Ivan has created this video on a local company that does custom load development for shooters.
Read the whole story at kitbadger.com/unknown-munitions-part-2-custom-load-development.
Ivan has created this video on a local company that does custom load development for shooters.
Read the whole story at kitbadger.com/unknown-munitions-part-2-custom-load-development.
Operation Frankton was a commando raid designed to disrupt the shipping of the German-occupied French port of Bordeaux in southwest France during World War II. The raid was carried out by a small Royal Marines unit known as the Royal Marines Boom Patrol Detachment (RMBPD), part of Combined Operations, now known as the Special Boat Service. They planned on using six canoes to be taken to the area of the Gironde estuary by submarine. They would then paddle by night to Bordeaux. They would attack the docked cargo ships with limpet mines and then escape overland to Spain on arrival. Twelve men from no.1 section were selected for the raid, including the commanding officer, Herbert ‘Blondie’ Hasler, and with the reserve Marine Colley the total of the team numbered thirteen. One canoe was damaged while being deployed from the submarine, and it and its crew, therefore, could not take part in the mission. Only two of the ten men who launched from the submarine survived the raid: Hasler and his no.2 in the canoe, Bill Sparks. Of the other eight, six were executed by the Germans, while two died from hypothermia.
The British Prime Minister Winston Churchill believed the mission shortened the war by six months. The words of Lord Mountbatten, the Commander of Combined Operations, are carved into a Purbeck stone at Royal Marines Poole (current headquarters of the SBS): “Of the many brave and dashing raids carried out by the men of Combined Operations Command none was more courageous or imaginative than Operation Frankton.” The Royal Marines Boom Patrol Detachment (RMBPD) was formed on 6 July 1942 and is based at Southsea, Portsmouth. The RMBPD was under the command of Royal Marines Major Herbert ‘Blondie’ Hasler, with Captain J. D. Stewart as second in command. The detachment consisted of 34 men and was based at Lumps Fort, and often exercised in the Portsmouth Harbor and patrolled the harbor boom at nights.
The Bay of Biscay port of Bordeaux was a significant destination for goods to support the German war effort. In the 12 months from June 1941 – 1942, vegetable and animal oils, other raw materials, and 25,000 tons of crude rubber had arrived at the port. Hasler submitted a plan of attack on 21 September 1942. The initial plan called for a force of three canoes to be transported to the Gironde estuary by submarine, then paddle by night and hide by day until they reached Bordeaux 60 miles (97 km) from the sea, thus hoping to avoid the 32 mixed Kriegsmarine ships that patrolled or used the port. On arrival, they hoped to sink between six and 12 cargo ships then escape overland to Spain.
Permission for the raid was granted on 13 October 1942, but Admiral Louis Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations, increased the number of canoes to be taken to six. Mountbatten had initially ordered that Hasler could not take part in the raid because of his experience as the chief canoeing specialist but changed his mind after Hasler (the only man with experience in small boats) formally submitted his reasons inclusion. The RMBPD started training for the raid on 20 October 1942, which included canoe handling, submarine rehearsals, limpet mine handling, and escape and evasion exercises. The RMBPD practiced for the raid with a simulated attack against Deptford, starting from Margate and canoeing up the Swale.
Mark II canoes, which were given the codename of Cockle, were selected for the raid. The Mark II was a semi-rigid two-man canoe, with the sides made of canvas, a flat bottom, and 15 feet (4.6 m) in length. When collapsed, it had to be capable of negotiating the submarine’s narrow confines to the storage area then, before it was ready to be taken on deck, erected and stored ready to be hauled out via the submarine torpedo hatch. During the raid, each canoe’s load would be two men, eight limpet mines, three sets of paddles, a compass, a depth sounding reel, repair bag, torch, camouflage net, waterproof watch, fishing line, two hand grenades, rations, and water for six days, a spanner to activate the mines and a magnet to hold the canoe against the side of cargo ships. The total safe load for the ‘Cockle’ Mark 2 was 480lbs. The men also carried a .45 ACP pistol and a Fairbairn-Sykes Fighting Knife.
The men selected to go on the raid were divided into two divisions, each having its own targets.
· A Division
· B Division
A thirteenth man was taken as a reserve, Marine Norman Colley.
Mission
On 30 November 1942, the Royal Navy submarine HMS Tuna (N94) sailed from Holy Loch in Scotland with the six canoes and raiders on board. The submarine was supposed to reach the Gironde estuary, and the mission was scheduled to start on 6 December 1942. This was delayed because of bad weather en route and the need to negotiate a minefield. By 7 December 1942, the submarine had reached the Gironde estuary and surfaced some 10 miles (16 km) from the estuary’s mouth. Canoe Cachalot’s hull was damaged while being passed out of the submarine hatch, leaving just five canoes to start the raid. The reserve member of the team, Colley, was not needed, so he remained aboard the submarine with the Cachalot crew Ellery and Fisher.
According to Tuna’s log, the five remaining canoes were launched at 1930 hours on 7 December. The plan was for the crews to paddle and rest for five minutes every hour. The first night, 7/8 December, fighting against strong cross tides and crosswinds, canoe Coalfish had disappeared. The surviving crews encountered 5 feet (1.5 m) high waves, and canoe Conger capsized and was lost. The team consisting of Sheard and Moffatt held on to two of the remaining canoes, which carried them as close to the shore as possible, and had to swim ashore. The teams approached a significant checkpoint in the river and came upon three German frigates carrying on with the raid.
Lying flat on the canoes and paddling silently, they managed to get by without being discovered but became separated from Mackinnon and Conway in canoe Cuttlefish. On the first night, the three remaining canoes, Catfish, Crayfish, and Coalfish, covered 20 miles (32 km) in five hours and landed near St Vivien du Medoc. While they were hiding during the day and unknown to the others, Wallace and Ewart in Coalfish had been captured at daybreak near the Pointe de Grave lighthouse where they had come ashore. By the end of the second night, 8/9 December, the two remaining canoes, Catfish and Crayfish, had paddled a further 22 miles (35 km) in six hours. On the third night, 9/10 December, they paddled 15 miles (24 km), and on the fourth night, 10/11 December, because of the strong ebb tide, they only managed to cover 9 miles (14 km). The original plan had called for the raid to be carried out on 10 December, but Hasler now changed the plan. Because of the ebb tide’s strength, they still had a short distance to paddle, so Hasler ordered them to hide for another day and set off to and reach Bordeaux on the night of 11/12 December.
After a night’s rest, the men spent the day preparing their equipment and limpet mines, which were set to detonate at 21:00 hours. Hasler decided that Catfishwould cover the western side of the docks and Crayfish the eastern side.
The two remaining canoes, Catfish and Crayfish, reached Bordeaux on the fifth night, 11/12 December; the river was flat calm, and there was a clear sky. The attack started at 21:00 hours on 11 December. Hasler and Sparks in Catfishattacking shipping on the western side of the dock placed eight limpet mines on four vessels, including a Sperrbrecher patrol boat. A sentry on the deck of the Sperrbrecher, apparently spotting something, shone his torch down toward the water, but the camouflaged canoe evaded detection in the darkness. They had planted all their mines and left the harbor with the ebb tide at 00:45 hours. At the same time, Laver and Mills in Crayfish had reached the eastern side of the dock without finding any targets, so returned to deal with the ships docked at Bassens. They placed eight limpet mines on two vessels, five on a large cargo ship, and three on a small liner.
On their way downriver, the two canoes met by chance on the Isle de Caseau. They continued downriver together until 06:00 hours when they beached their canoes near St Genes de Blaye and tried to hide them by sinking them. The two crews then set out separately, on foot, for the Spanish border. After two days, Laver and Mills were apprehended at Montlieu-la-Garde by the Gendarmerie and handed over to the Germans. Hasler and Sparks arrived at the French town of Ruffec, 100 miles (160 km) from where they had beached their canoe, on 18 December 1942. They contacted someone from the French Resistance at the Hotel de la Toque Blanche and were then taken to a local farm. They spent the next 18 days there in hiding. They were then guided across the Pyrenees into Spain.
It was not until 23 February 1943 that Combined Operations Headquarters heard via Mary Lindell’s secret message to the War Office that Hasler and Sparks were safe. On 2 April 1943, Hasler arrived back in Britain by air from Gibraltar, having passed through the French Resistance escape organization. Sparks was sent back by sea and arrived much later.
Aftermath
On 10 December, the Germans announced that a sabotage squad had been caught on 8 December near the Gironde’s mouth and “finished off in combat.” It was not until January 1943 that all ten men on the raid were posted missing in the absence of other information until news arrived of two of them. Later it was confirmed that five ships had been damaged in Bordeaux by mysterious explosions. This information remained until new research of 2010 revealed that a sixth ship had been damaged even more extensively than any of the other five reported. This research also revealed that the other five vessels holed were back in service very shortly afterward.
For their part in the raid, Hasler was awarded a Distinguished Service Order and Sparks the Distinguished Service Medal (DSM). Laver and Mills were also recommended for the DSM, which could not be awarded posthumously, so instead, they were mentioned in despatches.
Of the men who never returned, Wallace and Ewart were captured on 8 December at the Pointe de Grave (near Le Verdon) and revealed only certain information during their interrogation, and were executed under the Commando Order, on the night 11 December, in a sandpit in a wood north of Bordeaux and not at Chateau Magnol, Blanquefort. A plaque has been erected on the marked bullet wall at the Chateau, but the authenticity of the details on the plaque has been questioned; indeed, given the evidence of a statement by a German officer who was at the execution, there can be no doubt that the Chateau has no link with Wallace and Ewart. A small memorial can also be seen at the Pointe de Grave, where they were captured. In March 2011, a €100,000 memorial was unveiled at this same spot. After a naval firing squad executed the Royal Marines, the Commander of the Navy Admiral Erich Raeder wrote in the Seekriegsleitung war diary that the executions of the captured Royal Marines were something “new in international law, since the soldiers were wearing uniforms.” The American historian Charles Thomas wrote that Raeder’s remarks about the executions in the Seekriegsleitung war diary seemed to be some ironic comment, which might have reflected a lousy conscience on Raeder’s part.
After having been set ashore, MacKinnon and Conway managed to evade capture for four days, but they were betrayed and arrested by the Gendarmerie and handed over to the Germans at La Reole hospital 30 miles (48 km) southeast of Bordeaux, attempting to make their way to the Spanish border. Mackinnon had been admitted to the hospital for treatment for an infected knee. The exact date of their execution is not known. Evidence shows that Mackinnon, Laver, Mills, and Conway were not executed in Paris in 1942 but possibly in the same location as Wallace and Ewart under the Commando Order.
The attack had been planned for the fourth night, but because they were not far enough up the river, Major Haslar delayed it until the fifth night, deciding to move in closer to the target area. They continued along the river with great caution and found a lay-up position in reeds, only a short distance from two large cargo ships. In their hide position, the men worked out details of the plan of attack. With only CATFISH and CRAYFISH now available, Catfish was to take the shipping on the east bank, and Crayfish the shipping on the west bank.
Nineteen limpet mines with nine-hour fuses were placed, resulting in considerable damage to at least five large ships in the harbor. Adolf Hitler was furious. One of the cockles had been discovered, and he demanded to know how ‘this child’s boat’ could have possibly breached all German defenses and security, traveled over seventy miles at night in very rough seas and against the tide, then attacked and sank his shipping with not one of them being discovered! The answer that Hitler did not want to hear was that these ‘children’s boats’ had been crewed by well-trained, determined, and courageous, Commando raiders of the ROYAL MARINES. Major Hasler received a DSO for his part in organizing and leading the raid and Marine Sparks a DSM. The RMBPD later became The Special Boat Squadron.
The Commandos’ final task was to leave the target area undetected then make their way through France in the hope of finally reaching England. After a few miles, they went and wished each other luck, hid their cockles a quarter of a mile apart by sinking them, and headed inland. The men headed north for Ruffec in the hope of connecting with the Marie-Clare Line that operated in the Ruffec area. Contact was made, and Marie-Clare (Mary Lindell) had the men moved to Lyon while traveling to Switzerland to report their contact. A route was arranged for them to travel to the south of France, cross the Pyrenees, and return to England via Gibraltar.
CATFISH: Major Hasler/Marine Sparks reached the target area destroyed shipping. He returned home via Marie-Clare Escape Line and Gibraltar.
CRAYFISH: Corporal Laver/Marine Mills reached the target area, destroyed shipping. Last seen landing. Captured by Germans. Executed in Paris on 23 March 1943.
CONGER: Corporal Sheard/Marine Moffat capsized in a second tidal race. He was last seen swimming to shore off Point de Grave. Moffat’s body was found later. Sheard’s body was never found, presumed drowned.
CUTTLEFISH: Lieutenant Mackinnon/Marine Conway last seen off The Mole at Le Verdon. He was later captured by Germans, executed in Paris on 23 March 1943.
COALFISH: Sergeant Wallace/Marine Ewart missing near Banc des Olives after the first tidal race. Later captured by Germans and executed near Bordeaux on 12 December 1942.
CACHALOT: Marine Ellery/Marine Fisher – canoe damaged on torpedo hatch of HMS Tuna. They were unable to take part in the raid.
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Detroit Arsenal, Mich. (Friday, Dec. 11, 2020) – Soldiers of the 82nd Airborne will soon get the chance to do something no U.S. infantry Soldier has done in 26 years – employ a dedicated mobile, direct fire vehicle platform against hardened positions, dismounted personnel and light armored vehicles.
The experience comes to them as the first of several pre-production Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF) ground combat platforms are being delivered to Fort Bragg, N.C. to be used in the Soldier Vehicle Assessment (SVA).
“We are incredibly excited to see the MPF platform entering into this phase,” said Brig. Gen. Glenn Dean, the program executive officer for Ground Combat Systems. “MPF represents an innovative and aggressive approach to system acquisition. The beginning of our SVA in January illustrates how hard the teams are working to keep the major events of this program on schedule.”
Currently the Army’s Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) do not have a combat vehicle assigned that is capable of providing mobile, protected, direct, offensive fire capability. To fill that capability gap the Army is using an innovative and competitive Acquisition approach to provide IBCTs with their own organic lethality platforms to ensure overmatch against peer and near peer threat.
The MPF solution is an integration of existing mature technologies and components that avoids development which would lengthen the program schedule. The priority has always been to field this new critical capability soonest, but the MPF will also be capable of accommodating additional weight and spare electrical power to support future growth.
The SVA is on track to commence on Jan. 4, 2021. It will be conducted at Fort Bragg and will run through June 2021. During that time, Soldiers will use the MPF prototypes to conduct a wide variety of operational scenarios. The SVA is an operational assessment rather than a formal test event, and it will directly inform the development of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) of this new capability for the IBCT.
“The MPF brings a new level of lethality to our infantry forces. The SVA gives us the first opportunity to put these vehicles in the hands of our Soldiers with the 82nd Airborne and begin to develop the methods by which our forces can best employ MPF,” said Brig. Gen. Ross Coffman, the Army’s director for the Next Generation Combat Vehicles Cross Functional Team. “Once they are able to begin interacting with these prototypes, I know that our Soldiers are going to come up with the best ways to utilize MPF in our light formations.”
The competitive phase of the program is scheduled to conclude with the selection of a single materiel solution and transition into production near the end of fiscal year 2022.
By Ashley John
I was fortunate to participate in the recent 50th Anniversary of the Son Tay Raid commemoration held in Phoenix, Arizona by the Silent Warrior Foundation. The operation to rescue American POWs from deep inside North Vietnam is examined in great deal by Raider Terry Buckler in his new book, “Who Will Go.” I highly recommend it.
I had a great time during the event, meeting some legends, enjoying the camaraderie of old comrades in arms, and making new ones.
My friend Erik Lawrence captured quite a bit of video during the event and has turned it into two episodes for his video series.
Episode One
Episode Two
Commonly referred to as the “banana suit,” this 70-era track suit saw service well into the late 80s when it was replaced by a Grey ensemble that absorbed stains.
Prior to its adoption as a measure to help professionalize the post-draft VOLAR, or volunteer Army, a soldiers wore fatigues for physical fitness trining. Initially with boots, and eventually with running shoes.
The banana suit consisted of yellow top and bottom along with yellow shorts with black piping and a reversible yellow to black t-shirt. That last item was so that units could conduct sports, with one team yellow and the other black.
Training and Doctrine Command’s Combined Arms Center kicked off the new decade prioritizing equipping the Army’s troop-level formations with new doctrine as the Army continues to modernize its formations and the way it fights.
It’s a surge effort to equip unit leaders across warfighting disciplines with the tactics, techniques and procedures to help them lead Soldiers and build lethal, cohesive teams.
The roll-out began in 2019 with an overhaul of all of the Army’s foundational Army Doctrine Publications such as ADP 3-90 (Offense and Defense), ADP 2-0 (Intelligence), ADP 3-19 (Fires), and ADP 4-0 (Sustainment).
The publishing blitz continued through 2020 and is set to carry into 2021 with more publications developed from the outgrowth of its doctrine overhaul. It aims to deliver specific and tailored guidance for the different warfighting disciplines with new Field Manuals, Army Technique Publications, Training Circulars and handbooks.
The Army even updated its doctrine about doctrine, publishing APD 1-01, Doctrine Primer, July, 2019. It says, “doctrine provides a coherent vision of warfare, and provides a common and standardized set of principles, tactics, techniques, procedures, and terms and symbols for the Army.”
“These revisions [to doctrine] make publications relevant to near-term operational environments and ensure Army doctrine is balanced to support Army forces conducting operations across the competition continuum and the range of military operations.”
After establishing its doctrinal foundation with its new ADPs and FMs, TRADOC turned its attention to publishing even more doctrine publications offering practical guidance such as ATPs for Soldiers and leaders operating at the lowest tactical levels.
“ATPs provide Soldiers with ways or methods to accomplish or complete a mission, task, or function.”
The Army’s most fundamental warfighting elements are squads, platoons, companies and battalions. TRADOC aimed much of its focus center mass at platoons to make the most difference.
Many senior leaders see mastery of fundamentals as essential to success on the battlefield. Platoon level publications help junior leaders train their Soldiers to gain that mastery.
Soldiers are considered members of a profession whose common language is doctrine. Leaders and Soldiers in a platoon are tied to together by that common language and framework. That’s why their knowledge of it is deemed so critical.
“The Army has expectations that when you show up to your first job, you have a certain baseline of knowledge. A large part of that comes from doctrine,” said Col. Richard Creed, Director Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate.
“Your Soldiers and NCOs expect you to understand what your role and responsibilities, what the doctrine says for the kind of organization you’re a part of.”
“It gives you a common point of departure. When you have a common baseline of knowledge, you can start at a higher level of learning. It allows you to communicate easier with those above and below you.”
In 2020, TRADOC published numerous ATPs to arm its leaders and units with the latest insight on a myriad and training and operations. Examples include, ATPs covering Infantry Small-Unit Mountain and Cold Weather Operations, Techniques for Multiple Launch Rocket System and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System Operations, and Materiel Management-Supply-Field Services Operations.
Training Circulars were also published to guide certification and qualification training for Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery Soldiers and units.
“You need to know which doctrine applies to you. Some of it is branch specific and some job specific,” said Creed.
There are also several publications set to publish beginning in 2021. Medical platoons can expect, ATP 4-02.4 Medical Platoon, Aviation platoons – ATP 3-04.23, Engineer and Air Defense Artillery platoons a new handbook for their operations. Later in the year, units performing Electronic Warfare, Chemical-Bio-Nuclear-Radio-Explosives, and Military Police operations will see updated doctrine as well.
TRADOC’s doctrine push shows no sign of slowing. It stands to be an ongoing process of learning, modernizing, and revising its doctrine to keep Soldiers and leaders equipped with much needed guides to inform their training and support their operations. Commandants at the Army’s Centers of Excellence that represent the Army’s diverse warfighting disciplines are leading efforts to update publications within their purview.
“We revise doctrine continuously and we capture lessons learned. We take lessons learned about operations going on all over the world and we update and revise doctrine to account for those lessons,” said Creed.
Lt. Gen. James Rainey, Combined Arms Center’s Commanding General, took it a step further, saying he wanted feedback from junior leaders using the publications. He said he wants to know if leaders and units have what they need and to provide feedback if anything is missing from the Army’s doctrine catalogue.
TRADOC also reinforced its emphasis on strengthening Soldiers’ tactical and technical expertise with the development of a web-tool, called Army 21. It’s a web-based multimedia interactive learning tool that allows Soldiers to learn about their unit’s formations and their doctrine from an internet browser (CAC login required).
“Army 21 addresses what we see as a knowledge gap for our junior leaders,” said Col. Chris Keller, Director of Center for Army Lessons Learned. “Soldiers must understand how the Army mans, equips, and fights.”
“It delivers a one-stop resource to quickly learn and understand current Army organization and about the unique capabilities of our Brigade Combat Teams across the force.”
You can access the tool at atn.army.mil/getmedia/449fcb0e-3b11-404f-b012-f5c85b429fd0/a21 (CAC login required)
Here’s a video tutorial of Army 21.
By Maj Orlandon Howard, Public Affairs, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
DroneShield Ltd’s (ASX:DRO or DRO.AU) (“DroneShield”), a pioneer and global leader in the C-UAS sector, and Squarehead, a Norwegian-based acoustic array technology company, have entered into a partnership in the C-UAS space.
DroneShield’s DroneSentryTM multi-sensor C-UAS system with integrated Squarehead Discovair G2TM acoustic direction finding sensors
Going forward, DroneShield will be offering an integrated system for C-UAS detection and mitigation, with DroneShield’s radiofrequency, radar and camera-based UAS detection and electronic warfare UAS defeat products integrated with Squarehead’s Discovair G2TM direction-finding acoustic system, within DroneSentry-C2TM airspace awareness, command-and-control and reporting software. This product integration of the two companies’ offerings has been completed, and the combined solution is available to customers at present. The combined system is presently undergoing test evaluation schedule with the U.S. Department of Defense.
Squarehead CEO Stig Nyvold said: “We are pleased to enter into the partnership with DroneShield in the rapidly emerging C-UAS space. C-UAS security and airspace awareness is becoming an increasing problem for wide range of military and civilian customers, and we expect our capability to detect any drone in the near field to provide a great added layer in DroneShield’s solution.”
Oleg Vornik, DroneShield’s CEO, added: “This partnership combines DroneShield best-in-class C-UAS sensors and effectors with Squarehead’s expertise in the acoustic domain. The combined system is already being evaluated by the US military, and we look forward to rolling this out globally, with an extensive schedule in front of us over next several months, including Europe and the US.”