Operation Flipper was a raid by the Combined Operations to kill Field Marshall Erwin Rommel at his headquarters in Sidi Rafa, Libya, that would take place between 10-19 November 1941. The attack would use man from Combined Operations, Special Boat Services (SBS), No. 11 Commando, Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), and also the man from the Special Operations Executive (SOE) G(R). This raid was to be a smaller part of a more significant campaign to relieve Tobruk and push the Axis from North Africa.

The operation had four main objectives, first and foremost was to kill Rommel at his headquarters, destroy the nearby Italian headquarters and its communications network, sabotage the Italian Intelligence Office in Appolonia and its communications network between Faidia and Lamdula, and lastly, conduct general sabotage actions elsewhere in the Axis forces rear area.

Leading the mission was Colonel Robert Laycock. His second in command was Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Keyes. On November 10, 1941, Laycock’s six officers and 53 men boarded the submarines Torbay and Talisman and left Alexandria harbor for Beda Littoria, Cyrenaica. Waiting for them on the beach was Captain Jock Haselden and an Arab soldier from the SOE’s G(R). They would guide the folbots (early versions of Klepper type canoes) to the beach and help them ashore. Once ashore, they would meet up with the rest of Haselden man, including two more Brits, a free Belgian, and another Arab soldier who stayed further inland; all had been dropped off by the LRDG earlier that day. Haselden’s team had local knowledge of the area; one of the Arabs would lead the assault team to the target while the rest of Haselden’s team would sabotaging the communications. Keyes got himself and all his men ashore. But as Layton and his men prepared to disembark, a storm struck. Heavy seas drove Talisman aground, and only Layton and seven men reached the beach.

With his force cut in half, Keyes modified the plan. It would be a two-part assault; Keyes would attack Rommel’s HQ, and Lt. Roy Cooke would lead the Italian headquarters’ attack. Layton and a small force would defend the force’s escape route. On the evening of November 15, Keyes, Cooke, and their men headed inland. Despite the weather, the groups managed to reach their respective launch positions on the evening of November 17. At midnight, they attacked. Keyes, leading a three-person assault team, burst into the villa identified as Rommel’s headquarters. They surprised a German officer who was killed as he struggled with Keyes. The attackers then rushed down the hall, and Keyes opened a room where ten Germans were arming themselves. One of the Germans shot Keyes, killing him. What the team didn’t know was that Rommel had left the compound a week earlier for Rome. After Keyes’s death, things started to get worse.

Campbell was shot in the leg by one of his men. He passed command to Sergeant Jack Terry and remained behind. Terry gathered the raiding team and retreated with 17 men to rejoin Laycock at the beach. Cooke’s men encountered a platoon or so of Italian police paratroopers. The Italians had been searching for the British raiders close to the village Mansura north of Cyrene. With the Italian and Germans looking for the raiding party, Laycock knew it would be impossible to re-embark on the submarines as they waited for the weather to improve. They were discovered and exchanged fire with local Italian and German troops. Low on ammo and aware that they could not stand off a larger force, Laycock ordered the men to scatter. Laycock and Terry made it to safety after 37 days in the desert. Bombardier John Brittlebank, one of the SBS teams who had guided the commandos in the folbots, escaped and survived alone in the desert for forty days until Allied troops picked him up. The rest of the raiding force was captured, some of them were wounded.  

The raid was considered a failure by the British high command, but to the Germans, especially to Rommel, it showed what the Combined Operations could do. It would also help Winston Churchill decide to put the Commando’s and other groups under the SOE after the British military decide they didn’t need them anymore. Rommel was quoted as saying, “It was a brilliant operation and with great audacity.” Rommel ordered that Keyes and all the rest of the Commandos be buried with full military honors, sending his personal chaplain, priest Rudolf Dalmrath, to officiate. He had cypress crosses and wreaths made for the British and German dead. Rommel also instructed that photographs be taken of the ceremony and Keyes’ grave and sent them to his parents, a chivalrous act that increased British respect for him. British Special Operations would continue to wreak havoc thru out the Africa Theater of Operation, significantly contributing to the Allies victory.

One of the biggest codebreaking achieved by Naval intelligence during WWII was on April 14, 1943, they learned that Adm. Isokoru Yamamoto was preparing a visit to the upper Solomon Islands to inspect Japanese bases. Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz immediately relayed the details to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, who informed President Franklin D. Roosevelt. According to reports, the president’s response was “Get Yamamoto.” Whether or not the president actually said those terms, the order was given to assassinate the mastermind of the Pearl Harbor attack.

Ironically, the object of American vengeance had repeatedly put his life on the line by speaking out against US wars. He saw how poor industrial Japan was in comparison to the United States and the United Kingdom because of his postings in America and England.

When asked how he thought a war between Japan and America would go, Yamamoto replied that he would “run wild for six months or a year, but after that I have absolutely no confidence.”

“It is a mistake to consider Americans as luxury-loving and weak,” Yamamoto said in a meeting with classmates from his hometown of Nagaoka on Sept. 18, 1941. Remember the American industry is much more mature than ours, and they have unlimited oil supplies, unlike us. Japan would never be able to defeat the United States. As a result, we should refrain from fighting the US.”

When his government decided to go to war, Yamamoto put his personal feelings aside and pledged to do everything in his power to win.

Yamamoto was playing chess with a member of his team, Capt. Yasuji Watanabe, when they learned over the radio about the assault on Pearl Harbor and Japan’s subsequent declaration of war. “That’s too bad, Watanabe,” he said. Tell the Emperor that the navy did not intend it this way from the start if I die before you.”

Operation Vengeance is a vengeance-seeking operation.

Adm. Yamamoto was killed when the Betty bomber was shot down over Bougainville on April 18, 1943.

Following that came an incredible run of Japanese victories. The Imperial Japanese Fleet was then defeated at Midway, nearly six months to the day after Pearl Harbor. Yamamoto saw the writing on the wall when the arduous Guadalcanal war ended in early 1943. “I sense that my life must be completed in the next hundred days,” he wrote in a letter to a friend in Marchs. He left for the south to oversee the next phase of the operation.

Operation I-Go was a joint Japanese navy-army aerial counter-offensive launched on April 1, 1943, to halt American advances in the Solomon Islands and New Guinea. Yamamoto, now based in Rabaul, decided on April 13 that he wanted to inspect Japanese bases in the upper Solomons. Yamamoto halted the offensive on April 16, pending the completion of his inspection, after acknowledging without question exaggerated pilot reports of ship sinking’s and aircraft shootdowns.

Eighteen P-38s were chosen and fitted with special drop tanks (sixteen for the assault, two spares). While the others targeted the fighter escorts, a “killer” flight of four fighters led by Capt. Thomas G. Lanphier, Jr. would target the two Betty bombers containing Yamamoto and his staff.

Nimitz had to time his window of opportunity to intercept Yamamoto perfectly. Fortunately for him, his opponent was known for being punctual. Yamamoto’s path was outside the control of naval fighters, but it was within the range of Army Air Force P-38Gs that had recently been deployed to Guadalcanal.

Maj. John Mitchell USAAF, commander of Squadron 339, found himself assisting Vice Adm. Marc Mitscher and other senior commanders in preparing the assault on April 17. The intercept will take place over Bougainville Island. A 1,000-mile round trip was planned, with a 600-mile roundabout approach from the south. Eighteen P-38s were chosen and fitted with special drop tanks (sixteen for the assault, two spares). While the others targeted the fighter escorts, a “killer” flight of four fighters led by Capt. Thomas G. Lanphier, Jr. would target the two Betty bombers containing Yamamoto and his staff.

Operation Vengeance is a vengeance-seeking operation.

Any of the pilots who flew Adm. Yamamoto’s assassination flight, Operation Vengeance. From left to right: William Smith, Doug Canning, Besby F. Holmes, Rex Barber (historians believe he was the pilot who shot down Yamamoto), John William Mitchell, Louis Kittel, and Gordon Whittiker. Roger Ames, Lawrence Graebner, Julius Jacobsen; Eldon Stratton, Albert Long, and Everett Anglin; and unknown, crouching from left to right. Image from the National Archives

The P-38s of Operation Vengeance took off at 7:25 a.m. on April 18, the first anniversary of the Doolittle Raid. They arrived at the intercept point at 9:34 a.m. and saw their objective exactly on time.

While the other planes assaulted the other escorts, Lanphier and 1st Lt. Rex T. Barber of the killer flight split up to target the Bettys and immediate escorts. One P-38 and its pilot, 1st Lt. Raymond K. Hine, were killed when both bombers were shot down.

“That son of a bitch will not be dictating any peace terms in the White House,” Lanphier radioed shortly before noon, as the returning P-38s prepared to land at Henderson Field. Yamamoto was no longer alive. Lanphier’s comment was a misinterpretation of Yamamoto’s words, as he broke radio silence to say. Yamamoto was implying that a military victory over America could not be achieved by winning a single war, or even a series of battles.

The Navy Cross was awarded to any pilot who took part in the assault. The question of who shot down Yamamoto’s plane sparked a debate, with both Lanphier and Barber claiming responsibility. Barber was later identified as the perpetrator by historians.