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Archive for the ‘Army’ Category

RAND Study – Setting Higher Close Combat Standards for the Army Combat Fitness Test

Tuesday, April 22nd, 2025

In the announcement to transition this June from the Army Combat Fitness Test to the Army Fitness Test, the Army referenced a study by RAND, published in late December, 2024. Here is a link to the full study as well as a summary.

www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA3000/RRA3092-1/RAND_RRA3092-1

Key Findings

There is sufficient evidence to inform the Army’s decision on raising ACFT standards for close combat MOSs

The ACFT with current administration protocols and standards has been evaluated against injury outcomes.

Higher ACFT standards for close combat MOSs can be implemented as a strategy to ensure that overall fitness is maintained at the higher levels demonstrated by soldiers in close combat MOSs.

For the MDL, there is strong evidence that can inform a specific higher minimum standard for combat MOSs based on combat task performance. For the other five ACFT events, the quality and quantity of evidence varies.

Results from the Practice Phase highlight trade-offs among alternative standards

Evidence from the Practice Phase suggests that an overall ACFT score minimum of 450 points and 150 pounds on the MDL may be too high to achieve a 95 percent overall pass rate and 90 percent pass rate for select subgroups. Under all options considered, the reserve component exhibits lower pass rates.

Alternative approaches to higher standards affect ACFT pass rates differently. Younger, female soldiers have lower pass rates when the MDL standard increases, while several MOSs have lower pass rates when the standard for total ACFT points is increased to 450.

However, prior research shows that soldiers’ performance improves with experience, so the pass rates observed in the Practice Phase may understate the extent to which soldiers will continue to improve toward new standards.

Recommendations

The Army should weigh the evidence across such key decision criteria as defensibility and relevance to general fitness or combat task performance and select a standard accordingly.

Consider compensatory approaches that raise as a new standard the overall points requirement to ease implementation and minimize variation in subgroup outcomes.

Supporting policy should be implemented to facilitate the movement to higher standards. This could include glide paths to allow soldiers sufficient time to train, access to training resources, and clear messaging about the goals of the higher ACFT standard.

Consider re-norming the scoring system at the same time as adopting higher standards to reflect current age and gender norms throughout the Army and ensure that norms are appropriately set for soldiers in both close combat and non–close combat MOSs.

Collect further evidence for minimum ACFT standards through criterion-related validation studies that examine the relationship between each ACFT event and organizational outcomes, such as combat task performance, retention rates, and other relevant metrics.

Army Establishes New Fitness Test of Record to Strengthen Readiness and Lethality

Tuesday, April 22nd, 2025

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Army announced today the establishment of the Army Fitness Test (AFT) as the official physical fitness test of record for all Soldiers, replacing the Army Combat Fitness Test.

The five-event AFT, is designed to enhance Soldier fitness, improve warfighting readiness, and increase the lethality of the force.

The AFT consists of the three-repetition maximum deadlift, hand-release push-up army extension, sprint-drag-carry, plank, and two-mile run. RAND Corporation analysis and Army data from nearly 1 million test records helped inform the new standard.

Phased implementation of the AFT will begin June 1, 2025, with new scoring standards for Soldiers in 21 combat military occupational specialties (MOSs) taking effect on January 1, 2026, for the active component and June 1, 2026, for the Reserve and National Guard.

The AFT combat standard is sex-neutral and age-normed. Soldiers serving in combat specialties must achieve a minimum of 60 points per event and an overall minimum score of 350.

The AFT general standard is performance-normed by sex and age groups. Soldiers serving in combat-enabling specialties must attain a score of at least 60 points per event and an overall minimum score of 300.

Implementation guidance and associated execution orders will be released in May.

The change reflects the Army’s continued focus on building a physically ready force capable of meeting operational demands in austere environments.

The Army is also adapting its policy framework to support implementation, including support to Soldiers with medical profiles and governance to monitor the impact of the new standard on readiness, retention, and end strength.

Army Public Affairs

Below is the implementing memorandum.

US Army Seeks Attritable FPV Drones

Monday, April 21st, 2025

If you’ve hung around with me over the last year all I want to talk about is attritable drones and you’ve likely heard me say “The attritable drone is the 155 shell of the future” so many times you’d like to rip off my arm and beat me to death. But right now I’m so happy that I don’t think I’d feel it.

Fortunately, I’m not the only person who thinks this way. The Marines have set up a drone team to work on requirements and TTPs and now the Army is jumping on board with First Person View (FPV) attritable drones.

To be sure, the Army (and all of DoD) have procured a lot of unmanned aerial systems but they’ve been what I refer to as “enduring capabilities”. Expensive and exquisite, we can’t afford to lose the vast majority of these systems due to cost and lack of industrial base capacity.

Ukraine on the other hand goes through around 10,000 attritable drones per month, using them as much as munitions as anything. Surging up to 30,000 per month, they are manufactured in small buildings and basements, often near the front.

The vast majority are sent on one-way missions to conduct ISR or deliver end effects like EW and kinetic strike. They allow the small unit commander to have his own dedicated Air Force and it’s changing the way we will fight. I’ve heard some executives in the defense industry look at the lessons learned from drone use in Ukraine and retort with “that’s not how we do it in the US,” demanding that the military continue to buy expensive drones packed with capabilities that will likely be destroyed in their first use. Fortunately, Soldiers and their leaders are seeing the issue and understand that it doesn’t make sense to destroy and bunker with a $50,000 drone when it can be done with a $2000 model. They know that our foes are going to be able to continue to generate these systems even when our exquisite systems are used up in the first days of a large scale conflict. Small, FPV drones provide an asymmetric advantage to even the smallest and least sophisticated of foes.

My vision is a drone categorized as a munition in order to acknowledge its attritable status and to streamline acquisition which ordered in quantity and shoes up at the unit where it is configured using Modular Open Source Architecture (MOSA) components for the day’s operations. Some may be configured with cameras and sensors while others receive effectors such as EW packages and explosive warheads or weapon racks to drop small munitions such as grenades like a mini-bomber. Taking a note from what we’ve seen in Ukraine a flying Claymore may also be an option. Using simple onboard computers and software defined radios, software will be uploaded to provide various flight and command and control enhancements like pixel lock and home on jam capabilities as well as follow the leader control for swarms.

Now on to what the Army is looking at. The other day the Army’s Uncrewed Aircraft Systems Project Office issued a Sources Sought Notice to industry for Purpose Built Attritable Systems (PBAS) First Person View (FPV) Small Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (SUAS).

This Sources Sought is to assess commercially available and viable Purpose-Built Attritable Systems (PBAS) First Person View (FPV) Small Uncrewed Aircraft System (SUAS) candidates for a possible invitation for a follow-on demonstration in support of the United States Army Maneuver Elements. This sources sought may be used to fulfill future procurement requirements.

The Program Executive Office (PEO) Aviation, Project Manager (PM), UAS, seeks information on commercially available products that are production ready, reusable, unretrievable components (uncrewed aircraft platforms, payloads, and ancillary equipment) and cost-effective SUAS to be employed at the maneuver small unit level. FPV enabled SUAS provide the maneuver force a low cost solution with increased maneuverability, precise lethal payload delivery, and operator concealability. As such, the PBAS FPV, hereafter referred to as PBAS, designed with baseline mission characteristics that focus on rapid reconfigurability and modular payload capabilities that allow for mission changes across target acquisition tasks, with the added flexibility to execute kinetic operations as needed. The system’s mission characteristics include a field-level reconfigurable, modular payload capability to execute the primary mission of Reconnaissance Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA), secondary mission of communications relay, and enhanced mission set of lethal payload delivery and electronic support.

What is most critical to this plan, and as far as I know still unavailable, is the Interface Control Document for these MOSA drones. It will tell industry what connectors to use and what power they will have available.

Additionally, we need a domestic supply chain for the components to create these drones. Right now, most batteries, circuitry, and motors are coming from within the Chinese sphere of influence. The alternative suppliers are foreign.

Interested parties should visit sam.gov and have until May 8, 2025, 4:00 PM CST to submit. I’m sure they mean CDT, but then notice says CST.

The image at the top was taken by SPC Israel Fernandez and depicts U.S. Army Sgt. Tucker Smith with the UAS Platoon, 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade prepares his Skydio X10D drone for its observation flight during “Project Shiv” at Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, Feb. 20, 2025. Project Shiv is an innovative exercise involving using first person view drones assembled at Balli Airfield in conjunction with development munitions created by the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command (DEVCOM) Armaments Center. This is the kind of innovation that is going to keep the Army relevant.

Maneuver Short Range Air Defense in Brigade Combat Team Operations

Monday, April 21st, 2025

Observations and Best Practices of The 6th Battalion, 56th Air Defense Artillery, National Training Center, Rotation 25-02

Download document here: No. 25-976, MSHORAD in BCT Operations [PDF – 565.1 KB]

Introduction: Defining the Role of Short Range Air Defense in the Brigade Combat Team (BCT)

Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD) is an inherently demanding mission set, requiring Air Defense commanders, leaders, and subject-matter experts to have a comprehensive understanding of air threats, and system capabilities, as well as an understanding of the ground fight for Air Defense units to meet their higher headquarters’ commander’s intent and end State.

The relationship between SHORAD units and the supported maneuver commander is a unique dynamic that requires detailed planning through the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) to ensure there is a shared understanding, vertically and horizontally, for incorporation of SHORAD into the scheme of maneuver.

Since 2022, three Maneuver SHORAD (M-SHORAD) Battalions have been established, with two organic to division-level organizations. It is during this initial window of establishing M-SHORAD that lessons learned, and best practices must be captured at the National Training Center, and codified as actionable doctrine for the Air Defense force at large.

This paper describes both best practices and recommendations for M-SHORAD batteries in support of the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and division, specifically regarding the role of the Air Defense Coordinator (ADCOORD), employment of Stinger and Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft System (C-sUAS) systems, and engagement authority within the division. The ADA Branch must continually examine the role of SHORAD and mission command dynamics to set conditions for success in future SHORAD implementation. This paper references the yet-to-be-published FM 3-01, dated 04 November 2024, to provide appropriate context for the National Training Center rotation 25-02. Charlie Battery, 6th Battalion, 56th Air Defense Artillery Battalion (C/6-56 ADA BN) was the supporting M-SHORAD Battery during this rotation.

The Role of the Air Defense Coordinator

Battery commanders of M-SHORAD units often find that they, as the air defense coordinator (ADCOORD), have more detailed and contextual information at their level than at the Division Air Defense (DIVAD) headquarters when supporting the BCT. Enemy air avenue of approach, force protection capabilities, other Air Defense assets in the area of operation, local dynamics, and a host of other mission considerations are often better understood in real-time by the battery commander rather than their higher headquarters. In this relationship, immediate decision-making on detailed matters and specific actions is best executed at the lowest level, where the information and contextual understanding are timelier and more precise.

Throughout rotation 25-02, the C/6-56 ADA BN battery commander validated this concept through continual integration into the brigade plans and current operations (CUOPS) at the Main Command Post (MCP). It was critical that the battery commander had a holistic understanding of the brigade’s mission, and appropriately planned considerations for the battery to manage the execution of air defense operations. The most significant impacts the ADCOORD had were specific recommendations of task organization and command relationships (COMREL), synchronized efforts for the development of the unit airspace plan (UAP) to define Airspace Management requirements, and the early integration into MDMP and Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE).

While C/6-56 ADA BN had a comprehensive task organization and COMREL going into the rotation, the nature of the fight required dynamic reorganization of the battery to optimize ADA assets in opposition to the air threats. Integrating the ADCOORD with the brigade S2, plans, and operations officer enabled the ADCOORD to inform the commander and adjust the task organization appropriately to ensure M-SHORAD coverage supported the identified unit or protected asset.

As the ADCOORD, the Battery Commander also influenced the specific type of command and support relationships within the brigade. This synchronization was achieved through the purposeful integration of the Battery Commander through the MDMP process, and the deliberate inclusion of ADA considerations in the brigade’s decision support matrix (DSM), enabling the tenets of Air Defense and Mission Command throughout the operation.

Of note, the most detrimental impact on the ADCOORD was the understaffed and undertrained Air Defense Airspace Management (ADAM) cell. Due to the naturally demanded requirements to provide real-time information to the MCP and CUOPS, there continued to be an increased expectation of situational awareness from the ADAM cell, especially considering the threat of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and deliberate integration of M-SHORAD.

To help the ADAM cell manage the fight, the C/6-56 commander provided Soldiers from the battery. However, this resulted in “mission creep,” with the battery effectively serving as the ADAM cell, specifically regarding battle drills, TOC updates, and COP management. It is critical to the functions of the MCP, and supporting M-SHORAD Battery to ensure the ADAM cell is manned, trained, and equipped to enable command post activities with marginal, if any, augmentation from the battery.

While the draft of FM 3-01 does outline a battery commander as the ADCOORD to a supported Brigade Commander, it does not clarify the relationship of multiple SHORAD Battery Commanders to a single brigade.

Non-Dedicated Stinger Teams

In 2017, the Headquarters Department of the Army published HQDA EXORD 182-17 Implementation of Increasing Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD) To Maneuver Forces Initiative. The United States Army Air Defense Artillery School immediately began training various non-air defense Soldiers and units as part of this directive. Since then, units have struggled maintaining training proficiency and standards for gunnery programs within the BCTs and divisions.

In the case of rotation 25-02, approximately 24-man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) were issued to the BCT. However, it quickly became apparent that the operators of those systems were not integrated into the scheme of air defense. This included surface-to-air missile (SAM) engagement reports, MANPADS distribution plan, or the DSM to reallocate air defense assets. It was also unclear whether the operators were trained and certified on the weapons system, as the brigade did not maintain any centralized gunnery program.

While this may not be the case with every BCT or division, all units are required to understand the training and certification of Stinger operators for the proper planning and projection of ADA combat power. If it is the intent of the United States Army to increase the air defense capabilities within the BCT to non-air defenders, it is imperative for elements at the division and below to establish and manage a gunnery program.

Training circular (TC) 3-01.18 outlines the gunnery standards for both air defenders and non-air defenders; however, the current publication tasks the organic Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) or delegated ADA Brigade Commander to oversee the program and establish a brigade standardization officer to evaluate battalion teams, training plans and training schedules.

It may be necessary to include a 14P, AMD Crewmember, Master Gunnery position, and the necessary equipment to divisions to provide oversight for evaluations and gunnery standards in line with TC 3-01.18 across the formation. The current TC only refers to Avenger Master Gunners but may be interchangeable with M-SHORAD Master Gunners based on the overlap of base knowledge of the Stinger weapon system. The Master Gunner position could be assigned to the Division AMD sections to support all division MANPADS gunnery, for both Air Defense and non-Air Defense Stinger teams.

While the draft FM 3-01 does charge the ADCOORD with providing oversight of AMD training and certification, the current TC is incongruent with the DIVAD construct within a division, including divisions that must maintain currency without a DIVAD to provide oversight. Until the training circular can better capture the current structure and requirement of non-dedicated air defense, it will likely be at the discretion of the division or BCT commander to determine the unit’s training strategies, standards, and training schedules.

In units without a DIVAD, non-dedicated MANPADS gunnery is even more problematic. In those cases, divisions maintain zero ADA commanders, with the division AMD chief serving as the senior air defender in the division and the ADAM air defense officer as the senior air defender in the brigade. In these organizations, there is even less capability to provide the necessary oversight to manage a MANPADS gunnery program in accordance with the current TC. It may be essential for the next iteration of the TC to shift to a MOS agnostic approach, enabling any organization or unit to establish MANPADS programs or source mobile training teams as necessary.

Counter Small UAS Systems and Employment

Much like the previously discussed MANPADS concerns, divisions and brigades lack the training proficiency and certification requirements associated with C-sUAS systems. While two divisions have been issued Smart Shooter, Modi, Bal Chatri, and Drone Buster, it is also clear that these systems have been either relegated to use only by assigned air defenders or lack any oversight, specifically in organizations that do not have a DIVAD battalion.

In those cases where a DIVAD is assigned to a division, air defenders show excellent proficiency when employing C-sUAS systems. However, the availability of personnel to employ handheld systems is limited, as the supporting ADA battery typically operates on their primary weapon system, the M-SHORAD Stryker. In cases where the systems are issued to non-dedicated air defenders, they generally are improperly employed due to limited training with the system.

The number of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) systems or other capabilities that are not programs of record is also increasingly challenging to manage. Systems previously seen at the National Training Center include, but are not limited to, MADS-K, BEAST+, Titan, SkyView, and Enforceair. Including these self-procured systems increases the training requirements and certification for each BCT. These systems are often challenging to manage from an emission control (EMCON) and spectrum management perspective.

As recommended with the MANPADS, it is a commander’s prerogative to ensure training and certifications are managed within a centralized standardization program. As of 17 September 2024, the Fires Center of Excellence, Directorate of Training & Doctrine released the Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Home Station Training Support Package & Administrative Guide. The UAS support package should serve as the base document for units for handheld and self-procured systems until the appropriate gunnery standards are established. However, based on the type of C-sUAS systems, it will likely not be a comprehensive training guide.

Short Range Air Defense Engagement Authorities

As M-SHORAD continues to integrate into maneuver elements, the ability to make timely and accurate engagements and manage airspace within a brigade or division becomes increasingly more complex. Key to this discussion is the level of control for SHORAD units, specifically the engagement authority.

Joint Publication (JP) 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats states that while the engagement authority originates at the joint force commander (JFC) and can be delegated to the area air defense commander (AADC), and that engagement authority can also be delegated to the individual fire unit based on the operational necessity and rules of engagement (ROE) for defensive counterair operations.[2]

This level of autonomy will be vital to ensure that SHORAD units supporting the maneuver commander can make timely engagements to protect the force. The current draft of FM 3-01 states ADA commanders in divisions and BCTs control engagements using the ROEs, with engagements typically decentralized to the fire unit. However, this will still require a certain level of synchronicity to ensure engagements occur in line with the area air defense plan (AADP). Additionally, it will be necessary to establish engagement boundaries that consider the coordinating altitude (CA) for other airspace users and clearance of fires, forcing integration between the DIVAD and echelons above the brigade and division.

During rotation 25-02, C/6-56 ADA BN, in conjunction with the NTC higher control cell (HICON), refined the engagement authority to ensure that they met training objectives and best replicated real-world application. This was primarily accomplished through the deliberate planning and coordination between the Battery ADCOORD and HICON in line with the scenario-generated air threat and constructive division guidance.

The published rules of engagement considered declared hostiles, hostile intent, hostile act, and autonomous engagements and were subsequently published in the division order. In turn, C/6-56 ADA BN codified the brigade’s engagement authority for hostile air threats: “Stout VCs have engagement authority (EA) of RW and group 1-2 UAS. All engagements must be reported to ADAM/BAE and Nighthawk 6 at BDE Main. EA for FW and group 3-5 UAS is with BDE AMD Cell, Nighthawk 6, or BDE Main. All located at BDE TOC.

What was not detailed in the C/6-56 ADA BN plan was the CA. CA is a determining factor for engagements within a joint environment. In addition to the CA, the battery, in conjunction with the ADAM cell and brigade aviation element (BAE), needs to ensure that the appropriate airspace coordinating measure (ACM) requests are submitted as part of the UAP to create shared understanding between airspace users.

Observations from rotation 25-02 suggest the use of a low-altitude missile engagement zone (LOMEZ) to better define where SHORAD units operate, specifically for those elements maneuvering with the supported unit. For those SHORAD elements in a fixed or static location (MCP, airfield, brigade support area, etc.), a short-range AD engagement zone (SHORADEZ) may be more appropriate. However, these recommendations may change based on employment and mission requirements.

Additional coordination is required for a SHORAD unit when divisional assets identify a threat aircraft operating in the division area of operations but do not have the authority to engage the threat under the rules of engagement or weapons control status. This procedure needs to provide specific guidance to include potential SHORAD engagements above the CA, as the DIVAD must coordinate with the division Joint Air Ground Integration Center (JAGIC) for engagement authority in these cases.

Annex A to ATP 3-91.1, The Joint Air Ground Integration Center, outlines this process in detail.[4] What potentially requires an update is the Call for Defensive Counterair with Established Track, with the understanding that JP 3-01 and the pending FM 3-01 delegate engagement authority to the ADA commanders in divisions and BCTs using published ROEs.

To reduce the time to engagement, the JAGIC should develop a decision authorities matrix, or appropriate Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) to ensure they are delegated appropriate authorities to execute their functions organic to the JAGIC to facilitate these engagements. It is important to remember that these authorities must be consistent with the airspace control plan and the area air defense plan defined by the JFC and Joint Force Air Component Commander.

Conclusions and Implications for Air Defense

Air Defense and Maneuver Culture. SHORAD’s current and future missions require air defenders to understand short-range air defense and integration with the supported commander. This relationship, nested within mission command, will help necessitate the development of doctrine, unit operating procedures, military decision-making, and operations.

Additionally, it is the responsibility of the Air Defense proponent and doctrine to ensure lessons learned and best practices are codified in a way that is communicated back to the force, resulting in tangible changes to Army DOTMLPF-P. This includes adjustments to the programs of instruction within professional military education for officers, warrant officers, and enlisted Soldiers as early as possible within the ADA school. Future curriculum must address joint service interoperability, large-scale combat operations, and the increasing role of air defense in the division fight. Air Defense may need to leverage maximum attendance to the Stryker Leaders Course and the Maneuver Captain’s Career Course to bridge the knowledge gap between M-SHORAD and the maneuver force.

Leader Development. The DIVAD requires mature, independently operating company-grade leaders skilled in communications, critical thinking, and the ability to conduct leader engagement while integrating at echelon. Positions, such as the ADCOORD and ADAM cell officer, are crucial touchpoints to synchronize efforts with the supported unit. It is equally important for maneuver commanders to be educated on the air defense capabilities organic to their unit. Air defense leaders are ultimately responsible for educating the supported commanders and facilitating effective mission command in complex air and missile defense environments.

Realistic Training. Conducting realistic training that appropriately replicates the complexities of a joint and dynamic environment benefits the DIVAD and the division. Demanding home station training and combat training center rotations must push the Soldiers and systems required for real-world application to ensure units can meet the stresses of combat against agile and proficient advisories. It is the charge of unit master gunners, commanders, and standardization teams to ensure units are challenged with the complexities of large-scale combat operations.

[1] ATP 6-0.5, Command Post Organization and Operations, Headquarters Department of the Army, Mar 2017.

[2] JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, 13 Mar 2024

[3] JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, 13 Mar 2024

[4] ATP 3-91.1, The Joint Air Ground Integration Center, April 2019

By MAJ Julian Rodriguez, Center for Army Lessons Learned

MAJ Julian Rodriguez currently serves as the Senior Air Defense Trainer at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA. His previous assignments include 4-3 ADA BN as a Patriot Battery Platoon Leader and Battery Executive Officer; 82nd Division, Combat Aviation Brigade as the ADAM OIC; 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade as the brigade planner; White Sands Missile Range as the AMD Test Detachment Commander; and 30th ADA BDE as a Battalion Executive Officer and Brigade Operations Officer. MAJ Rodriguez’s civilian education includes a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Texas at Arlington, and a Master’s degree in Leadership Studies from the University of Texas at El Paso.

Paul Revere’s Ride Pioneers Army Signal Corps, Military Intelligence

Saturday, April 19th, 2025

WASHINGTON — As the nation commemorates the 250th anniversary of the beginning of the Revolutionary War in April, the Army looks back at the roots of its legacy of service.

Paul Revere and his midnight ride is one of the most recognized images from the events surrounding the battles at Lexington and Concord on April 19, 1775. While most people think of him as a lone actor, he was part of a much larger network of early warning intelligence systems and communication nodes the Army later developed into the Signal Corps and military intelligence.

The crisis that led Paul Revere on his famous midnight ride didn’t begin overnight.

Resistance Groups

When Britain began to place more financial burdens on the colonists in the 1760s and remove fundamental rights, many colonists began to organize resistance groups like the Sons of Liberty.

By 1774, Massachusetts was the focal point for civil unrest, and the British government took extreme measures against the colony. The Crown curtailed most civil liberties, closed the port of Boston, and in October, dissolved the colonial legislature.

In response, the legislature continued to meet as the representatives of the people, calling itself the Massachusetts Provincial Congress. Working through the Fall, the Provincial Congress established a Committee of Safety, reorganized the colony’s militia, encouraged more efficient leadership, and established higher standards of readiness for quick-reaction units, known as minute battalions. Soldiers in these units tended to be younger, more highly motivated, better trained, and were known as “minutemen.”

Most minute units were led by combat veterans of the French and Indian War (1754-1763). By early 1775, nearly 20,000 troops were organized in militia regiments and minute battalions across the colony.

Secret caches

To support the combat element of what was being referred to as the Massachusetts Provincial Army, the Congress established a Committee of Supplies to amass military stores and equipment in secret caches around the colony.

Communities hid small arms, ammunition, artillery pieces, tents, entrenching tools, medical chests, and other supplies in gardens, outbuildings, and basements. If the growing force of 4,000 British regulars in Boston were ever to begin a conflict in Massachusetts, the Provincial Army would need these supplies to rapidly mass and meet them in combat.

Since the citizen-soldiers of the militia could not stay on alert permanently, the provincials organized a robust intelligence and signal network to provide early warning if a threat appeared.

Intelligence agents inside Boston collected information on British plans and speedily sent word into the countryside so that the Provincial Army were almost as informed of the actions of the British military as the British were themselves.

The Committee of Safety established a network of alarm riders in the counties around Boston to be able to rapidly spread the word should the Sons of Liberty have actionable intelligence.

Paul Revere

An early member of the Sons of Liberty who had experience carrying urgent messages across the colonies was 40-year-old silversmith Paul Revere.

By April of 1775, he was one of those in Boston entrusted with the mission of passing through British lines to carry word into the countryside should the regulars ever march on a provincial target. If caught with incriminating information, Revere and the other alarm rides could suffer imprisonment or death.

On the evening of April 18, patriot leader Joseph Warren received intelligence that a force of about 700 redcoats was assembling to march west toward Concord the next day to seize military supplies and arrest members of the Provincial Congress.

Warren instructed Paul Revere and William Dawes to escape the city and activate the colony’s alarm network.

Unsure if the British force would march out via Boston neck or ferry their troops across the Charles River toward Cambridge, Revere coordinated signal lanterns in the steeple of Boston’s Old North Church: one if by the land route, two if by water.

This simple but effective code let Revere and other alarm riders know just before midnight that Royal Navy sailors were ferrying the regulars to Lechmere Point.

Revere slipped past the warships in Boston harbor to Charlestown, where he mounted his horse and raced westwards to spread the alarm.

Joined by William Dawes, who had spread the alert on the route from Boston Neck, Revere rode through the night toward Concord, spreading word that, “The regulars are coming out!” This triggered the colony’s alarm network.

Alert riders spread the word north, west, and south, with word reaching as far away as New Hampshire, Maine, and Rhode Island by the end of the day on April 19.

The network activated some 14,000 militia and minutemen in 47 regiments all within marching distance of Concord.

Church bells and drums called the soldiers to muster, families cooked rations and rolled cartridges, and dozens of companies began their march.

Few thought it would be the first action in what would become an eight-year war for independence, nor that someday an organization called the U.S. Army would develop signal network systems based on relays to communicate across the battlefield. The groundwork established in colonial Massachusetts forms the basis for the modern-day Army Signal Corps and military intelligence branches.

By MAJ Jonathan Bratten, U.S. Army Center of Military History

Army Advances Research in Robotics, AI and Autonomy

Friday, April 18th, 2025

ADELPHI, Md. — In recognition of National Robotics Week, U.S. Army researchers highlight some of their groundbreaking work aimed at advancing the future of human-machine integration for the battlefield.

The U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Army Research Laboratory, known as DEVCOM ARL, robotics research spans across ground and air autonomous systems, and energy systems, that support future mobility and maneuverability of these systems. ARL robotics researchers partner with industry, government and academia to help protect and support the Soldier.

One example of a recent ARL breakthrough is integrating generative artificial intelligence with robotics for battle damage assessment operations. ARL robots are now capable of understanding and responding to natural language, offering the Soldier human-like interactions.

“We are bridging the gap between humans and robots, making them more intuitive, responsive, and, ultimately, more useful for the Soldier,” said Phil Osteen, a lead researcher for the Artificial Intelligence for Maneuver and Mobility, or AIMM program. “ARL researchers have demonstrated an interactive bi-directional communication system that enables real-time exchanges between humans and robots.”

By interacting with Soldiers using natural language, robots can better communicate battlefield observations such as damage assessments and mission execution reports, enhancing battlefield operations.

The AIMM program is also focused on advancing autonomous off-road mobility, human-guided machine learning, and tactical behaviors that go beyond simple point-to-point movement. Army operations are complex, requiring considerations such as cover, concealment, mission considerations and formation controls, according to Udam Silva, AIMM program manager.

“We’ve made significant progress in off-road mobility,” Silva said. “We can now autonomously navigate through dense vegetation at operational speeds.”

ARL researchers also leverage external collaboration. In a research effort under AIMM, robotics researchers collaborate with an industry partner, Overland AI, on dual-use hardware and software solutions for ground autonomy, enabling vehicles to navigate challenging natural terrain autonomously at operationally relevant speeds.

In a separate ARL autonomous program, Human Autonomy Teaming, or HAT, is creating a cutting-edge toolkit of a suite of technologies that enable continuous mission planning, execution and review process between humans and autonomous systems, offering a more honest assessment. This iterative, or continuous assessment is a way of shortening that cycle, so Soldiers can determine when their autonomous systems deviate and why.

“This gives Soldiers the tools to correct robots’ behaviors using techniques such as human-guided machine learning developed by multiple ARL programs,” said Dr. Brandon Perelman, HAT program manager.

The HAT program is ensuring the U.S. Army’s software is continually refined to counter adversaries’ adaptations, according to Perelman.

According to Perelman, the software being developed is compatible with multiple interfaces, so mission plans can go into any equipped vehicle. It has a data synchronization and re-streaming package so different data streams can line up, while also looking at video feeds and positions, navigation and timing data from a robot for a fuller view of a complex situation such as encountered on the battlefield.

The HAT program informs future research aimed to expand vertically to higher, larger echelons in the Army chain of command as well as horizontally, across warfighting functions, to include multiple domains such as mount-dismount coordination, and ground-air teaming.

These examples represent some of ARL’s transformative robotics work that span multiple critical domains, designed to enhance military capabilities and ensure technological superiority.

Related link: Robotics Research Collaboration Campus (R2C2)

By U.S. Army DEVCOM Army Research Laboratory Public Affairs

Army’s Advanced Manufacturing Revolutionizes Mortar System, Enhancing Soldier Safety

Thursday, April 17th, 2025

ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL, Ill. — In a significant leap forward for Soldier safety and operational effectiveness, the 120mm mortar system’s attenuating blast cone has undergone a transformative redesign.

“Our service members are the bedrock of our nation’s defense,” stated Col. Dave Guida, commander of Rock Island Arsenal-Joint Manufacturing and Technology Center. “They stand ready, modern and prepared to defeat any adversary. Equipping them with the best possible equipment is an imperative priority. This redesigned ABC is evidence of that commitment.”

The project, spearheaded by the Advanced Manufacturing Center of Excellence at RIA-JMTC, leverages the power of additive manufacturing to create a lighter, more efficient, cost effective and safer ABC. This innovation directly addresses concerns regarding head trauma and concussions associated with the legacy equipment, underscoring the Army’s unwavering commitment to equipping its soldiers with the most advanced technologies available.

“Collaboration was the cornerstone of this project,” explained Edward Flinn, director of the AM CoE. “We ensured it not only met, but exceeded expectations in terms of functionality, durability and ease of use in the field.”

The original eight-part ABC presented significant challenges for Soldiers in the field, contributing to fatigue and hindering maneuverability, especially in challenging terrain. Recognizing the need for improvement, the AM CoE embarked on a rigorous redesign process, initially streamlining the ABC to a two-part system and ultimately refining it to a four-part configuration based on extensive feedback. This iterative approach ensured the final design met the rigorous demands of real-world operations, balancing weight reduction with structural integrity and ease of maintenance.

“Additive manufacturing empowers us to push the boundaries of design,” Flinn elaborated. “We can create components that are simultaneously lighter, stronger and more adaptable to the ever-changing demands of the battlefield. This is a true game-changer for military equipment design and production and it’s happening right now at the RIA-JMTC AM CoE.”

The selection of titanium, renowned for its exceptional strength-to-weight ratio and corrosion resistance, further enhances the ABC’s performance. While the 3D-printed components are solid, the strategic use of titanium and the design freedoms afforded by additive manufacturing have resulted in an ABC that weighs less than half of its conventionally manufactured counterpart. This significant weight reduction, achieved without compromising structural integrity, enhances Soldier mobility and reduces fatigue, crucial factors in demanding operational environments. This highlights the power of AM to optimize performance not just through complex internal structures, but also through material selection and overall design efficiency.

Beyond the immediate benefits of a lighter, more efficient design, the AM process offers significant cost and time savings across the entire product lifecycle. Eliminating the need for expensive tooling and lengthy lead times associated with traditional manufacturing, AM enables rapid prototyping and on-demand production. This agility is crucial in responding to rapidly evolving operational needs and maintaining a decisive advantage in an increasingly complex global landscape.

“The ability to rapidly prototype and iterate designs using AM is transformative,” Guida emphasized. “It allows us to respond quickly to emerging threats and deliver solutions to the Warfighter at an unprecedented pace. This speed and flexibility are essential in maintaining leverage against any adversary.”

While the initial production run of 700 ABCs utilized traditional manufacturing methods for comparative analysis and to ensure a smooth transition, the AM CoE is poised to take over full production during the sustainment phase. This data-driven approach allows the Army to thoroughly evaluate the long-term cost-effectiveness and efficiency of AM, paving the way for wider adoption of this groundbreaking technology.

“RIA-JMTC, Tank-automotive and Armaments Command and Army Materiel Command work tirelessly across the Department of Defense to synchronize logistics, build supply chain resilience and achieve combat readiness goals,” Guida said. “A modernized organic industrial base, coupled with data-driven predictive and precision logistics, ensures we can provide the right parts and materiel to Soldiers when and where they need them. When the need arises for new, upgraded or modernized equipment, the skilled artisans of the OIB stand ready to deliver.”

Sustainment leaders are increasingly relying on data analytics and advanced information systems to accurately predict battlefield requirements, effectively connecting the foxhole to the factory. This focus on strategic readiness is essential for maintaining a prepared and responsive force. Continuous transformation ensures the Army can deliver trained, cohesive and lethal forces capable of meeting future challenges in complex operational environments.

“The redesigned ABC is an equipment upgrade that embodies the Army’s commitment to Soldier safety, technological advancement and a future-ready force prepared for any contingency,” Flinn said. “This initiative reinforces the principle that strategic readiness begins at home and that investing in advanced manufacturing and data-driven logistics is essential for maintaining a decisive edge on the future battlefield.”

By Kendall Swank

Irregular Warfare: U.S. Army’s IW Doctrine

Wednesday, April 16th, 2025

I regularly find myself initially confused during conversations regarding IW, listening for cues as to whether others are mentioning Irregular Warfare or Information Warfare. Having practiced both, often simultaneously, it leads my mind to wander in various directions.

That’s one of our biggest weaknesses in the national security establishment, terminology. We often find ourselves speaking past one another as we attempt to use various buzzwords to gain common ground.

This video is about Irregular Warfare. Below is the description:

Currently, the U.S. Army’s Irregular Warfare (IW) doctrine is being reviewed and updated by the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate at Fort Leavenworth, KS. This film is part of that ongoing discussion and highlights some of the most basic and important parts of current IW doctrine that should remain in place, while suggesting some needed changes as well.

The character and form of war are constantly changing, yet its fundamental nature remains the same. Though Great Power Competition is now our primary national security challenge – a departure from conducting almost two decades of continuous irregular war against violent extremist organizations worldwide – the requirement for mastery of irregular warfare persists. Far from abandoning these critical competencies, we will sharpen these capabilities for application against peer competitor, nation-state adversaries. – 2020 Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy

IW Reality: Conventional forces have, and always will have, a role in IW across a variety of missions, and a range of military activities

IW Myth: Irregular Warfare (IW) is Counterterrorism (CT), CT is Special Operations Forces (SOF), therefore IW is SOF.