TYR Tactical

Archive for the ‘Profession of Arms’ Category

Air Force Coins Official Maintenance Duty Uniform, Adds Immediate Wear of Tactical OCP Caps

Monday, June 14th, 2021

Air Force commanders of units with aircraft maintenance, industrial and other labor intensive Air Force Specialty Codes will have the option to authorize wear of a standardized, maintenance duty uniform, also referred to as coveralls, which may be worn on a day-to-day basis upon publication of the updated AFI 36-2903 anticipated for August 2021.

The career fields authorized to wear the MDU are: 2A, 2F, 2G, 2M, 2P, 2S, 2T, 2W, 3E, 3D, 1P.

“The MDU idea was presented to the 101st uniform board in November 2020 as a way to help increase readiness and timeliness from the work center to the flight line,” said Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force JoAnne S. Bass. “We are hoping this change will instill a sense of culture and inclusivity for our maintainers who work to keep the mission going 24/7.”

When authorized by commanders, the sage MDU will be unit funded and members will wear the basic configuration consisting of a nametape, service tapes and rank along with the higher headquarters patch on the left sleeve and a subdued U.S. flag and organizational patch on the right sleeve. The coyote brown t-shirt, OCP patrol or tactical cap, coyote brown or green socks, and coyote brown boots, are worn with the uniform. The MDU will not be utilized for office work environments, non-industrial or non-labor tasking, but is authorized for wear when transiting from home to duty location and all locations on installations. It must be worn in serviceable condition. Local coverall variants are still authorized but only in work centers and on the flight line.

Tactical OCP Cap

Additionally, immediate wear of some tactical OCP caps is authorized while the Air Force continues the acquisition process to complete this new uniform item. These are not yet available through AAFES.

Current tactical OCP caps may be worn if they are made entirely of OCP material or OCP material with a coyote brown mesh back. No other colors or combinations are authorized. The Velcro or sew-on spice brown name tape will be worn centered on the back of the caps. The only item authorized for wear on the front of the cap is rank for officers.

Officers will wear either pinned, sewn or Velcro spice brown rank insignia centered ½ inch on the front of the cap on an OCP background. Air Force first lieutenants and lieutenant colonels will wear black rank. Velcro on the hat should not exceed the size of the insignia. Chaplains may wear the chaplain occupational badge sewn-on and centered ½ inch above the visor.

Enlisted members will not wear rank insignia or a subdued flag on the cap, only a name tape on the back of the cap is authorized. The front of the cap must not have any Velcro or other items.

In addition, females are authorized to pull their bun or ponytail through the back of the tactical OCP cap.

Once the acquisition process is complete for the new uniform item, which is expected to take approximately a year, all other caps will be unauthorized.

At this time, Guardians will adhere to the uniform standards of the U.S. Air Force until the U.S. Space Force develops its own policy.

Note: Theater commanders prescribe the dress and personal appearance standards in the theater of operations.

USAF Clarifies Female Hair Standards

Friday, June 11th, 2021

Building on women’s hair updates announced in February 2021, beginning June 25 when hair is secured behind the head, the hair may extend six inches to the left and to the right and six inches protruding from the point where the hair is gathered.

For more information at go.usa.gov.

Blast from the Past – What Sort Of Man Reads Infantry?

Monday, May 31st, 2021

For decades, Infantry Magazine was the professional journal of the grunt. Printed by the Infantry Center, it facilitated outreach to members of the branch, informed on modernization efforts and served as a platform for professional writing. This ad promoting the publication, was printed during the early 70s heyday of men’s pulp magazines, with their lurid covers promising to satisfy an appetite for life.

I love the combat ace look, with ascot, starched OG-107 fatigues, aviator shades and leather gloves. The only things missing are a Vietnamese Ranger badge or jump wings, and direct embroidery.

The text reads:

What sort of man reads Infantry?

He’s the guy who’s always there when the going gets tough. Cool, self-assured and thoroughly in control of the situation, he makes the difference no matter what team he’s on. A profile of INFANTRY readers shows that 98% have specialized skills. Taste patterns in clothing reflect remarkable similarity and conformity, leaning towards the conservative. The IM reader is widely traveled, 97% having traveled abroad or resides in a foreign land. An outdoorsman at heart, he is the bon vivant of cuisine au natrual (sic). The INFANTRY buff is well informed and willing to go out of the way for a superior product.

Air Force Releases Updated Fitness Test Score Breakdown

Friday, May 28th, 2021

WASHINGTON (AFNS) —

The Air Force will resume physical fitness testing July 1 with only three components: push-ups, sit-ups and the 1.5-mile run.

Without the waist measurement as a scored component, push-ups and sit-ups will increase from 10 to 20 points each, while the 1.5-mile run will remain at 60 points. Scoring will fall into five-year age groups, as opposed to the previous 10. Updated charts can be found here.

The waist measurement will no longer be required as part of the physical fitness test but a separate assessment of body composition, as required by DoD Instruction 1308.3, will continue starting in October. Testing for body composition may continue to use some form of waist measurement and may be administered during PT testing to reduce scheduling and administrative burdens, but body composition will not be a component of the PT test itself. Further details on the body composition program will be released at a later date.

The Air Force has also worked on alternative strength and cardiovascular testing exercise options with plans to announce them in the coming weeks. Once announced, members and fitness monitors will have approximately six months to familiarize themselves with use and execution of the alternative testing options prior to having them available in January 2022. Members will have a choice of which testing options they choose for their physical fitness assessment components. The six-month timeline will help ensure fitness assessment cells are prepared to train physical training leaders to administer tests using the new options.

“We are moving away from a one-size-fits-all model,” said Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. CQ Brown, Jr. “More testing options will put flexibility in the hands of our Airmen – where it belongs. We know not all Airmen maintain their fitness the same way and may excel in different areas. Alternate components provide choices while still providing a mechanism to determine overall fitness.”

These changes align under the Air Force’s Action Order Airmen, people-first approach.

“Physical fitness is an important part of our everyday lives, it’s more than just a test – it’s a way of life, our readiness and ultimately our future success,” said Chief Master Sgt. of the Air Force JoAnne S. Bass. “July 1st is a chance to refocus on building a lifestyle of fitness and health, and I know our Airmen will be ready.”

For additional information, Airmen can visit myPers or the Air Force’s Personnel Center’s fitness program page.

The Space Force will follow these policies until service-specific fitness policies are developed and fielded.

Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs

Platoon Leader Designs App to Help Soldiers Earn Their EIB

Thursday, April 29th, 2021

U.S. Army service members now have a new training aid to help them earn the coveted Expert Infantryman Badge, a mobile app.

1st Lt. Egor Krasnonosenkikh, an infantry officer assigned to 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 7th Infantry Division on Joint Base Lewis-McChord used self-taught programming skills to design an app, “EIB Pro,” to help train his Soldiers.

Just as the Combat Infantryman Badge was intended to be an award for U.S. service members whose primary mission was to close with and destroy the enemy, the Expert Infantryman Badge was instituted to build and maintain esprit de corps within U.S. infantry units. In order for any infantryman to earn the coveted badge, they must demonstrate expertise in their profession’s tasks and drills.

Since its creation, it has been downloaded over 11,000 times and in 65 different countries.

Videos, written instruction, a step-by-step guide, tasks, conditions and standards for EIB tasks are all provided within the app. There’s even a progress tracker that measures your task confidence, repetitions per lane and a “station deep dive” that tracks progress per event.

“So, I think the catalyst was definitely COVID. I was at home and on my computer anyway, so I figured I’d do something that’s useful to the army. I got my EIB the year before I made my app, and I really disliked that little book that we got, which always got destroyed easily,” he said.

At the time, he was a platoon leader and really wanted to see Soldiers in his unit get their EIB, he said. Some Soldiers even had to practice while at home, an environment that he felt would be hard to train in just using a small book.

Soldiers found the app to be a useful training tool, he said.

His battalion ended up having the highest success rate that year, 28.5%, almost double the Brigade average.

“There were Soldiers that told me without my app, they don’t think they would have gotten it. I’ve even heard that from captains and majors,” said Krasnonosenkikh.

He learned how to program on his own using YouTube videos and online resources. Growing up, he had a big interest in video games and what it took to make them, he said.

He spent his early years in Russia, before his uncle invited his mother and himself to move to the United States where he pursued an education and eventually a commission in the U.S. Army.

Soon, he’ll be developing apps, officially, for the military as a member of U.S. Army Futures Command.

He’s also currently working on an education app geared towards squad leaders and team leaders to make Army doctrine more accessible.

The app is free to download, available on the Android and iPhone store and receives updates by 1st Lt. Krasnonosenkikh himself.

By Jerod Hathaway

Army, ASU Publish Human-Autonomy Communication Tips

Tuesday, April 27th, 2021

ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, Md. — Army and Arizona State University researchers identified a set of approaches to help scientists assess how well autonomous systems and humans communicate.

These approaches build on transformational scientific research efforts led by the Army’s Robotics Collaborative Technology Alliance, which evolved the state of robots from tools to teammates and laid the foundation for much of the service’s existing research into how humans and robots can work together effectively.

As ideas for autonomous systems evolve, and the possibilities of ever-more diverse human-autonomy teams has become a reality; however, no clear guidelines exist to explain the best ways to assess how well humans and intelligent systems communicate, Army researchers said.

“The future Army is going to have complex teams in terms of how they will involve autonomy in different ways,” said Dr. Anthony Baker, postdoctoral scientist at the U.S. Combat Capabilities Development Command, known as DEVCOM, Army Research Laboratory. “There is a clear need to be able to measure communication in those types of teams because communication is what defines teamwork. It reflects how the team thinks, plans, makes decisions and succeeds or fails.

If you can’t measure how the team is doing, you can’t do anything to improve their performance, their decision-making, all of those things that make it more likely for the Army to maintain a decisive overmatch on the battlefield and for the warfighter to accomplish the mission, he said.

In the recently published Human-Intelligent Systems Integration journal paper Approaches for Assessing Communication in Human-Autonomy Teams, researchers listed 11 critical approaches for assessing communication in human-autonomy teams. Baker said their focus is to change Soldier involvement with those systems.

The approach considers communication structure:

· Who is saying what to whom and when

· Dynamics, or how interaction patterns evolve over time

· Emotion, which looks at how information is communicated through facial expressions and vocal features like tone and pitch

· Content, which draws on different aspects of words and phrases themselves

“If we want Soldiers and intelligent systems to work well together, we have to have the right measurement tools to analyze and study their communication because communication is so critical to how well they can perform,” Baker said.

As lead author on the paper, Baker said it won’t be enough to study these things after the teams are fielded.

“We need the measurement tools while those teams and technologies are being developed by the Army,” he said.

Because multi-domain operations are fundamentally dependent on improving the efficiency and optimization of communications within and between domains, the goal of this cross-cutting work is for these systems to be able to work with teams more naturally, he said.

According to Baker, this work may also provide a critical roadmap for analyzing communication in complex human-autonomy team structures such as those forecasted for Next Generation Combat Vehicle operations.

“There may be a time when a smart, load-carrying mule robot should carry a squad’s extra gear completely independently and without Soldier involvement, but there is also a push in some areas to make it so that if systems do need to involve Soldiers, they can do so in a way that’s more natural for the Soldiers, like working with a human teammate,” Baker said.

Consider how a Soldier telling a robotic system, “I need you to take that gear up the hill and wait an hour before going to the next zone,” is much easier than inputting a series of buttons and switches on a remote control.

“We want intelligence assessments, command and control decisions and other important things like that to be possible with less Soldier involvement, but we still want Soldier engagement for some things, and we want it to be easier,” Baker said. “Hence why the RCTA had a large focus on making Soldier-robot interactions more efficient.”

The Robotics CTA was a decade-long research initiative began in 2009 that coalesced a community of researchers from the Army, academia and industry to identify scientific gaps and move the state of the art in ground combat robotics. Strategic investments in Army-led foundational research resulted in advanced science in four critical areas of ground combat robotics that effect the way U.S. warfighters see, think, move and team.

Baker said it laid the groundwork for a lot of how the Army thinks about human-robot interaction and drove the shift in how government and industry look at robots as teammates, rather than just tools.

The laboratory’s Human-Autonomy Teaming essential research program, Human-Autonomy Teaming essential research program, or HAT ERP, continues down paths started in the RCTA, which laid broad building blocks for how to describe, model, design and implement new ways of partnering humans and robots, which are intelligent systems with physical forms.

“RCTA was not interested in explaining or providing ways to study communication between human teammates, instead being aimed at how humans and robots communicate,” Baker said. “Our work looks at it from the perspective that we will need ways to study the communication of any type of team–whether or not those teams currently involve any number of robots or autonomy. We want to be agnostic to the overall makeup of the team, so we provide communication assessments suitable for many different scenarios.”

These communication assessment approaches also apply to Soldier-only teams as well.

“Imagine a future human-autonomy team that has to re-task an autonomous vehicle to go join another platoon, and now the team is just humans only,” he said. “Our work seeks to provide the literature with ways to analyze communication in those teams, no matter what they look like or what they’re supposed to do, so that we can draw conclusions about how well they are working together and accomplishing their goals.”

Future research will seek to validate some of the approaches identified in the paper using datasets collected from Next Generation Combat Vehicle lab studies and field experiments, Baker said.

DEVCOM Army Research Laboratory

Air Force Rewrites Basic Doctrine, Focuses on Mission Command, Airpower Evolution

Monday, April 26th, 2021

MAXWELL AIR FORCE, Ala. (AFNS) —

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown, Jr. recently signed perhaps the most sweeping change of Air Force basic doctrine in the service’s history, marking a major milestone in the service’s strategic approach to “Accelerate Change or Lose.”

Core themes to the revised Air Force Doctrine Publication-1: The Air Force are the foundation and evolution of airpower and the concept of mission command.

“When it comes to airpower, it’s about the fact that we can fly, fight and win anytime and anywhere. That is tried and true – how we exploit the air domain, operating in and through the air domain,” Brown said. “That’s what we’ve done since we became an Air Force, and that’s what we’ll continue to do. How we do that might change based on what we see happening in the world and where technology might take us.”

With the Air Force recently releasing its new mission statement – To fly, fight and win … Airpower anytime, anywhere – the general said that “leaders need to ensure that all Airmen – active duty, Guard, Reserve or civilian – understand how much they contribute to airpower.”

The document defines the concept of mission command as a return to the philosophy of mission accomplishment guided by the commander’s intent, while operating in environments characterized by “increasing uncertainty, complexity and rapid change.”

“To drive commander’s intent, we have to be very broad in our thinking,” he said. “We have to give Airmen the leeway, without being very prescriptive, to lead and execute while still meeting intent. When Airmen are empowered, they’ll be able to make things happen that we didn’t even think about.”

In the document’s “CSAF Perspective on Doctrine,” Brown reminds Airmen: “Leaders must push decisions to the lowest competent, capable level using doctrine as a foundation for sound choices.” This core idea resonates throughout the rewrite.

AFDP-1 also updates the legacy airpower tenet of “centralized control, decentralized execution” to “centralized command, distributed control and decentralized execution.” This evolution allows for a framework from which to develop new operating concepts, strategies and capabilities to address rapidly changing and increasingly challenging operating environments.

Brown’s new focus on mission command and centralized command, distributed control and decentralized execution postures the Air Force to execute what he lays out in his “Accelerate Change or Lose” vision: “We must focus on the Joint Warfighting Concept, enabled by Joint All-Domain Command and Control and rapidly move forward…”

While AFDP-1 marks a significant departure from the generally slow pace of change in doctrine, it represents the significant change in focus by the Air Force from retrospective and incremental to future-focused and poised to seize opportunity.

Doctrine represents the best practices and principles that articulate how the Air Force fights. The recent rewrite of AFDP-1 represents a consolidation from 141 pages to 16 pages and a refinement of “the most fundamental and enduring beliefs describing airpower and the Airman’s perspective.”

With the March 2021 release of the “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance,” President Joe Biden reminded the nation “the distribution of power across the world is changing, creating new threats.”

AFDP-1 is poised to reorient the Air Force for the era of great power competition and accelerated change.

Air University Public Affairs

The Baldwin Files – Lighting A Fire

Saturday, April 24th, 2021

This article is about how to light a fire. Of course, as is my habit, I will meander a bit on the way to the final objective for this Wisdom Walk. The last week of February, I got the opportunity to do something that was both enjoyable and personally rewarding. I was invited to engage with some motivated young EOD members of the Air National Guard (ANG) at an ANG facility in Portland, Oregon. They had gathered in Portland from EOD Detachments as far away as Vermont and Texas for a colloquium, i.e., a series of seminars focused on professionally developing the junior airmen who had the opportunity to participate. My role, over a couple of days, involved facilitating some small group discussions on leadership and team building. We talked about issues relevant to them and their individual detachments and I told a few (hopefully) illustrative war stories to prompt additional thought and discussion.

Most of the attendees were E-4s becoming eligible for E-5, with 2-3 years’ time in service, and in their mid-20s. Some were full-time and others part-time. A couple had prior service in non-EOD specialties in the Army and USMC. Generally, they were not at all confident that the Air Forces’ NCOES system for their grade was adequately preparing them for leadership positions. Therefore, all the Airmen came willing and eager to learn. To their credit, the EOD organizational leadership had authorized and funded the colloquium – and perhaps subsequent iterations – to formally address at least some of the perceived gaps in their training. From my perspective, everyone involved from leadership to the most junior attendee was switched on and dedicated to the mission. By the way, the NCO who did the bulk of the leg work to put it together and then executed the plan was a Technical Sergeant (E-6). It was top-down supported, but not top driven. That is a good way of doing business. A worthy effort by all to light some leadership fires.

I did get off to a less than stellar start on my first day. Those of us not from Portland stayed at the same hotel near the ANG facility. I shuttled with some of the others in a rental SUV to the base. Because I was the oldest – by a wide margin – they let me ride in the front passenger seat. We all passed our IDs to the driver so that he could show them at the gate. Since I retired, I visit a military base about once or twice a year and normally drive my own car. Frankly, since I was a passenger this time, I was sightseeing and not paying attention or thinking about protocol. I was the only officer in the car and when the ANG gate guard saw my ID he saluted – and I missed it. As we pulled away, one of the guys said something about it and I immediately realized my mistake. I asked the driver to turn around and we circled out and back into the gate so that I could apologize to the Airman on duty and render a proper salute.

I was embarrassed by the unforced error. However, in hindsight, making the extra effort to correct my unintentional mistake perhaps served as a better leadership lesson than if I had done it right the first time. One does not get respect without giving respect. The various seminars that the Airmen attended and the small group discussions I already mentioned were not the entirety of the program. Additionally, they had daily homework which involved readings and informal briefbacks to the group and debate on various subjects. I sat in and observed many of those and, again, was impressed that everyone seemed to be putting in the work. I met briefly with the Squadron Commander who was hosting the event and had the opportunity for one-on-one sidebars with some of the senior NCOs on site. I learned a lot.

I did have an issue with one of the books on their reading list. It was, “On Combat” by LTC(R) David Grossman. This is as good a time as any to share my unfavorable opinion of this particular officer and his books. I served with 2LT Grossman in A Company, 2nd Battalion, 47th Infantry, 9th Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington in 1979-80. He was my Company’s Executive Officer and I was a Sergeant (E-5). The silly SOB once tried to put me in for an (undeserved) ARTICLE-15 (Non-Judicial Punishment). Long story short, I had ample reason not to like the guy. Sometimes new leaders will try hard to be “nice” to their subordinates. Rationalizing, I suppose, that appeasement is the quickest way to get the respect they know that is needed to successfully function as leaders. That is a rookie mistake. Soldiers will take advantage of the “nice” leader but will never respect or have real confidence in his or her leadership. It is a cliché but true, soldiers respect leaders they see as “tough but fair.” Soldiers know that “nice” will not cut it when a mission goes off the rails. Of course, some leaders do the opposite. They imagine they will get respect by being dicks to their subordinate leaders and soldiers. That is also a rookie mistake, but that is the way 2LT Grossman decided he wanted to go.

So, I have a very poor opinion of the guy’s leadership skills in 79-80. To be sure, even leaders who start off on the wrong foot can evolve and improve over time. I never served with him again, and for all I know he got better with age. Maybe. Either way, that is not why I find his books problematic. His first was “On Killing” published in 1995 and apparently based on his doctoral thesis in psychology. For those that have not read it, “On Killing” beats two points to death – no pun intended. One, that humans have a powerful and innate inhibition against killing. Two, that modern military training uses “Pavlovian and operant conditioning” to overcome this allegedly “instinctive aversion” to killing. Moreover, Grossman extrapolated that violent movies and video games were doing the same thing to the youth of the world. The book did not get much attention initially. Then the Columbine School shooting happened in April 1999. Suddenly, in the post mass shooting hysteria, Grossman was a hot commodity and on all the TV shows. He was able to conveniently provide the answer that people wanted to hear. It was not bad parenting, drugs, or simply two demented teenagers who were responsible for their own heinous actions. It was violent movies and video games that were to blame for the shooting. His book sales soared.

Indeed, Grossman continued to repeat his two core assertions over and over again – in all his books. Nevertheless, they are not true nor are they supported by any real scientifically valid data or by the entirety of human history. In fact, the vast preponderance of evidence tends to prove the exact opposite. Humans instinctively averse to killing? Tell that to Cain or Able. Anyone who believes that has not had much contact with homo sapiens or read “Lord of The Flies.” I do not need a doctorate in psychology to have observed that humans kill for any and every imaginable reason – and for no reason at all. I spent some time in 1997 in Liberia. That country was at the end of a twelve-year civil war. One of the signature features of that brutal conflict was gangs of teenage boys roaming the streets hacking their neighbors to death with machetes. They had guns, but liked inflicting maximum pain and terror and enjoyed the kill more when it was slow. These boys had never seen a violent movie, or TV, or video game. Most had never lived in a house with electricity. We had run-ins with quite a few of these misguided “children.” They avoided direct confrontation with us – because they were not suicidal – but continued to terrorize the civilians out of our sight.

I have seen similar albeit less egregious examples in many undeveloped places in the world. Adolescent humans, especially males, are amoral at best. Without proper socialization, supervision, and reinforcement, they are dangerous, undisciplined, and vicious predators. More than that, Grossman claimed in his first book that almost every country in the world was experiencing a surge in violence – especially among teenagers – that was fueled entirely by those evil video games. Wrong. His earnest assertions notwithstanding, even in the 90s, despite high profile events like Columbine, violent crime was – and continued – declining in most developed countries. That is still true today. No matter how realistic the graphics, video games do not cause people to kill. Remember, Grossman also claims that first-person “shooter games” are so dangerous to a young person’s psyche because they virtually replicate the military’s insidious “Pavlovian conditioning.” That is news to me. I have personally trained hundreds of soldiers in shooting and other combat skills. I have routinely applied realistic practical application drills and repetition but I have never used – or seen anyone else use – any “brainwashing” techniques. My mission was to train soldiers not psychos. Grossman knows better and his insinuation about military – and police – training is inaccurate, insulting, and dangerous.

If bellowing out “To Kill, Drill Sergeant” when the NCO in the Round Brown asks “What’s the spirit of the bayonet” during bayonet drills is all it takes to suppress this supposedly deeply ingrained aversion to killing, I would suggest that is further evidence that it was not much of an inhibition in the first place. The American people need not worry. Military training is not going to turn little Jonny and Sally into psychologically damaged killing machines. I have already given this guy more oxygen than I would prefer. But it irks me personally and professionally that these books are still on so many reading lists and taken by some as gospel. I could continue to deconstruct his writings point by point. Many of his other dubious claims – presented as facts – are easily refuted, as are the cherry-picked anecdotal vignettes he provides as “evidence” to support his arguments. However, there are a number of other sources online who already do that debunking in more detail for those interested. Are there any “truths” in his books at all? Sure, there are kernels of valid insight here and there – mostly repeated from earlier writers. But those nuggets are buried deep in the BS that I already described. In my opinion, they are not worth digging out of the surrounding crap.

Since I always try to do my due diligent research for these articles, I did something I never intended to do. I bought Grossman’s “On Killing” and “On Combat” so I could refresh my memory. I looked at them and they were as grossly misleading as I remembered. Now, because I am loath to put them in my bookshelf with better books, I have them sitting on my desk and they annoy me. As a matter of principle, I do not believe in banning or burning books. Nor, in good conscience, could I pass these to someone else. However, if I ever have an emergency and need to start a fire, I will not hesitate to sacrifice these books as tinder for that fire. I do not think that would subtract anything significant from the sum total of humanities’ knowledge. It is probably the most utility I can expect to get from them. I trust that I have explained in sufficient detail why I would never recommend any of Grossman’s books for professional development. Still, I am not trying to make it my business to tell people what to read or not read. Consequently, I intend for this “public service warning” to serve only to more fully inform potential future readers of Grossman’s books.

Now, let us wade out of the swamp and back onto the trail. I would like to more directly address the subject of starting fires. I use fire as a tool a lot here on the Homestead. There is rarely a week that goes by that I am not starting one to burn debris. Just before my trip to Portland, we had an ice storm here. The ice brought down several trees and big branches all over my property. I have already cleared some of the stuff that was in the way, but it will be late in the summer before I get everything cleaned up. Once I get it chainsawed down to a size I can move, I carry or drag it all into an open area to burn. I prefer not to use accelerants like gasoline or fancy fire-starting techniques. I find that a crumpled local newspaper and a Bic lighter gets the job done just fine. I have been trained on a lot of methods to start a fire. I exercise some of those skills – like using flint and steel – from time to time to stay in practice but use the more expedient modern methods to get real work done.

Starting a fire with flint and steel is a neat trick of the trade. It is common practice in survival training to start by introducing this technique first. If I am giving a class, I do the same. It is a confidence builder because the student is rightly impressed that two inherently non-flammable items can produce sparks when struck together. Of course, a spark only lasts a split second – not long enough to actually start a fire. Therefore, it is necessary to capture those sparks on intermediate material like charcloth to produce an ember that will last longer. The ember is transferred to a loose tinder bundle, – a birds’ nest works well – the instructor blows gently into the bundle to introduce more oxygen, and the nest bursts into flames! The flaming nest is transferred under some pre-arranged dry kindling and voila, a fire has been started. There are countless videos on YouTube demonstrating how to use flint and steel and other “primitive” fire starting methods. Of course, in real-life survival situations, flint and steel is sort of the throwaway course of action. Traditional flint and steel are not included in any military survival kits and only someone with training who intentionally wants to go “old school” would even consider those items for everyday carry vice matches or a lighter.

It is probably obvious by now where I am going with this. I truly appreciate the art of making real fire, but I am much more fascinated by the more challenging process of “lighting a fire” in a soldier’s head and heart that eventually – with luck – turns a follower into a leader. I am not talking about motivating a soldier to get the assigned task of the day accomplished. That is different. It is considerably easier to get someone to DO something than it is to get someone to BE something new, i.e., becoming a leader themselves. After Portland, I started giving it some serious thought. At first, it seemed logical to me that starting a fire in the way I described above was directly analogous to inspiring an individual to lead. The premise seemed straightforward enough. An experienced leader provides a spark, magically the spark becomes the ember, the ember becomes a flame, and a new leader is produced. However, the more I thought about my own experiences, the more I realized that I had never seen it work exactly that way. First, a proverbial spark or two from one leader is not enough. Soldiers are not necessarily predisposed to be fire-ready charcloth, tinder, or kindling. Nor, can they simply internalize a spark by osmosis, self-generate an ember, then a flame, without additional outside heat and pressure being applied.

It eventually came to me that a more accurate analogy is that soldiers are like lumps of coal. I grew up with coal fires. Most people reading this probably never used coal to heat their homes or cook their food like we did when I was young. Even before electricity and natural gas were available options for heating, coal was only accessible in certain limited areas of the country – like the hills of Eastern Kentucky. Therefore, most people alive today have only experience with burning wood in their fireplaces – if at all. Coal is funny stuff. It is not easily combustible. Sparks could shower on it all day and nothing happens. You can hold the flame of your trusty Bic on a piece of coal until your hand gets tired and it still does not light. It takes more direct heat for a longer period of time. So, to burn coal, one has to start a hot wood fire first and only then throw in a couple lumps of coal. Once the coal ignites there is no need for additional wood unless the ashes go cold and you have to start over. The coal burns hotter than wood and is not consumed as fast so the fire does not have to be refueled as often. If you have used charcoal briquettes that are not pre-infused with lighter fluid in your grill you might have some idea how hard it is to work with coal. In other words, one does not start a fire with coal. The fire has to come first.

That means that a leader cannot get by just producing sparks, embers, or small flames. A leader has to have a full-on leadership coal fire in his or her belly first. A leader, in direct proximity, has to provide enough heat and pressure to get a subordinate lump of coal (soldier) to ignite and burn independently. It takes time and probably multiple leaders reinforcing the process to make it happen. It is not easy. At least, when lighting an actual fire, one has the benefit of real-time feedback. Sparks, embers, and flames are visible. You can tell immediately if you are producing the results you want or not during every stage of the process. Not so with a leadership fire. Even the best new soldiers are only at entry-level and are still figuring out how to do their individual jobs right. It takes weeks or months – maybe years – for them to recognize, absorb, and internalize, more complicated leader skills.

We often talk about teaching, coaching, and mentoring, in the military almost in one breath. We practically say it as one word “teachcoachmentor” as if the three are interchangeable leader tasks. They are not. I may discuss them in greater detail at a later time. For now, suffice to say that I think of teach and coach as a mostly “push” process. The teacher or coach has knowledge that he or she is pushing down to the students and the student is generally in the receive mode. Mentoring is more of a “pull” process, with the person being mentored pulling the specific information they need from the mentor. I have found that tactical level leaders are fairly effective at providing push (teaching and coaching style) support, training, and guidance to their subordinates. Mentoring, not so much. Additionally, a subordinate may or may not be comfortable trying to reverse the normal dynamic and take the lead to pull information from his supervisor. That is why I recommend soldiers seek to find mentors outside their chain of command. There is just too much baggage between a soldier and his immediate leadership to overcome.

That is also why command directives for supervisors to “professionally develop” their subordinates by mentoring them on a strict schedule never produce the desired positive results. Not to mention the inevitable follow-on tracking and reporting requirements. Real mentoring is not something that can be top driven or one size fits all. Besides, no matter how hot they are, Battalion Commanders and leaders at Brigade and higher are just too far away for their heat to reach the individual lumps of coal (paratroopers) on Ardennes Street. Too far away to pass on that leadership fire. It is Sergeant’s business. It is Company Grade Officer’s business. It has to be done by hand on an individual basis. That does not mean that senior leaders do not have a role. One thing that all leaders can do is set the right example. Remember that a leader is always on parade. Be the best possible role model you can be for your subordinates. Do not try to be nice and avoid being a dick. Make an honest effort to earn respect. Do it right. You are being watched.

In fact, reflecting on my experience, I realize that I got my fire by watching leaders I respected and had the privilege of getting close to over many years. I observed intently their daily successes – and occasional failures – as they strove to achieve mastery of the art and science of war and displayed sincere dedication to principled leadership. I followed in their footsteps as best I could and hopefully provided enough heat of my own to light other fires and pass the torch of leadership successfully to those that followed me. That is the point of this article, and that was the intent of the colloquium. We will not really know if any of our efforts worked until sometime in the future when those E-4s become NCOs and we find out if the fire in their bellies is hot enough to ignite the generation of EOD Airmen coming on their heels. That is when we will have our Tom Hanks happy moment and know that we have done our part to perpetuate a fire that endures.

De Oppresso Liber!

LTC Terry Baldwin, US Army (Ret) served on active duty from 1975-2011 in various Infantry and Special Forces assignments. SSD is blessed to have him as both reader and contributor.