without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by the war and how he intends to conduct it.”

“War is no pastime; it is no mere joy in daring and winning, no place for irresponsible enthusiasts. It is a serious means to a serious end.”

Carl Von Clausewitz

A few days ago, just after the invasion of Ukraine started, an SSD reader commented to the effect that Putin was giving the West a “masterclass” on hybrid warfare. I could not disagree more. Sure, Putin’s Russia is fairly capable of combining tank columns with SOF tactically and applying the tools of cyber and informational warfare to some effect. It sounds and looks fairly impressive when experienced in real-time and reported by non-experts – including the people of Ukraine – on the ground. But as a military professional who has studied war all my adult life, it looks more like amateur hour. Based on TV interviews in the last 24 hours, my personal opinion is shared at least by a few other professionals like LTG (R) Keith Kellogg, and GEN (R) Jack Keane. That is not to say that the Russian military might not prevail in the next hours, days, or weeks, to overcome their obviously weaker opponent and occupy portions of Ukraine including the major cities. However, I would be willing to bet that the likely bloody insurgency to follow will make that a very hollow victory.

But there are some obvious lessons to be learned, even as fighting goes on. Let us start with a little abbreviated history – not Putin’s version. Ukraine has had an enduring and distinct identity, separate from Russia, for many generations. Before WWII, the Ukrainians suffered mightily for their desired independence and perceived disloyalty under Stalin’s Soviet Union. By “suffered,” I mean that millions were killed. It is true that during WWII some Ukrainians initially sided with the German invaders, hoping to break away from Russian dominance. Since the Germans quickly demonstrated that they hated “Slavic people” almost as much as the Jews, the Ukrainian people realized their mistake, pivoted, and initiated a brutal insurgency against the Germans on behalf of the Soviets instead. To this day, when Russians want to disparage Ukrainians, they call them NAZIs. So, despite the fact that Russians and Ukrainians are ethnically and culturally “cousins,” some of the history is ugly, and the personal animosity is real and runs deep. Especially for old-timers who venerate the “good old days” of the Soviet Union as Putin does.

More recently, the Russian military has not displayed much excellence or even minimum signs of professional prowess in a series of campaigns. First, Afghanistan. There is no denying that we – the US and NATO – ultimately had no more success in Afghanistan in achieving our stated objectives than the Soviet Union. As with our experience, their initial invasion went well. However, the inherent weaknesses in the Soviet’s ability to sustain their forces hamstrung their options to conduct effective operations in a way that the US-led Coalition forces never had to face. Here is a fun fact. Soviet forces in Afghanistan suffered far more non-battle casualties than were ever killed by the Mujahedeen. Preventable diseases – often brought on by poor sanitation practices – decimated Soviet units in a way their opponents were never able to. Their non-battle casualty rates were the same that Soviet soldiers had suffered during WWII. Their medical and casevac capability had basically not improved in the intervening 40 years. Hell, they had not even been able to effectively educate their conscripts in basic field sanitation practices that, likely, would have had a major positive effect in reducing those casualties.

Of course, in the years after the Soviet Union dissolved, there were the Russian incursions into Georgia, Chechnya, and incremental steps into Crimea and Eastern Ukraine starting in 2014. None of these campaigns went as the Russians presumably hoped – except, arguably, for the “annexation” of Crimea. Still, the Russian military did not perform to anything approaching a high standard in any of those cases. I do want to emphasize the fact that there are some very professional and capable elements in the Russian force structure. The Russians can indeed be very formidable in some circumstances. No doubt! But, when Putin brings 190,000 of his soldiers to the game, only a very small percentage of those ground forces are “top of the line.” Indeed, the bulk of his forces are conscript-reliant formations that are still ill-trained and unmotivated and their gear is poorly maintained and unreliable. Case in point, Russian conscripts are not particularly interested in dying in Ukraine or in killing Ukrainians that they hold no animosity toward what-so-ever. On the other hand, the Ukrainians appear to be much more motivated since they are being attacked.

Putin may be a lot of things. One thing he is not is a military genius. At least for now, I am not seeing any such genius from his generals either. The incursion into Ukraine, to this point, has been entirely predictable and pedestrian. Absolutely nothing bold or innovative. No surprises. It appears Putin was expecting the threat of violence to achieve his objectives of neutering Ukraine and putting NATO and the US on our back heels. It reminds me of our plan in Iraq for OIF. Where we plotted out the invasion in great detail and did the big handwave for whatever was going to happen afterward. It actually appears to me that the Russian generals did not have an invasion plan ready. I suspect that is because they were not eager to own another difficult occupation. They remember those other quagmires from earlier in their careers.

I can speculate, based on my experience, that Putin expected Ukraine and/or NATO would cave to his demands if he just put on enough pressure. First, he ominously positioned forces. That did not get him anything except more weapons shipments to Ukraine. True, those were perhaps more symbolic than substantial, but they were the opposite of what he wanted to happen. The shipments and promises of more to come also helped stiffen the Ukrainian spines as well and they continued to rebuff his threats. He then moved some forces overtly into the already contested Donbas region. I thought he would play that “peacekeeper” card for at least several days while threatening to expand the Russian foothold beyond the separatist enclave into the rest of the region. He pulled the trigger on the next phase quicker than I expected, but that move still did not work in Putin’s favor.

Instead, Germany stopped validation of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. More than other sanctions that might take some time to inflict pain on Russia, that was a significant economic counter punch to Putin. I do not think he expected or planned for that. Frankly, it appears that he thought Germany specifically – in large part because of the pipeline – would slow roll any NATO response to aggressive Russian moves short of an actual shooting war. Today (26 Feb), Germany joined other countries in sending weapons to Ukraine – something they had been hesitant to do earlier. Likewise, Sweden and Finland, traditional “neutral” countries are now considering even closer ties to NATO – albeit, both will probably continue to forego actual formal membership in the Alliance. Clearly, Putin counted on fracturing not strengthening NATO’s and the EU’s resolve. An unintended, unexpected, and unwelcome, consequence from Putin’s perspective, I am sure. Putin’s plan has now clearly moved into the “friction” portion of his war.

For those that are not familiar with the concept, Clausewitz explained friction’s role in war this way; “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end up producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war.” “Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper.” He goes on to describe how chance, danger, and exertion, all contribute to general friction “No other human activity is so continuously or universally bound up with chance. And through the element of chance, guesswork, and luck come to play a great part in war.” “The dangers inseparable from war and the physical exertions war demands can aggravate the problem to such an extent that they must be ranked among its principal causes.” “Action in war is like movement in a resistance element. Just as the simplest and most natural of movements, walking, cannot easily be performed in water, so in war it is difficult for normal efforts to achieve even moderate results.” Clausewitz then asks and answers this question; “Is there any lubricant that will reduce this abrasion? Only one, and a commander and his army will not always have it readily available: combat experience.”

Putin does not have a lot of combat veterans in his formations except some of the most senior officers I mentioned earlier. So, the learning curve is steep for the junior Russian officers, NCOs, and soldiers, at the pointy end facing this complex, ambiguous, and “hybrid” battlefield for the first time. Of course, the same is true of the Ukrainian military and people. But at least, they have the advantage of being on the defensive on their home turf. That levels the field at least a little and they appear to be making a credible fight of it. I do not think Putin’s plan anticipated that possibility either. Everyone judged – myself included – that Putin’s forces had a clear advantage within the cyber and informational domains. His people have been putting out a lot of mis- and dis- information for months and even years to “prep the battlefield.” A good deal of that effort has been targeted to the West in general and the US in particular. From my observations, his efforts were not as effective as they were first perceived to be, and now seem to be faltering – badly – at the very moment that he needs them to reinforce and enable his maneuvers on the ground.

My conclusion may be premature, but based on their lackluster performance so far, I do not think the Russian military is setting a high bar or providing a useful template for what “right” looks like in the cyber or informational domains. We just need to learn from their mistakes. All of their mistakes. It could be that Putin does not have a General Zhukov to give him sound military advice. Maybe he got it but did not accept it. What I see being showcased in and around Ukraine is mostly Russian operational shortcomings and vulnerabilities, not strengths. That does not mean that we can underestimate them. I worry a great deal about their capabilities in the Arctic region. The fact that they have many more icebreakers than we do in the West, for example. That means that we are overmatched in that critical capability. That, in turn, means that Russia can put pressure on the northern sea lanes and put themselves in a better position to control those sea lanes. That would be strategically unacceptable for the US and our Allies. We need not match them ship for ship, but we do have to figure out an effective counteraction.

What about multi-domain land warfare? We talk about it a lot; but, in practice, we are no better at it today than the Russians are proving themselves to be. The military that seems to be doing the most thinking about the multi-domain or hybrid model of war seems to be the Chinese. Unlike the US or Russia, the Chinese have not fought a war since their brief dust-up with Vietnam in 1979. That puts them at a disadvantage, but they do appear to be motivated to get it right when war does come. They bear watching, but that does not mean I think they have broken the code yet. Still, in the strategic context, I worry about them more than I do Russia. I have been looking for lessons from history that may help get us better situated to dominate multi-domain warfare in the future. The example that I think has the most promise is generally considered an experiment that failed for the US military during the early Cold War. That is the “Pentomic Division” of the late 50s. The concept never proved to be capable of doing what had been hoped, in large part because the command-and-control architecture of the time would not support dispersed operations as envisioned. The subordinate “Battle Group” – a task-organized Battalion Task Force to use modern terminology – sounds about the right size for a self-contained and independent maneuver element to me. Although they may not get it perfectly right, I think the USMC is moving in the right direction with their ongoing restructuring because it attempts to address some of the same challenges.

I do not have all the answers and I do not know all there is to know about war. I cannot see the future any clearer than anyone else. My educated opinions and prognostications on Ukraine may certainly prove to be wrong – in part or whole. With operations ongoing, we are in the thick of the fog of war. Still, I am willing to bet I have it more right than not. It is a sin to underestimate your enemies. It is just as egregious a sin to overestimate your enemies. When I was in Germany during the Cold War, the Russian soldiers were reportedly impervious to heat, and cold, and fear. They were berserkers, who would pour across the inter-German border in endless waves. The 8th Guards Army had three times the tanks of all the NATO forces combined and theirs were simpler and more reliable than ours. Bullshit!

The Soviet conscripts of that Army were only formidable on paper; they were actually barely trained, unmotivated, and more afraid of us than we were of them. Their vehicles were starved for parts beyond anything we could imagine and so poorly maintained that fully half would never have gotten out of their motor pools. And, unless they ran on water and could shoot pieces of scrap wood from their main guns, their logistics tail was just as anemic and would never have been capable of keeping up with the demands of fuel and ammo expenditures in a high-intensity conflict. We all like to “Armchair General” whatever war is going on at any given time. I am indulging in a little of that myself right now. But we all know; some armchair generals are more credible than others. Those are the ones to pay attention to – and not the ones who just talk the loudest.

De Oppresso Liber!

LTC Terry Baldwin, US Army (Ret) served on active duty from 1975-2011 in various Infantry and Special Forces assignments. SSD is blessed to have him as both reader and contributor.